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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to compensate for the defects in the forms of conceptualism which John 
McDowell (1994a) and Bill Brewer (1999) hold: it does this by analysing the conceptual 
structure of the content of experience using colour experience as the central case.  
First, the root of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism, as I shall 
argue, is the different notions of concept and experience used by the two sides. The non-
conceptualists’ notion of a concept, or conceptual capacity, has been defined very 
narrowly, satisfying very restricted conditions, whereas their notion of experience is 
much wider and more flexible, ranging from a subpersonal state to a personal level. By 
contrast, conceptualists are quite open to broad notions of a concept, or conceptual 
capacity, but seem to define the content of experience as belonging only to the personal 
level. 
Second, in order to build a bridge between these two different notions of both concept 
and experience respectively, I will argue that three major types of conceptual capacities 
can operate in experience. I call this ‘conceptual engagement’. I then suggest that we 
need to consider two perspectives on colour experience: namely, the functional and the 
expository. The former concerns ‘how experience physically works’, whereas the latter 
concerns “what experience has.” Both perspectives will prove useful for explaining 
perceptual content at the sub-personal and personal level. This distinction is required 
because what we call the ‘content’ of experience does not belong to just one particular 
stage of experience. 
Last, as a final supplementation of previous conceptualism, I will consider the 
discrimination abilities involved in perception as being themselves a type of conceptual 
capacity. At this point, I will adopt the notion of receptivity as used by McDowell 
(1994a), but deny that a conceptualist is committed to spontaneity being involved in 
receptivity. I will further propose that understanding discriminative abilities as 
perceptual receptivity could prepare the ground for taking over perceptual contents into 
the contents of thought. I will argue that perception could be passive and conceptual, 
hence separate from spontaneity.    
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Introduction 
 
I look out of the window and I see white clouds under the blue sky. I also see the glow 
of autumn leaves. I experience the coloured world outside the grey window frame. I also 
experience the late autumn of 2014.  
Whilst looking out of the window, I receive varied colour information about the world 
that I see and distinguish, that is to say, I experience the coloured world through my 
vision. However, my experience beyond the window obviously does not only embody 
the response of my visual cells to the world. 
 
What information do I get from my visual senses? What does the world that I see look 
like ―as opposed to what I judge it to be like? The substance of these questions may be 
revealed by considering the well-known debate between Fodor (1984; 1988) and 
Churchland (1988) about informational encapsulation of perception. Fodor believes that 
the empirical evidence shows that perceptual systems are encapsulated and formulates 
the hypothesis of modularity. Informational encapsulation means that they provide 
information for the cognitive system but they are unaffected in their operation by any 
information held in the cognitive system. Perceptual input systems delivered to brains 
such as neuro signaling are separated from our cognitive system, so perceptual 
information is encapsulated from our cognitive capacity.       
  
What Fodor argues is that our perceptual input system is entirely independent of our 
previous knowledge or experience in the process of delivering the visual information to 
our brains. Moreover, it is impregnable to higher cognitive states such as desires, beliefs, 
expectations, etc. even though perception sometimes allows access to some background 
knowledge (Cf. Raftopolous 2009: 269-271). That is, perception is informationally 
isolated from our cognitive capacities. For example, when we know that we are 
experiencing an illusion and thus form the belief that things are not as they seem, our 
belief does not banish the illusion. 
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Fodor, however, argues that observation is theory-neutral because “two organisms with 
the same sensory/psychology will quite generally observe the same things, and hence 
arrive at the same observational beliefs, however much their theoretical commitments 
may differ” (Fodor 1984: 120). In this respect, Fodor believes that perception seems to 
be a different type of process from a cognitive process whilst conceding that observation 
could be a type of cognitive process.1  
By contrast, Churchland (1988) argues that perception is not isolated since cognitive 
states could affect perception. Observation involves top-down processes and there is a 
substantial amount of information in the perceptual stage of vision that is obviously 
bottom-up and theory-neutral. One reason for this is that although there could be some 
perceptual information such as purely given sensation, this is quite useless in that it 
cannot be used for any “discursive judgment” (Raftopolous 2009: 271) because a mental 
state with such information is not a semantically contentful state. Raftopolous argues 
that only observational judgments are semantically contentful states because they have a 
content, which can be considered as an outcome of a conceptual framework.2	  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This does not mean that Fodor concedes the relativistic theories of philosophy of 
science saying that observation is theory-dependent. Rather, he believes that perceptual 
analysis has access to our previous knowledge or theories that are relevant to processed 
perceptual information, not just to the theory that is inherent in the system (Cf. 
Raftopoulos 2009: 269-270).  
2 However, Raftopoulos (2009) argues that both Fodor and Churchland are wrong 
because vision is neither fully encapsulated nor fully theory-laden. But he seems to be 
more closely Fodorian because the perceptual states on which observations are based 
result from entirely bottom-up processing. Perceptual learning, for instance, is no 
argument for theory-ladenness because it entails only data-driven changes. Perceptual 
states do not seem to be independent of a subject’s experiences, but they are independent 
of her theory. Therefore it is possible that we can see others perceptions without 
knowing their theory. This idea has an obvious outcome for the anti-realist position on 
science, which is supposed to follow from the theory-ladenness of perception. This will 
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interesting point in both Fodor and Churchland is that perception involves any kind of 
content, but their concepts of content are different. According to Fodor’s concept of 
content, such as information, the notion of perceptual content is defined widely. By 
contrast, if we would take only Churchland’s notion of perception, namely semantically 
contentful states, then cognitive states, e.g., personal level experience, could have 
perceptual content.  
The important point is that these arguments all seem to be closely related to what we 
normally call ‘content of perceptual experience’. We know that we may not have a 
perceptual experience without a perceptual system. If this is right, then what do we 
experience when we perceive something? What does ‘perceptual experience’ really 
mean? For instance, when we have a visual experience of a scarlet rose, the content of 
experience may be described in various ways that we know, such as a red flower, 18-
1658 TPX of the Pantone colour list, this scarlet, that rose, and so on. Which of these, if 
any, captures the visual experience as it is for the subject? These are all questions about 
the content of perceptual colour experience.   
There are two different views about the content of experience, assuming that experience 
has content. One is that the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, whilst the 
other is that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. In general, the 
theory that the content of perceptual experience is entirely conceptual, like the content of 
a propositional attitude or belief, is called ‘conceptualism’. The idea that the content of 
perceptual experience could be non-conceptual is called ‘non-conceptualism’.  
Conceptualists, particularly McDowell (1994a) and Brewer (1999), claim that the 
content of perceptual experience must be conceptual in order to be a reason for a belief, 
e.g. my visual experience of the white clouds is the reason for my belief that there are 
white clouds outside the window only because both experience and belief involve the 
concept cloud. Non-conceptualists deny this for several reasons. Among them, I will 
focus on the following non-conceptualist arguments, because, not only do they show that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be more discussed in chapter IV.  
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most non-conceptualists have very different notions3 of concepts and experience from 
conceptualists, but they also highlight the traditional conceptualists’ preoccupation with 
the operation of conceptual capacities, even in passive perceptual mechanisms. Through 
examining these arguments for the contents of colour experience and rebutting them, I 
will defend the key idea of conceptualism, but also argue for the need to modify it in 
certain ways.  
The following are the non-conceptualist arguments from the contemporary and scientific 
literature that I will examine:   
1. Conceptually unsophisticated creatures such as animals and human infants can 
enjoy a perceptual experience, seemingly without possessing or entertaining 
concepts in the same way as human beings (Peacocke 1983 and 2001; Hurley 
1998). 
2. The content of experience, in particular colour experience, can be defined by its 
physical cause and the perceiver’s visual mechanism (Tye 2000; Byrne and Hilbert 
2004) independently of the perceiver’s possession of concepts.  
3. There could be non-conceptual contents at the early visual stage that are 
cognitively impenetrable (Marr 1982; Pylyshyn 1999; Lamme 2003 and 2004; 
Raftopoulos and Müller 2006; and Raftopoulos 2009).   
4. We can see more shades of colours than we have concepts of colours (Evans 
1982). 
My discussion of these objections will indicate that non-conceptualists wrongly hold that 
the content of experience refers to a particular stage of experience. I will argue that 
content, rather, is the product of the processing of all the stages of experience. As such, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I will claim neither that the conceptualists’ perspectives on concept and experience are 
entirely right nor that the non-conceptualists’ perspectives are entirely wrong. Rather, 
this study is intended to show (1) that the debate between conceptualism and non-
conceptualism starts from these different perspectives of concept and experience and (2) 
that we need to consider the two perspectives on experience in order to satisfy both 
conceptualists’ and non-conceptualists’ perspectives on concept and experience.    
18	  
	  
will argue that there could be a certain type of conceptual engagement, which should be 
one of three major types of conceptual capacities that conceptualists propose, in the 
processes of colour experience. Hence, I suggest that the non-conceptualists have to 
consider whether they have overlooked the possibility of conceptual engagement within 
stages.   
As well as discussing the above non-conceptualist arguments, I will also consider 
whether traditional conceptualism provides an adequate response to them. I start by 
looking at three major types of conceptual capacities in experience through briefly 
examining McDowell’s and Brewer’s idea of conceptualism. I then suggest that the 
conceptual character of experience has to be considered in terms of the two perspectives 
on experience: the functional and the expository. Distinguishing between the two 
perspectives may help to build a bridge between two camps.  
The reason for considering the two perspectives on experience is that not only do many 
non-conceptualists have a particular tendency to believe that an enabling condition of 
perception defines the content of experience (or, they believe that non-conceptual 
contents could exist at a particular stage of perception), they also understand the 
possibility of perception as something different from having an experience. Due to this 
tendency, it is important to point out there are two perspectives on experience that we 
need to consider in evaluating questions of conceptual character of experience. I will 
investigate how the conceptual character of experience could be confirmed by 
considering the two perspectives on experience.  
As such, the main focus of this dissertation is on how the content of perceptual 
experience is constituted, how we can consciously access it, and why we need to 
consider the two perspectives in order to access the content of each stage of perceptual 
experience. This will raise two key questions: (1) whether the content of our perceptual 
experience is entirely conceptual in the two different perspectives on perceptual 
experience, and (2) how conceptual capacities work to constitute and to engage the 
contents of colour experience, and particularly whether perceptual content could be 
utilised in the content of thought by using perceptual demonstratives.  
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After examining these two issues, this study proposes that we need to consider whether 
discriminative abilities are a conceptual capacity which could produce conceptual 
thoughts about that perception. This is the main difference between the existing theory 
of conceptualism and the improved conceptualism that I want to develop.  
This thesis is not intended to offer an escape route to the philosopher who wanders alone 
in the dark maze of the dispute between the conceptualist and the non-conceptualist, 
rather it aims to offer a small torch that allows us to identify the non-conceptualist’s trap 
that we must avoid in the maze. 
This thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter I begins by briefly examining the relationship between perceptual contents and 
the conceptual character of experience. In so doing, it focuses on the common 
assumptions involved in the traditional conceptualist’s view of contents, concepts, and 
experience. This chapter firstly considers what a perceptual content is on the traditional 
picture of conceptualism. Secondly, this chapter argues that philosophers are led to non-
conceptualism when they define ‘concept’ too narrowly, specifically, having it depend 
on a particular condition, whilst adopting a very wide notion of experience. This, I 
suggest, is the main reason for the conflict between conceptualism and non-
conceptualism. For an effective resolution to the conflict, this chapter considers three 
types of conceptual capacities suggested by the conceptualists, particularly McDowell 
and Brewer, because it seems that the claim ‘content of experience is conceptual’ does 
not mean that perceptual content is conceptual, rather it basically means that perceptual 
content may be engaged with any of the three types of conceptualities. I call this ‘the 
conceptual engagement’. This chapter then explores two types of perspective on 
experience.   
Chapters II to IV investigates whether the new approach to the non-conceptualists’ 
arguments is compatible with the two perspectives on experience.   
Chapter II critically examines an argument that there could be a non-conceptual content 
of experience if it is true that conceptually unsophisticated creatures like animals or 
human infants can enjoy perceptual experience. This type of argument, which shares a 
similar idea with the non-conceptualism that Peacocke (1983 and 2001), Hurley (1998) 
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and, particularly, Bermùdez (1995 and 1998) defend, is strongly dependent on empirical 
results from physiology, neuro-physiology and comparative psychology, and suggests 
that there is strong evidence that such creatures have perceptual contents without 
possessing concepts that adult humans have. If this is true, then it provides strong 
practical examples of non-conceptualism. This chapter argues that the proponents of this 
type of non-conceptualism seem to believe that a content of experience is a mere 
physical reaction to objects. This may lead us into the trap of treating an enabling 
condition of perception as a condition that constitutes the content of experience. This 
study points out that we have to distinguish between an enabling condition for 
perception and a condition for constituting the content of experience. The distinction of 
the two perspectives on experience will help us to see why an enabling condition for 
perception may not show what is in the conceptually unsophisticated creatures’ 
perceptual states.       
In connection with Chapter II, Chapter III considers colour physicalism, which is one of 
the most popular theories of colour in recent years. Some physicalists, Byrne and Hilbert 
(1997 and 2003) in particular, believe that colour experience is necessarily related to the 
physical properties of a coloured object, and that the content of colour experience can be 
explained in physical terms. This account might prompt two claims. The first is that 
colours are mind-independent properties of material objects. The second is that the 
content of colour experience is determined by physical causes. If these are right, then 
they might support non-conceptualism as well as the non-conceptualist’s claim that we 
will examine in Chapter II. While the non-conceptualists considered in Chapter II treat 
an enabling condition for perception as a condition for constituting the contents of 
experience, and attempt to confirm the non-conceptual character of experience through a 
non-human creature’s perception of colour constancy, the colour physicalists we turn to 
in Chapter III try to apply the same method to the content of human experiences. If this 
attempt is successful, then it provides even more weight to the non-conceptualist’s 
position. This chapter critically examines this idea, along with the example of ‘colour 
variation’.  
Following on from the discussion in Chapters II and III, Chapter IV begins by 
examining the notion of non-conceptual character of experience in the work of recent 
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philosophers and psychologists, namely Dretske (1981), Marr (1982), Block (1995), 
Pylyshyn (1999), Lamme (2003 and 2004), Raftopoulos and Müller (2006), and 
Raftopoulos (2009), who hold that we need to divide perceptual experience into two 
different stages in order to prove the non-conceptual content of experience.  
The first stage, which they call ‘the early visual system’, is correlated with an enabling 
condition of perception, which would be shown when we take the ‘the functional 
perspective’ on experience; and the second stage, what they call ‘late vision’, where the 
subject of perception is able to identify the object of perception, i.e., the perceptual 
information obtained by the early visual system, is related to what I call ‘the expository 
perspective’ on experience.  
According to them (especially, Raftopoulos and Müller 2006), if a perceptual state or an 
experience has contents provided by a subject’s visual (mechanical) system, which 
cannot be cognitively penetrated, then that state or experience has non-conceptual 
content. However, if the content of a state or an experience is provided by a system that 
is cognitively penetrable, then that state or experience has conceptual content. So, the 
presence or absence of cognitive penetration determines which of these two stages a 
content falls into and serves as a criterion of the conceptual content and the non-
conceptual content of experience. 
The reason for taking the above philosophers’ accounts into the discussion of this thesis 
is to clarify that it is which part of the visual stage the philosopher thinks (primarily) 
constitutes the perceptual experience. As such, the distinction of these two stages also 
shows why we should consider the two perspectives on experience. 
By examining the arguments of these philosophers (especially Raftopolous’s 2006 and 
2009), this chapter shows that they fail to prove the non-conceptual content of 
experience. It then becomes clear how information obtained by vision (including a 
subpersonal state) can be conceptualized in personal level of experience through this 
distinction. In addition, this difference leads to the issue of whether the contents in an 
early visual system really could exist, or at least how we can prove their existence 
without any conceptual engagement.  
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Chapter V more clearly identifies the fundamental component of non-conceptualism by 
examining the fineness of grain argument and demonstrative concepts. I will mainly 
discuss the three objections to the demonstrative concept approach that non-
conceptualists give, such as the problems of indeterminacy, the conditions for possessing 
demonstrative concepts, and the causal relationship between the use of perceptual 
demonstratives and experience. In particular, we will look at the contributions of 
Peacocke (1998a and 1998b), Kelly (2001a and 2001b), and Heck (2000). We will then 
consider the discriminative ability involved in perception as a conceptual capacity. The 
result of this chapter is to propose the key idea of my own ‘improved conceptualism’, 
which is that perception could provide inferential thoughts, even though it activates 
without any conceptual engagement, so that we may access the content of perception 
conceptually. This is the key claim of the version of conceptualism that this thesis 
defends.      
The concluding chapter consists of two parts: (1) a summary of the conclusion of each 
chapter, and, (2) an additional explanation of why the content of experience could be 
constituted conceptually even though there is no conceptual engagement when 
perception happens, using the two examples suggested by Crane (1992) and Heck (2000).  
In (1), I reiterate the problem of non-conceptualism and restate the basic idea of 
advanced conceptualism.  
In (2), this study briefly considers the examples of ‘the waterfall illusion’ (Crane 1992) 
and ‘a stick in water’ (Heck 2000).  
Both suggest that perception could happen without any conceptual engagement, but 
agree that a conceptual capacity is required to form a belief. If so, it is fully possible that 
there could be perceptual content that is not engaged with any type of conceptual 
capacity, but we are able to form a perception-based belief even though it is not 
conceptually engaged. Hence it is possible that the contents of our beliefs could be 
different from the contents of perception, i.e., there could be perceptual contents that 
cannot serve as reasons for perceptual belief. However, this fact implies neither the non-
conceptual content of experience nor the impossibility of conceptual engagement. Rather, 
we could have inferential thought elicited from perceptual discrimination separately 
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from perceptual belief at the same time. Therefore, there could be a possibility that 
perceptual contents can be grasped by a subject’s possession of a concept in inferential 
thought.  
This dissertation tries to show that this type of conceptualism is successful in confirming 
the conceptual character of colour experience; that it could build a bridge between 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism; and finally that it may play an important role in 
future research regarding the various perceptual experiences that are not considered here.    
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Chapter I. Experience and its Content 
 
We know what we experience when we undergo that experience. Knowing what we 
experience roughly means that we know what is conveyed to us by experience, viz. we 
know the contents of experience. Talk about what we experience is thus understood as 
talk about the contents of experience. This chapter mainly focuses on the debate between 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism about the content of experience. The basic idea of 
conceptualism is that content of experience must be conceptual, and that this is so in 
order to be a reason for belief (McDowell 1994a; Brewer 1999). Non-conceptualists 
deny this.  
Both camps basically agree with the representational view of experience4 which states 
that the content of a mental state is the way it represents the world as being (Cf. Toribio 
2007: 445; Nes 2011: 11). Conceptualists such as McDowell and Brewer maintain that 
the way a subject represents the world must be specified using her possession of 
concepts, while non-conceptualists such as Peacocke, Heck, and Crane, claim that there 
are ways of representing the world without deploying, or entertaining, any concepts that 
the subject possesses. Because of this, the non-conceptualist claims that the content of 
experience is not entirely conceptual, and that it is hard to see how perceptual content 
can be a reason for belief.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Many philosophers, particularly those who advocate non-conceptualism, raise a 
question about how conceptualism plays out in the relational view of experience or in 
naïve realism, according to which veridical perceptual experience immediately acquaints 
subjects with aspects of mind-independent reality. They state (Cf. Campbell 2002, Fish 
2009, Schellenberg 2011 and Speaks 2015) that no conceptualist gives an adequate 
treatment of problems raised by these views. They believe that conceptualism is only 
applicable to the representational view of experience, and to the personal level of 
experience. I acknowledge this point, but this is not germane to the subject of this thesis. 
So, I do not argue for the relational view of experience.    
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The main reason for the debate between the two camps, I suspect, is that they are using 
different notions of concept and experience. Although most conceptualists are open to 
the notion of a concept encompassing a contextual aspect, they define experience only as 
the product of all the stages of experience. Non-conceptualists, by contrast, have a 
tendency to define concepts very narrowly, but their notion of experience is wider (from 
the subpersonal to the personal level) than the conceptualists. This thesis will not argue 
in any depth for one of the alternative notions over the other; rather it will try to satisfy 
both camps’ demands of the conceptual character and non-conceptual character of 
experience derived from their different notions of concepts and experience. 
For this reason, I will first examine why the conceptualists think that the content of 
experience is wholly conceptual. I will argue that there can be three major types of 
conceptual capacities that could be engaged with perceptual content in the conceptualists’ 
theory of perception.  
 
Second, this chapter suggests that there are two perspectives on experience that we have 
to consider in evaluating the conceptual character of experience. These are the functional 
perspective and the expository perspective. The former concerns ‘how it works’, 
whereas the latter concerns ‘what it has’. This distinction does three things. First, it helps 
us to see what motivates conceptualism or non-conceptualism; second, it builds a bridge 
between conceptualism and non-conceptualism; and third, it prepares the ground for the 
main claim of this thesis, namely that there could be conceptual engagement in every 
level of experience  
I can now put my cards on the table. First, I accept so called ‘state non-conceptualism’ 
according to which perception could occur without any exercise of conceptual capacities: 
for example, both human and non-linguistic animals can enjoy perceptual experience 
without deploying or entertaining any concepts at all (Peacocke, Hurley, and Bermùdez 
et al.). Perception is fundamentally dependent on perceptual mechanisms rather than a 
perceiver’s conceptual capacity, hence the representational contents of perception could 
be independent from a perceiver’s conceptual capacities. As such, there could be non-
conceptual character within perception. Nevertheless, subjects are able to consciously 
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access perceptual contents. 5  
Second, in order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience, we must be able to 
access to the contents of experience: we may know that an animal has a perceptual 
experience without knowing what it experiences. That is to say, we can evaluate whether 
the content of experience is conceptual only if we are able to access the representational 
content of experience. Not only does this accessibility confirm the existence of 
perceptual content but it also shows how a subject could engage with perceptual 
information obtained by perceptual mechanisms using concepts that the subject 
possesses. Hence this accessibility implies a possibility of conceptual engagement in the 
whole process of experience. In order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience 
then, we should do two things: first we should acknowledge that perceptual contents 
must exist in the perceiver’s experience; and second, that the confirmation of the 
existence of perceptual content is possible only if a perceiver is able to consciously 
access it.  
On this basis, I would expect that we would see conceptual engagement in the process of 
evaluating the conceptual character of experience. From this, I advance a position that 
motivates conceptualism, namely that the content of perceptual experience, and even 
perception, could be affected by conceptual capacities, even though existing versions of 
conceptualism allow for the non-conceptual character of perception.  
The main discussion of this chapter lays the groundwork for a type of conceptualism that 
has not previously been considered by McDowell and Brewer.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This idea is suggested by Ned Block (1995). He divides consciousness into two types: 
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is 
what we call experience, that is “the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it 
is like to be in that state” (Block 1995: 227). In contrast, A-consciousness is kind of 
“availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action” (ibid). I 
consider these two types of consciousness in order to develop the idea of conceptual 
engagement in explaining personal level of experience.  
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I-1. Why is the Content of Experience Conceptual? 
  
The claim that experience has conceptual content is intimately related to 
representationalism according to which experience has a certain sort of representational 
content, i.e. content that represents the world as being a certain way.6 The question of 
whether experience has conceptual content of experience is thus the question of whether 
or not its representational content is conceptual. 7  The main reason for holding 
conceptualism about the representational content of experience is that perceptual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Shoemaker presents the following account. He says, “[…] the ways are simply 
properties things appear to us to have. Appearing a certain way is (it is natural to 
suppose) appearing to be a certain way, and being a certain way is having a certain 
property” (2006: 461). On this view, the representational content of experience entails 
that perceived objects have certain properties. Shoemaker (2000 and 2006) calls this 
representation of appearance (phenomenal) properties.    
7 However, philosophers who hold austere relationalism or naïve realism, such as 
Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), Brewer (2006), Fish (2009), et al., do not agree with 
the representational view of experience (Cf. Schellenberg 2011). According to them, the 
content of experience is not representational, rather it is a type of relation between a 
subject’s perceptual state and mind-independent properties of objects. However, I will 
not discuss this view in depth because the relationalist’s view of experience is 
fundamentally not in competition with representationalism; hence most relationalist 
theories of perceptual content apply “only to accounts of perceptual content on which 
perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role” (Schellenberg 2011: 714). It 
thus seems that personal level experience is not considered in the relationalist’s 
argument. Of course, I agree that perception itself is sometimes relational, particularly at 
the occurrence of perception. Yet, what we call experience is both relational and 
representational, i.e., experience involves both features simultaneously. Hence, the 
content of experience is not defined by only one feature of experience, viz. when we 
discuss the content of experience, we have to discuss both features.       
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contents provide reasons for empirical beliefs (McDowell 1994a; Brewer 1999). Indeed, 
the world which is a target of perceptual belief or judgment is the empirical world. 
Perceptual beliefs about the empirical world are formed by the contents of our 
experience of the world. There are two main related arguments on this view.   
First, it is argued that perceptual content must match with belief content if we are able to 
believe what we see. On this view, beliefs have conceptual content because what we 
believe is that things are ‘so and so’ and ‘thus and thus’ (Cf. Crane 1992: 6). If 
experience shares the same content with its belief, then experience must be constituted 
by conceptual content. That is to say, if the main reason for forming an empirical belief 
is some empirical content, then experience must have conceptual content because both 
belief and experience have the same content.   
Second, a conceptualist such as John McDowell pays more attention to the relation 
between beliefs and experience rather than just arguing that experience has the same 
content as the beliefs that it produces. McDowell’s conceptualism starts by avoiding the 
problem of ‘the Myth of the Given’ in traditional empiricism raised by Wilfred Sellars. 
Sellars’ diagnosis of the failure of empiricism is that the mere causal impingement of the 
external world upon the senses does not supply justification for beliefs about the world; 
rather only if perceptual experience had a belief-like conceptual structure, could it 
rationally justify such beliefs. McDowell agrees with Sellars that experience has 
conceptual content since that is how it forms a reason-giving relation to thoughts.  
 
I-1.a. The Capacity of Spontaneity	  
McDowell’s elaboration of the above idea is that experience is a joint product of 
‘receptivity’ and ‘spontaneity’, and has rich conceptual content (1994a: 4–5 and 7–10). 
McDowell argues that “when we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on in 
receptivity, not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity” (1994a: 
10). McDowell's point is that concepts do not merely impose a top-down constraint on 
the range of permissible perceptual contents; rather, they are intimately involved in the 
production of those contents. That is to say, we should not believe that a non-conceptual 
content presents first in experience, that conceptual capacities are then exercised on it, 
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and that, finally, an empirical thought (or an empirical belief) is obtained. Instead, we 
should think that conceptual capacities are actualized in experience―in other words, 
spontaneity is actualized in receptivity―and it is this “co-operation between spontaneity 
and receptivity” (1994a: 9) which shapes the content of empirical thought. Therefore, 
the content of experience is not obtained by sensible intuitions only as operations of 
receptivity, but is also structured by conceptual capacities as operations of spontaneity. 
On this, McDowell is influenced by Kant and says that “if the receptivity of our mind, 
its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be 
entitled sensibility, then the mind’s power of producing representations from itself, the 
spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding” (1994a: 4 and footnote 3). 
McDowell develops Kantian idea of sensible intuition and understanding in order to 
redefine a notion of experience: he says that our intuition is sensible and contains only 
the mode in which we are affected by objects, on the other hand, it is the understanding 
which enables us to think of the object of the sensible intuition. Neither of them comes 
before the other, rather we should think that “without sensibility no object would be 
given to us, without understanding no object would be thought” (McDowell 1994a: 5). 
Using a famous Kantian slogan, ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind.’ In McDowell’s words:  
 
“The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity. […] It is not that 
they are exercised on an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state 
that already has conceptual content.” (1994a: 9) 
 
Experience thus involves the spontaneity of knowledge and does not merely passively 
occur. Here, ‘spontaneity’ can be simply a label for “the involvement of conceptual 
capacities” (McDowell 1994a: 9) that conceptualises or categorizes an empirical object. 
Therefore, what McDowell calls experience involves both receptivity as the capacity of 
receiving sensual intuition, and spontaneity that enables us to know an object obtained 
by sensible intuition. Our mind could have an empirical relationship with the world, 
therefore we are able to have content in our experience. This notion of experience could 
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avoid the problem of myth of the Given. I adopt this idea and would like to name it, 
‘Type-1 conceptual capacity’ (the capacity of spontaneity).  
● Type-1 Conceptual Capacity: A conceptual capacity such as 
spontaneity operated in perception, i.e., there is a conceptual 
engagement at the occurrence of perception. So the content of 
experience can be conceptual.  
As such, Type-1 conceptual capacity could be operated only in conscious experience 
only where an empirical object could be conceptualized or categorized. 
I-1.b. The Capacity of Understanding the Relation Between Perception and Belief. 
Brewer, a conceptualist, also argues that “sense experiential states provide reasons for 
empirical beliefs” (Brewer 2005: 217). He argues that “a person has such a reason for 
believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in 
some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state” (2005: 218). In 
other words, we can make sense of an experience being a subject’s reason for believing 
something about the world only if there are conceptual relations between the experience 
and the belief (Brewer 1999:149-152; See also. McDowell 1994a: 7-9). Thus, he claims 
that if perceptual states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have 
conceptual content. Both McDowell and Brewer believe that concepts mediate the 
relationship between minds and the world. We are able to think about the relationship 
between perception and belief. For this, there must be a conceptual content that enables 
us to think about such a relationship. I call this capacity ‘Type-2 conceptual capacity’ 
(the capacity of understanding relational structure of perception and belief). 
● Type-2 Conceptual Capacity: There is an epistemic relationship between 
perception and belief that allows us to make sense of how our thinking 
bears on the empirical world. We are able to think of this relationship, 
and this is possible because perception has conceptual content. As such, 
Type-2 conceptual capacity operates only if perception has conceptual 
content.      
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While Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) is the conceptualist’s 
characterization of the conceptual capacity involved in perception, Type-2 conceptual 
capacities operate only when we can conceive of the content of experience. That is to 
say, if it is clear that an experience has content, e.g. white clouds, and we can form a 
belief from the experience of white clouds, then we can consider whether my 
experience’s content, namely being of white clouds, justifies my empirical belief about 
white clouds. Here, not only are we able to consider the relation between the content of 
experience and the content of the belief, but also we can think of what there is in both 
the experience and the belief. We can think not merely that this experience justifies that 
belief, but that it does so in virtue of being an experience of white clouds. This is 
possible only if experience has conceptual content. As such, Type-2 conceptual capacity 
requires conceptual content, i.e., we are able to have Type-2 conceptual capacity 
because the content of perception is conceptual. 
I-1.c. The Capacity to Categorise the Object of Perception	  	  
While Type-1 and Type-2 conceptual capacities show the characteristic feature of 
perception, conceptualists such as McDowell and Brewer also focus on a further 
conceptual capacity through which we conceptually access perceptual content in the 
personal level of experience even when Type-1 and Type-2 conceptual capacities are not 
activated. That is, in order to confirm the conceptual character of experience, 
conceptualists regard an ability to use perceptual demonstratives as a conceptual 
capacity. This involves an expansion of the scope of the notion of a concept in order to 
include the conceptual character of perception. Conceptualists have countered the 
argument from Evans (1982), namely the fineness of grain argument, by appealing to 
demonstrative concepts (Brewer 1999: 170-174; McDowell 1994a: 56-60). According to 
them, a subject can make a perceptual judgment such as “that is thus” even if there are 
more fine-grained contents of perceptual experience than her possession of concept 
(Brewer 1999: 172).8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8McDowell seems to give a stronger argument about perceptual demonstratives than 
Brewer. He argues not only that “my visual experience represents something as being of 
that shade” (McDowell 1994a: 57), but also that we may context-dependently explain 
32	  
	  
Our capacity for using perceptual demonstratives is supposed to allow us to pick out 
fine-grained features for which we lack concepts. McDowell argues for this claim using 
the example of colour experience:  
“In the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively transcends one’s 
conceptual powers –an experience that ex hypothesi affords a suitable 
sample– one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as 
fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in 
which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample.” (1994a: 56-57, 
emphasis added) 
I call this the ‘Type-3 conceptual capacity’ (the capacity to categorise the object of 
perception in the personal level of experience):  
● Type-3 Conceptual Capacity: Perceived information such as phenomenal 
properties or characteristic features of objects can be grasped by a perceiver’s 
possession of concepts (including the use of perceptual demonstratives) in 
the personal level of experience. That is to say, the subject of perception is 
able to engage in conceptual thought about the object presented in perception 
using proper concepts that she possesses. 
This capacity is applicable to all features of experience. Thus constructions such as ‘that 
shape’, ‘that shade’, and ‘that volume’ should suffice for both a conceptual 
representation and conceptual expression of the fine-grained detail present in perception. 
Not only is this capacity involved in the use of perceptual demonstratives but also in the 
use of every expression of any content in perception. Type-3 conceptual capacity is 
possible only if a subject of perception possesses a proper concept about what she 
perceives.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the colour experience that cannot be captured by general concepts by using perceptual 
demonstratives. So the use of the perceptual demonstrative could show both Type-1 
conceptual capacity and Type-3 conceptual capacity in McDowell’s view.  
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I-1.d. Conceptual Engagement	  
As such, the existing conceptualists theories of conceptual character of experience could 
be named and summarized as follows: 
● Conceptual Engagement: For any perceptual experience, at least one of the three 
types of conceptual capacities could be engaged; thus we should regard all 
experience as conceptual.   
Hence, the notion of conceptual content used by the conceptualist could be perceptual 
content that is engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities in the processes of 
experience. 
However, the notable point here is that conceptualists do not clarify what perceptual 
content really is, that is to say, they do not either set a standard for being  perceptual 
content or delimit the scope of perceptual experience. Indeed, McDowell argues simply 
that either there is a rational relationship between experience and belief or that 
experience have rich conceptual contents by an operation of spontaneity9 (1994a: 4-5 
and 7-10), rather than giving a clear definition of what perceptual content really is. It 
seems that most conceptualists including McDowell (1994a) and Brewer (1999 and 2006) 
focus on the conceptual character of experience rather than clarifying conceptual 
perceptual content because they believe that the contents of experience are conceptual, 
based on the idea that perceptual contents (if they really exist) must be engaged with the 
three types of conceptual capacities. 
If this is so, what non-conceptualists call ‘non-conceptual content’ must be perceptual 
content which is not engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities. In fact, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In Mind and World, McDowell focuses on ‘receptivity’ alongside ‘spontaneity’ as a 
conceptual capacity involved in experience. Hence, an ability to have experience needs 
both receptivity and spontaneity. McDowell’s notion of experience attempts to solve 
‘how we locate the logical space of reasons’ (suggested by Sellars (1963)) governed by 
spontaneity by postulating experience as an actualization of a conceptual capacity in 
sensory consciousness (1994a and 1998a). 
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of the non-conceptualist arguments to be examined in due course, suggest that such 
conceptual capacities may not be engaged with perceptual contents, e.g., fine-grained 
contents of experience (Evans 1982), non-human creatures’ experience (Peacocke 1998; 
Hurley 1998), the waterfall illusion (Crane 1992), the example of a straight stick in 
water (Heck 2000), etc. Of course, these arguments also do not give us a clear definition 
of perceptual content, however they suggest that the content of experience is sometimes 
not engaged with any of these three conceptual capacities. Or, the non-conceptual 
arguments seem to expand the scope of perceptual content widely in order to find a 
perceptual content that can never be engaged with the conceptual capacities.  
The aim of this chapter is not to give a final definition of perceptual content nor find the 
nature of it, but rather, to postulate a condition for being perceptual content in both the 
conceptualist’s and non-conceptualist’s account. That is, to answer the question ‘what 
can count as a content of experience?’ in order to evaluate the conceptual character of 
experience.  
The next thing we should examine, then, is on what basis non-conceptualists think that 
the content of experience is sometimes not engaged with the three types of conceptual 
capacities.  
 
I-2. What is Non-Conceptual Content? 	  
Experience is simply “a relation between a perceiving subject and perceived objects, 
properties, events, or alternatively an event in which such a relation obtains” 
(Schellenberg 2011: 716). Perceptual content is content that exists within this relation. 
Conceptualists that we have examined so far believe that there can be, at least, one of the 
three types of conceptual capacities engaged within the relation between a perceiving 
subject and a perceived object, while non-conceptualists that we will examine in this 
section believe that there is a perceptual content, which does not engage any type of 
conceptual capacities, in this relation. The important thing is that both conceptualists and 
non-conceptualists 10  agree on the following claim about the relationship between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In fact, non-conceptualism about perceptual experience can be divided into two types: 
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concepts and contents:    
(C) A conceptual content is a content of our thought, such as a belief or 
judgment. Hence a non-conceptual content cannot be a content of thought.11      
The point to note here is that (C) does not entail that non-conceptual content is only in 
unconscious experience. But the interesting point here is that conceptualists treat 
perception as a kind of a thought-form. On the other hand some non-conceptualists, 
particularly Crane (1992) and Heck (2000) think that even conscious perception hardly 
belongs to a thought-form. They have argued that both perception and thoughts 
constitute their contents differently. Therefore, sometimes at least, they do not share the 
same type of content. If the content of an experience is of a different form to the 
thought-content, then it can be non-conceptual content even if we are in a conscious 
state because of (C). This idea is opposed to Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those involving the stronger claim, that (1) a perceptual content is entirely non-
conceptual (Evans 1982; Heck 2000 and 2007), and those involving the weaker claim 
that (2) there can be both conceptual content and non-conceptual content in perceptual 
experience (Particularly Peacocke (1992 and 2001)). Here I do not discuss this 
distinction between these types of non-conceptualism in depth. However, the key issue 
that I want to indicate in both cases is that the existence of content in perceptual 
experience implies the existence of conceptual character of experience.   
11 In the case of Byrne (2005), who defines a weaker sense of the notion of a concept, (C) 
is reasonable. I adopt this idea. Byrne advances a pleonastic definition of concepts, 
stating that a concept F is identical with the fact that a subject can possess the concept F. 
That is to say, “someone possesses the concept F iff she believes that ...F... So, for 
example, someone who believes that Seabiscuit is a horse, or that horses are birds, or 
that all horses are horses, possesses the concept horse” (Byrne 2005: 232). According to 
this definition, a concept is no more than that someone can possess a content of belief 
involving the concept. Further, we should not mix up ‘being able to think about 
something’ with ‘an object of thought’. Note that (C) only denies the latter.  
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spontaneity). On the basis of this, non-conceptualists also usually agree with the 
following two classifications of non-conceptual content (CPC and UPC):12  
CPC (Conscious Perceptual Content): This type of content allows a 
subject to consciously see the world as being the way the content represents 
it to be. Hence, a perceptual content is CPC iff it exists at the personal level. 
Therefore, non-conceptual CPC occurs when the subject of perception is 
able to recognize the content but fails to grasp it with any concept that she 
possesses.  
The fine-grainedness argument (or richness argument as sketched by Dretske 1981, 
Martin 1992, Bermùdez and Macpherson 1999), and first suggested by Evans (1982)) is 
the standard argument in favour of CPC.13 According to proponents of this view, we are 
consciously able to see various and detailed things such as properties or entities in 
perceptual experience. Among these fine-grained things, it appears that some items 
cannot be grasped by concepts that subjects possess, and hence, they might involve non-
conceptual content. Hence, the arguments from the above non-conceptualists who 
advocate CPC type non-conceptual content can be distilled into two points: First, we are 
sometimes not able to grasp fine-grained contents (e.g. Adrianople red, even though we 
may represent the object with the concept red); and second, concept-possession is not 
always required to represent the properties of objects even though we are in a conscious 
state about the properties of an object. These can serve as objections to Type-1 
conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) and Type-3 conceptual capacity that 
categorises the object of perception. However, conceptualists such as McDowell (1994a) 
and Brewer (1999) argue that all the content of personal level experience is fully 
conceptual because concept possession is required for the subject to represent properties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Some non-conceptualists do not distinguish CPC from UPC. But most non-
conceptualists, such as Bermùdez (2003) and Heck (2007) follow this classification. 
Heck (2007) criticizes Fodor (2007) for using (CPC) indiscriminately from (UPC) (Heck 
2007: 119).   
13 Kelly (2001a and 2001b) and Bermudez (2003) follow this line. 
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of the perceived object, and we are able to grasp the content of experience with 
demonstrative concepts that we possess; therefore all CPC must be conceptual. 
 
On the other hand, there are philosophers who think that non-conceptual contents belong 
to unconscious states of experience.   
 
 UPC (Unconscious Perceptual Content): This is a perceptual content of a 
particular stage of experience that is not first-person consciously accessible. 
A perceptual content is UPC iff it does not exist at the personal level. One 
example of this might be a content of a ‘subpersonal’ state. Therefore,  
perceptual content is non-conceptual UPC iff it is not capable of being 
consciously grasped by the subject.  
This subpersonal state is also considered an earlier stage of perceptual processing, and 
perceptual information in this stage is processed unconsciously. Non-conceptualists like 
Evans (1982) and Heck (2007) think that this information could be a type of content. 
David Marr (1982)’s computational theory of vision is a good example to this. He 
attempts to specify visual representation as the three levels of computational processes 
about the objective world. The first level arranges two-dimensional optical images 
produced by retina and the light reflected from an object. At this level, the eye and brain 
represents only the difference between brightness and darkness of the object. Marr 
describes this process as raw primal sketch → grouping → full primal sketch (Marr 
1982: 36). The second level processes visual representation as neither two-dimensional 
nor three-dimensional image. Marr calls this a 21 2 D sketch. The 21 2 D sketch has only 
retinocentric coordinates,  is operated from a perceiver’s angle, and does not include 
lighting conditions (1982: 241-245). The last level produces three-dimensional images 
using the 21 2 D sketch in the object’s angle. At this level, a perceiver is able to 
recognise the object of perception by comparing previous information about the object 
that she has. A sub-personal mental state is described as the first and the second level, 
and this state is supposed to have non-conceptual content (Cf. Frankish 2009: 90-91; 
Crane 1992: 140-142). Perceptual information at this stage is UPC type non-conceptual 
content. 
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However, philosophers like McDowell (1995) and Hamlyn (2003) criticize this position. 
According to McDowell (1995), the attribution to subpersonal states is just a metaphor 
used for explaining perceptual states, and hence the content of a sub-personal state 
cannot be a content of experience. Hamlyn (2003) also claims that if there is a certain 
type of transaction in a perceptual state, then it is just an informational transaction, and 
cannot be the content of an experience.14 This is connected to the question raised at the 
beginning of this thesis, namely the problem of delimiting the range of experience. I will 
examine UPC in depth, not least because we will see that non-conceptualists have a 
tendency to define the notion of a concept very narrowly, but also because they have 
considered the notion of experience widely and flexibly, e.g., from subpersonal states to 
personal states. This issue will be discussed in depth for two reasons: First, as I have 
said throughout this chapter, a perceiver’s consciously inaccessible perceptual contents 
cannot be the contents of her experience; and second, what non-conceptualists call ‘a 
content of subpersonal states’ (just in case we assume there must be a content of these 
states) is nothing more than a neuro-physiological reaction to external stimuli. It is 
obvious that no philosopher considers the stimulation response to be the product of 
perceptual experience; rather, it is usually considered the very early stage of experience. 
The non-conceptualist thus misunderstands the notion of experience in the sense that 
they treat experience as if it belongs to a just one particular stage. In connection with this, 
there is another non-conceptualist tendency that I will examine: 
SV (State View): According to this view,15 whether or not a content of 
perceptual experience is conceptual is determined by its relation to the 
subject. So a perceptual state is conceptual iff the subject has to possess 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14I extend the idea of conceptualism, after developing these criticisms from McDowell 
and Hamlyn, in order to criticize the non-conceptual arguments in Chapters II, III, and 
IV.  
15 This is suggested by Heck (2000: 485). Since this idea was mooted, most non-
conceptualists like Byrne (2003 and 2005), Speaks (2005), Crowther (2006), and Heck 
(2007) have followed the same line. 
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concepts that are required to characterize or to specify the content of that 
state. In contrast, a perceptual state is non-conceptual iff the subject is not 
required to possess concepts or to entertain any relevant concepts that are 
required in order to specify or to characterize the content of that state (Cf. 
Heck 2000: 485).  
In cases where a subject S undergoes a perceptual experience E, if S does not possess a 
concept that can typically describe or constitute E (Cf. Heck 2000:490, 2007: 130; Byrne 
2005: 4; Toribio 2008), then the content ‘p’ of E is non-conceptual. Hence, perception 
can be non-conceptual at the level of individual states or at the level of the contents of 
those states. Hence, the state view could be divided into two different types: (1) a subject 
does not possess the right concepts about a perceived object and, (2) a subject does not 
exercise or entertain concepts in order to be in a perceptual state with regards to a 
perceived object. I intend to agree with both (1) and (2). Perception could occur without 
conceptual engagement on the subject’s part, and we do not need to deploy concepts that 
we possess in order to specify the contents of our perceptual states. However, 
considerations of these versions of the state view will expose the reasons for holding 
conceptualism. We shall then see that there are two perspectives on perceptual 
experience: the functional perspective and the expository perspective. I will focus on 
these two perspectives in order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience, 
alongside criticising UPC. 
The last view concerning the relationship between concepts and content that we shall 
examine is:       
 CV (Content View): The content of perceptual experience is entirely 
different from the conceptual content that constitutes thoughts and beliefs 
(e.g. propositions).16  
According to CV, we sometimes see particular features of the content of perceptual 
experience that may not be features of the content of propositional attitudes, and vice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Philosophers like Mellor (1988), Crane (1992), and Gunther (2001) hold this view. 
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versa. For example, perception sometimes represents to us illusions or contradictory 
situations, which may not be considered attributes of conceptual content (e.g. the 
waterfall illusion (Crane 1988)).17 Dretske seems to take this line when he distinguishes 
between experience and belief since he defines experience as a “concept-free mental 
state” and belief, is a “concept-charged mental state” (2000: 113); hence, the distinction 
between experience and belief, for Dretske, is dependent on whether mental states 
involve concepts or not. Hence, according to CV type non-conceptualists, the content of 
perception is not entirely conceptual.  
This notion of the non-conceptual character of experience constitutes an objection to 
Type-2 conceptual capacity, i.e., the capacity of understanding relational structure of 
perception and belief. Of course, perception could represent contradictory contents or 
might involve non-propositional contents. However, the interesting point that I want to 
raise is ‘how we could identify non-conceptual content of experience if experience is not 
engaged with the thought’s form’. That is to say, the problem with CV is that the non-
conceptual content of experience is not confirmed by either non-propositional or 
contradictory perception or concept-free mental states, even if it is true that perception 
has a different content from thought and belief. Although perception and belief do not 
share the same content, the conclusion that perceptual contents are not constituted 
propositionally and conceptually does not follow. As such, having a different content 
from perceptual thoughts and beliefs does not directly imply that perception has non-
conceptual content. This is because, alongside those who hold UPC and SV, 
philosophers who hold CV also have the same tendency to think that a particular stage of 
experience may be non-conceptual; but they also treat the content of a particular state as 
the product of all of the processes of visual experience. Both the contradictory 
phenomenon and the possibility of a concept-free state seem to be parts of the perceptual 
processing that constitutes the content of experience. Although there could be non-
conceptual elements in the process of experience, there must be conceptual engagement 
in the process of experience. That is to say, CV seems to be derived from a 
misunderstanding of the conceptual character of experience, which we also see in UPC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In the Waterfall Illusion, a stationary object looks, in some sense, to also be moving.	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and SV.  
Of course, my reason for examining the above distinction is not only that I wish to show 
that these positions are wrong: I would also like to show that there are some common 
characteristics that may serve as criteria for whether something is conceptual content. In 
particular, the conceptual content in perceptual experience is associated with, or can be 
considered as having the characteristics of, consciousness, thought, and truth-apt 
sentences, and operates at a personal level; otherwise a non-conceptual content belongs 
to non-propositional and subpersonal levels that are not consciously accessible.18 Hence, 
when perception, or perceptual content, does not meet these criteria, it could be non-
conceptual, according to those notions of non-conceptual content.  
Despite being a type of conceptualist, I do not reject all of the above-mentioned non-
conceptualist demands for a non-conceptual content. In fact, as I have stated, sometimes 
perception occurs without any conceptual engagement, as in the case of SV; and we 
cannot always be consciously aware of the content of our perception at the time of 
perception, as in the case of UPC. I also agree that non-conscious and non-cognitive 
perceptual processes can be operative without conceptual engagement. However, I do 
not want to argue that these features of experience are sufficient for concluding that the 
content of experience is non-conceptual because this inference depends upon a further 
view common to the non-conceptualists who hold UPC and SV types of non-conceptual 
content. Specifically, they seem to expand the range of experience excessively in order 
to find any type of content that is not engaged with a subject’s conceptual capacities. Yet 
it seems that they are willing to interpret any physical reactions to given stimuli as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Of course, there can be perceptual content that we cannot be aware of in conscious 
experience. Ned Block (1995) makes a good suggestion. He believes that there are two 
types of consciousness: phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) and access 
consciousness (A-consciousness). Block’s distinction of A-consciousness and P-
consciousness will be discussed more in the next section, chapters IV and V.  
   
42	  
	  
perceptual information, and then treat these as perceptual content. This may be seen 
when they claim that conceptually unsophisticated creatures such as an animals and 
human infants must have a certain perceptual content based upon a physical analysis of 
vision or observation. So, this tendency may lead us to become confused about what 
perceptual content really is.  
In addition, they seem to believe that there must be perceptual content beyond the reach 
of our conceptual capacities. This view of experience may help us to understand the 
mechanism of perception but may not lead us any closer to discovering what is in a non-
conscious perceptual state. The most important thing, for my purposes, is the existence 
of perceptual content in order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience. That is 
to say, we ought to know what kind of content exists in both conscious states and non-
conscious states in order to evaluate whether the content in each state is conceptually 
engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities that I identified. However, the 
non-conceptualist’s account of experience clearly defines neither what kind of 
perceptual content belongs to non-conscious perceptual states nor how we could find 
what is in non-conscious states without depending upon conceptual engagement.  
Nevertheless, what I want to draw from these classifications of a conceptual and non-
conceptual content is that there are two perspectives on experience that we need to 
consider in order to evaluate its conceptual character. And these perspectives seem to 
satisfy both the conceptualist’s and non-conceptualist’s notions of experience and 
concepts. As I indicated earlier in this chapter, non-conceptualists have a tendency to 
define the notion of a concept very narrowly, while their notion of experience is wide. 
Likewise, conceptualists also tend to construe the conceptual character of experience 
very broadly, including the ability to use perceptual demonstratives, while they seem to 
define experience only as the product of all processes of experience. The aim of this 
thesis is not only to develop the existing model of conceptualism but also to build a 
bridge between these two different uses of concept and experience. As such, this chapter 
suggests that we need to consider the two perspectives, the functional and the expository, 
on experience so that we can satisfy the demands of both camps.  
43	  
	  
In the following sections, I provide accounts of the two perspectives and explain why we 
need to take them seriously in order to solve the problems raised in this section. 
 
I-3.  Two Perspectives on Experience 
	  
One point that I have emphasized so far is that non-conceptualists define concepts very 
restrictively whilst defining content and experience very widely. Of course, I do not 
intend to claim that this tendency is entirely wrong. As I have stated, I agree with the 
idea that SV could be a part of a perceptual process that constitutes the contents of 
experience. To reiterate, the aim of this thesis is to show that there must be conceptual 
engagement in the process of experience even if we partly accept a non-conceptualist 
approach to it. As such, the point of listing the above types of non-conceptual content is 
to show, eventually, that there is conceptual engagement in experience, i.e., the 
conceptual character of experience. Hence, the conceptual and non-conceptual accounts 
of experience that this thesis has examined so far try to answer the following questions: 
(1) How might a conceptual capacity affect the occurrence of perception?, and, (2) In 
what ways can we conceptually engage with the content of perception?  
 
I-3.a. The Functional Perspective on Experience 
The first question may be considered according to the two types of non-conceptual 
contents, SV (State View) and CV (Content View). Here, a conceptual capacity could be 
considered as a kind of ‘constituent’. This is connected to Type-1 conceptual capacity 
(the capacity of spontaneity) because, if perception involves a conceptual capacity such 
as spontaneity, then its content could be constituted by such capacities. In this case, 
when I talk about the conceptual character of experience, I am considering whether a 
conceptual capacity could engage with what constitutes its content. Further, if we regard 
perceptual experience as a type of thought (e.g. belief), the content of perceptual 
experience must be conceptual because thought-content is  always engaged with a 
conceptual capacity, particularly Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of 
spontaneity) and Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational 
structure of perception and belief) that operates only when perception has content. But if 
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we accept CV’s claim that perception is entirely different from thought (and its content 
is entirely different from thought-content), then we may doubt whether Type-1 
conceptual capacity and Type-2 conceptual capacity is engaged with perceptual content. 
Hence, if there is no conceptual engagement that constitutes perceptual content, then we 
can accept the view that perception could occur without the operation of conceptual 
capacities. This can serve as an objection to Type-1 and Type-2 conceptual capacities. In 
the cases of UPC (Unconscious Perceptual Content) and SV (State View), perceptual 
states could occur without conceptual engagement, i.e., a subject could be in a 
perceptual state without possessing or deploying any concepts that are relevant to the 
object of the state. So there is no conceptual engagement in these kinds of cases.  
I now want to suggest that we should take a certain perspective in order to know how the 
subject of perception could be in a perceptual state. I shall call this, the ‘functional’ 
perspective on experience: 
 
● The Functional Perspective on Experience: To consider perception 
functionally is to individuate a perceptual experience prior to, and 
independently of, determining its content. In doing this, we do not consider 
any type of conceptual capacities as elements of the experience; rather we 
should consider only an enabling condition for perception that belongs to the 
relation between the subject of perception and the object of the perceptual 
state. Therefore, taking the functional perspective would imply considering 
experience from the third person or observer’s position. 
Considering this perspective could track information in sub-personal mental states. For 
example, human adults and infants perceive the same world in the same way if we only 
consider how they represent the world functionally, say, by considering an enabling 
condition. Thus, although human adults are more sophisticated conceptual creatures than 
infants in describing what is represented in their perceptual states using concepts, they 
are indeed functionally in the same sort of state representing the world.  
 
I-3.b. The Expository Perspective on Experience 
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According to the second question, which considers a conceptual capacity ‘as 
explanation’, the content we can consciously access is entirely conceptual, even though 
we are able to confirm that there is no conceptual engagement in a perceptual state such 
as in the case above. The reason for this is to be found in the way in which we access the 
content of experience or mental states. Ned Block (1995) gives an explanation of why 
consciously accessible content must be conceptual by using the distinction of two types 
of consciousness: access consciousness (A-consciousness) and phenomenal 
consciousness (P-consciousness). According to him, P-consciousness is what we call 
experience, that is “the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be 
in that state” (1995: 227). Phenomenal consciousness results from our sensory 
experiences such as sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. By contrast, A-consciousness 
is kind of “availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action” 
(ibid). Unlike P-consciousness, Block explains A-consciousness as a state in which some 
content is “poised for use as a premise in reasoning”, “poised for rational control of 
action”, and “poised for rational control of speech” (1995: 231, emphasis added). These 
are clearly cognitive roles. Block argues that access consciousness must be 
‘representational’ because only representational content can figure in reasoning. Unlike 
A-consciousness, we are not aware of the content of P-conscious experience. Block 
insists that we are not able to access all the perceptual contents of P-conscious 
experience―including perceptual information carried by experience― rather only some 
of them could be reported by A-consciousness. This implies that some contents of P-
consciousness are separable from A-consciousness, i.e., A-consciousness is not 
accessible to all the perceptual information that comes with P-consciousness. Indeed, 
Block suggests a possibility of separating A-consciousness from P-consciousness by 
focusing on Sperling’s (1960) experiment of letters.19 In the experiment, subjects were 
exposed to flashing groups of letters, e.g.  in 3 by 3arrays for very short periods such as 
50 milliseconds. Subjects reported that they could see all the letters, but they reported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I will come back to this example at the beginning of chapter V where I show the 
possibility of existence of conceptual content and non-conceptual content in conscious 
experience. 
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only about half of them. Block thinks that this result shows that it is possible for the 
subject to have P-conscious experience of the letters, but for only half of the letters to be 
accessible to the subjects (in A-consciousness)20. This implies that not all contents of P-
conscious experience are always available to be reported.21  
The notable point here is that content of P-conscious experience could allow A-
consciousness to become accessible. That is to say, whatever the reason for the 
constituents of P-conscious experience is, the contents of P-consciousness can be 
reportable in A-conscious experience. Then we will be able to evaluate the characteristic 
feature of the reported content of P-conscious experience. This clearly entails conceptual 
engagement by subjects because the possibility of A-consciousness shows Type-3 
conceptual capacity–a subject is able to categorise perceived information using concepts. 
Hence, this reportability implies not only that we are able to know that some perceptual 
contents can be grasped by concepts that subjects possess but also that they are able to 
evaluate the characteristic feature of perceptual contents. Of course, contents that exist 
in P-conscious experience but are not encountered in A-consciousness might have non-
conceptual content because the diminished contents of P-conscious experience that are 
not reported could not be engaged with Type-3 conceptual capacity which categorises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Block explains this by saying that “I am P-conscious of all (or almost all - I will omit 
this qualification) the letters at once, that is, jointly, and not just as blurry or vague 
letters, but as specific letters (or at least specific shapes), but I don't have access to all of 
them jointly, all at once” (1995: 244). Through this, he argues that P-consciousness 
could be independent from A-consciousness, and that there could be diminished contents 
of P-conscious experience.  
21I follow Block’s interpretation of the experiment here in order to clarify the expository 
perspective on experience, say, how we get the conceptual content of experience. But 
this interpretation will show the problem of conceptualism that McDowell and Brewer 
hold, namely the co-existence of conceptual and non-conceptual content in the personal 
level of experience. I will also investigate how the conceptualists overcome this.  
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the object of perception.22  
Now we need to reconsider what ‘being in a perceptual state’ or ‘having an experience’ 
really means. It means that we have a content of the state or the experience. If the 
content of perception exists, then we must be able to access that content to confirm that 
we are having the experience, or that we are in such a perceptual state. Strictly speaking, 
there is no perceptual state or experience that does not involve content. Here I shall 
focus on McDowell’s idea of the concept as a ‘mediator’ or ‘link’ (1994a: 3), where a 
concept mediates between a subject and the object that the subject perceives. That is to 
say, accessing particular contents (but not all the perceptual information) of a perceptual 
state or experience (that is, confirming the existence of content) is entirely dependent 
upon the subject’s possession of certain concepts. Hence, we are able to access the 
content of experience through conceptual engagement even though, in such a case, our 
conceptual capacities are not engaged with what constitutes the content of that 
perception.23 I shall call this the ‘expository’ perspective on experience. 
 
● The Expository Perspective on Experience: To consider the expository 
perspective on experience, it is essential to take into account, in individuating the 
perceptual experience, both its representational content and its cognitive role.  
 
Taking this perspective will track the content of personal level experience, and so, 
requires the subject’s conscious awareness for identifying contents of experience, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Of course, this case is applicable to only Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises 
the object of perception. It also has a possibility of being a conceptual content because 
of the possibility of Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) and Type-2 
conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational structure of perception and 
belief). 
23 In Chapter V I discuss the notion of conceptual engagement as a method of accessing 
the content of experience in depth, alongside discussing recognitional capacities 
ability, which are considered to be a type of conceptual capacity by both conceptualist 
and non-conceptualist. 
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first-person narrative. Hence this perspective depends upon a speaker’s report. As such, 
considering this perspective is strongly dependent upon the subject’s conceptual 
engagement. For example, human adults functionally represent the same world but our 
reports about what is represented would be different according to which concepts we use. 
Therefore, the expository perspective does not individuate the content of experience in 
the same way as the functional perspective.   
 
I-3.c. The Reason for Considering the Two Perspectives on Experience	  
What I want to draw from the distinction of the two perspectives on experience is that 
not only does it satisfy both the conceptualist’s and non-conceptualist’s notion of 
experience and perceptual content, but also shows that both conceptual and non-
conceptual content belong to each stage of experience.24 As such, it is which part of the 
perceptual stage the philosopher thinks constitutes the perceptual experience which 
informs the perspective that they take. The functional perspective on experience 
concerns the role of conceptual engagement that could cause one to have an experience, 
namely whether experience is affected by the conceptual capacities that one possesses. 
That is to say, how conceptual capacities could operate in a subject’s experience and put 
her in a perceptual state with regard to some object, i.e., the very occurrence of 
perception. This will be considered carefully in order to raise an objection against the 
view that conceptual capacities do not play a causal role in constituting the content of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This does not mean that all non-conceptualists think that non-conceptual content 
belongs to only the subpersonal level. Non-conceptualists, (in particular Evans (1982), 
Dretske (1981) and Martin (1992)) focus on non-conceptual content within the personal 
level of experience as well, e.g., fine-grained colour contents and the representation of 
rich perceptual information. They argue that there is perceptual content that is not 
engaged with a perceiver’s conceptual capacity at the personal level of experience, 
therefore those contents may be considered as being non-conceptual. I will examine 
these argument in chapter IV and V.   
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experience.25 On the contrary, without deploying or entertaining any concept that we 
possess, we are able to have a visual experience of an object (e.g., a scarlet rose) because 
perception can convey the characteristic features of the rose without the related concepts 
that we possess. In this case, conceptual capacities do not play a role as constituents of 
the experience of a scarlet rose. Moreover, animals and human infants (i.e. those who 
are considered conceptually unsophisticated beings) can enjoy perceptual experience, 
and if we and those beings have the same representational contents, then their contents 
may be non-conceptual (Peacocke 1983; Hurley 1998). Hence, examining the functional 
perspectives on experience could be advantageous to these types of non-conceptualism.   
In contrast, the expository perspective on experience implies that concepts could be used 
for the interpretation of obtained information via visual stimuli in the personal level of 
experience: more precisely, it refers to ‘how subjects actually experience the world’.26 
While the functional perspective might motivate non-conceptualism, the expository 
perspective highlights the possibility of conceptual engagement on the subject’s part.  
Because of this second perspective, I shall argue that experience does not belong to only 
a particular stage of that experience. Rather ‘experience’ ought to refer to the whole 
process, from a subpersonal to personal level; hence we should not think of experience 
as something separate from the possibility of conceptual engagement. For example, I can 
describe my experience of a rose in many different ways using my possession of 
concepts, such as ‘a rose’, ‘a scarlet rose’, ‘that rose’, ‘a red rose’, and so on, even 
though my possession of these concepts does not affect the occurrence of my perception 
of the rose. Although a subject’s conceptual capacity is not engaged in putting her in a 
perceptual state of seeing the rose, she may freely access the content of such a state 
using the concepts she possesses, such as ‘flower’, ‘rose’, ‘this rose’, etc. The content of 
the perceptual state of the rose is something which in its very nature can be grasped by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Most non-conceptualists that this study examines hold this view. 
26 In this sense, we have to say that ‘what we say about the world’ is the same as ‘what 
we really experience about the world’. 
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concepts.27 This would explain why we should identify experience as the whole process 
of perceiving that allows conceptual engagement. First, that we could confirm what 
features of an object, e.g., a rose, represented in the subject’s subpersonal mental state, 
e.g., a red flower rather than green thorns, depending on the expository perspective on 
experience. Second, we are able to find how the subject of perception could be in the 
perceptual state of a red rose by taking the functional perspective on experience, but we 
are not able to approach what is in the non-conscious states of perception without taking 
the expository perspective on experience. Although when both conceptualists and non-
conceptualists discuss the conceptual character of experience, they do not talk about the 
mechanism of perception only, rather they really want to argue whether the content of 
experience is conceptual or non-conceptual.  
 
I-4. The Possibility of Conceptual Engagement	  
On the basis of the proceeding discussion, I suggest that we need to consider both 
functional perspective and the expository perspectives on experience in order to satisfy 
the conceptualist’s and non-conceptualist’s notion of experience. Therefore, if 
perceptual content cannot be engaged with any type of conceptual capacity in both 
perspectives, it can be considered non-conceptual. Otherwise, there is no reason to throw 
away conceptual engagement of experience.     
If this is so, then the problems waiting to be solved in this thesis are finding whether the 
contents of unconscious experience such as P-conscious experience (that is not 
encountered with A-consciousness yet in personal level of experience) or UPC 
(Unconscious Perceptual Content) or SV (State View) can be engaged with the three 
types of conceptual capacities, i.e., how we find conceptual engagement in non-
conscious experience if we define the range of experience as widely as the non-
conceptualists. 
Two strategies will address this issue. First, I will investigate whether there is any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 However, this is possible only when we do not delimit a range of experience as it 
belongs to a particular stage of experience, a subpersonal level or a personal level.   
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characteristic feature of experience that can be considered a different type of conceptual 
capacity that does not belong to the three major types of conceptual capacities, but 
nevertheless, can be considered conceptual engagement. I will focus on the 
discrimination ability of perception in order to argue that conceptual engagement could 
be saved even if we just take the functional perspective on experience. Second, I attempt 
to demonstrate that it is hard to define something being in a subpersonal state as a 
perceptual content (particularly acknowledged in UPC and SV types of non-
conceptualism) if we only take the functional perspective on experience. Of course, this 
attempt starts by adopting the non-conceptualist’s notion of experience.   
In chapters II and III, I will argue against the non-conceptualists, who emphasise the 
functional perspective, by using the second strategy. 
In chapters IV and V, I will stand against the non-conceptualists who hold CPC, SV and 
CV types of non-conceptualism by using the first strategy. 
These strategies will not be used only for evaluating the conceptual character of 
experience but will also show that perception involves a different type of a conceptual 
capacity, namely the discrimination ability, apart from a subject’s conceptual 
engagement using the three types of conceptualities.  
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Chapter II. Animals, Colour Constancy and Non-Conceptual Contents	  
Is a Physical Reaction to Stimulus, Experience? 
 
This chapter discusses several arguments put forth by psychologists and non-
conceptualists that conclude, since infants and animals are conceptually unsophisticated 
creatures who nevertheless have visual experiences, experience has non-conceptual 
content. To be specific, we will consider the possibility of consciously inaccessible 
contents that cannot be engaged by the three types of conceptual capacities at all.   
In fact, some experts in several different fields, including computational vision, 
experimental physiology, neuro-psychology, psychophysics, and comparative 
psychology, have found that creatures, like honeybees or human infants, who are 
considered to be non-conceptual, can perceive colour constancy, i.e., they constantly 
perceive that an object has a particular colour even though it looks that it has more than 
one colour (Walsh and Kulikowski 1998). The result of these studies challenges the 
traditional view of colour constancy experience that only creatures who are able to make 
cognitive inferences (e.g. human adults), perceive colour constancy because the colour 
constancy experience has been taken to go beyond a mere reaction to external stimuli. 
As such, it has been held that creatures who have conceptual capacities can perceive 
constant colours, while all others can’t.  
These empirical studies deal with two types of non-conceptual content: (1) unconscious 
perceptual content (UPC) and (2) perception itself, which is claimed to occur without 
any type of conceptual engagement. Hence this type of non-conceptual content could be 
raised as an objection to Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) and 
Type-3 conceptual capacity (the capacity to categorise the object of perception in the 
personal level of experience). 
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In fact, some non-conceptualist’s, such as Peacocke (1983) and Hurley (1998),28 also 
appeal to animal experience, in order to show that there may be non-conceptual content 
on the ground that conceptually unsophisticated creatures can enjoy perceptual 
experience similar to human adults. Moreover, a certain type of non-conceptualism, 
especially that offered by Bermudez (1998), is based on empirical studies of the 
experiences of non-human creatures; hence if these studies are correct, they seem to 
provide good reasons for accepting non-conceptualism and also suggest that it may be 
possible for us to enjoy experience without any type of conceptual engagement. 
The purpose of discussing the above non-conceptualist argument is to show the problem 
with UPC and SV types of non-conceptualism; namely, it is difficult to determine a 
specific perceptual content without considering the expository perspective on experience. 
There are two reasons for this: First the empirical studies do not confirm exactly what is 
represented in the perceptual states of honeybees and infants because the scientific 
research focuses merely upon how they react to the given stimuli (which is at best an 
enabling condition) rather than representational content per se. Second, some scientists 
and philosophers seem to think that a non-human creature’s mental state is at least 
intentionally directed upon the particular property of the target object in virtue of an ‘as-
if attribution’ (McDowell 1994) of intentionality. This does not tell us that those 
creatures indeed behaved in a way intentionally directed at the property of the object or 
that they are in conscious states representing the object and property, rather it simply 
describes their  behaviours as if they are in conscious states about the object. I argue that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  This does not mean that this thesis assumes that Hurley’s and Peacocke’s views 
amount to the same version of non-conceptualism. Hurley’s view relies on scientific 
findings for her claim, whereas Peacocke’s does not. Nevertheless, the reason for 
considering them as the same type of non-conceptualist is that both philosophers are 
relying on the dubious premises that ‘non-human animals do not deploy concepts like 
humans do’ and ‘animals have representational contents of experience’. This chapter 
provides an objection to these premises because these do not license the conclusions (1) 
that the non-human animals per se are non-conceptual and that (2) animals can represent 
the world in the same way as we do.	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by depending on the functional perspective in this way, we do not certainly know 
anything about the perceptual contents of animals and infants.  Therefore, this chapter 
raises an objection to the methodology and the notion of a perceptual content that the 
above philosophers and the experts have used rather than arguing that there could be a 
conceptual content even if we only adopt the functional perspective on experience. 
In section II-1, I begin by examining why empirical studies of perceptual constancy 
matter in the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. I then identify three 
potential problems involved in the empirical studies of non-conceptual character of 
experience. First, it is assumed that we can share the inner experience of animals 
through a physiological analysis of vision and the physical properties of colours. Second, 
this type of study seems to involve an excessive and arbitrary interpretation of non-
conceptual creatures’ intentional attitudes, i.e., misinterpretation of intentional causation. 
Third, there is fundamental ambiguity in the usage of the notion of recognition. 
On the basis of these problems, section II-2 then discusses whether the non-
conceptualist’s arguments raise the same problem as the empirical studies. That is to say, 
using a non-human case for proving non-conceptual content seems to rely upon some 
mistaken premises that the empirical studies hold. These are: 
 (1) Animals and human infants are non-conceptual creatures. 
 (2) We can prove that non-conceptual creatures really have perceptual 
experience through their behaviours and the physical analysis of vision and colours.   
 (3) Non-conceptual creatures can enjoy perceptual experience of objective 
properties like constant colour. 
 (4) There must be contents in their perceptual experience. 
 
From these premises, the non-conceptualist argues that the content of a non-human 
creature’s perceptual experience can be non-conceptual. 
Section II-3 will challenge premise (1) because of two reasons. First, non-conceptualist 
philosophers and  scientists have focused upon an enabling condition for perception, 
namely what such non-conceptual creatures discriminate by vision, rather than 
discussing their mental states; therefore the discussion does not directly address their 
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conceptual capacities, which could be deployed or exercised on perceptual information 
obtained by an enabling condition. Second, sometimes they are confused about whether 
such creatures do not have the same conceptual capacities that we human adults have or 
whether they do not possess any type of concept at all.   
I then argue that (2) and (3) are insufficient to show the existence of non-conceptual 
content in experience, and finally suggest that these may not justify the existence of 
perceptual content, i.e., premise (4).  
I will then conclude that these types of arguments for non-conceptual content concern 
entirely consciously inaccessible contents that are beyond the range of what we normally 
call experience; therefore, the content of animal perception may not be used for 
evaluating the conceptual character of experience. 
 
II-1.  Colour Constancy and Non-Conceptual Character of Experience	  
In this section, I begin by looking at the relationship between colour constancy and the 
non-conceptual character of experience. I then briefly explore the experiments with 
honeybees and human infants, which are typical examples of non-conceptual creatures, 
and consider why such examples are used for providing evidence of the non-conceptual 
character of experience by non-conceptualists.  
 	  
II-1.1. Why does Perception of Colour Constancy Matter?	  
‘Perceptual constancy’ generally refers to the phenomenon of our constantly perceiving 
a property of an object even though its stimulus condition is changing. In the case of 
colour perception, we constantly perceive that an object has a particular colour even 
though it looks that it has more than one colour. In other words, it is the constant colour 
that is perceived as itself (its own colour) while the apparent colour is perceived through 
varying conditions, such as brightness. The most well-known definition of colour 
constancy is “the constancy of the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in the 
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intensity and spectral composition of the illumination” (Foster et al. 1997 cited in 
Hilbert 2005: 141).29  I will start my discussion with this definition. 
We find many practical examples of colour constancy.  For instance, we can pick up a 
ripe apple in a box under dim lighting even though the surface of the apple looks darker 
or lighter than its own colour. We also know that, for instance, the surface of a white 
box under dim lighting may have two or more different colours (its own colour ‘white’ 
as well as apparent colours that are shadowed). Notwithstanding this, we can 
perceptually judge30 it to be the same colour, ‘white’, even though they look different. 
We also know the reason for the difference between the apparent colour and the constant 
colour, even though we judge them to be the same. In this sense, colour constancy seems 
an essential element of our conscious experience of colours. 
Traditionally, the perception of constant colour has been thought to show that our 
perceptual experiences do not entirely depend upon objects themselves but also on our 
being consciously engaged in perceptual judgment about such constancy. That is to say, 
while the changing aspect of colour is purely sensory, “the constancy is the result of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Recently, the constant colour of an object has been defined by surface spectral 
reflectance (SSR), called colour physicalism. According to this account, every surface of 
colour reflects a certain amount of light, and our visual systems are designed to detect 
that reflectance. But I do not seriously consider colour physicalism in this chapter. I will 
critically examine colour physicalism and the problem of colour variation in the next 
chapter. 
30	  Perceptual judgments of constant colour and apparent colour seem to imply that it 
requires a cognitive ability because there can be two different contents of perceptual 
constancy: namely, (1) I perceive them to be different and (2) I judge them to be the 
same despite perceptual difference. This could also show the feature of two perspectives 
on experience that the perceptual content from the functional perspective does not 
always affect the perceptual content from the expository perspective. But this does not 
directly entail the non-conceptual character of experience: instead, we can see how 
perceptual contents can be engaged with conceptual capacities throughout this thesis.	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inference or judgment” (Hilbert 2005: 146) on the traditional view. For instance, the 
apparent colour could be constantly changed according to lighting conditions; however, 
we are able to draw inferences about what makes the changes and to cognitively 
interpret the given visual stimulus (the apparent colour) through experience.31  
However, recent neurophysiological research tells us that the perceptual constancies are 
the result of unconscious processes “that are relatively independent of higher cognition 
is the dominant view among contemporary perceptual theorists” (Hilbert 2005: 149) 
rather than the result of inference. In fact, many scientific researchers in several different 
fields have found that creatures who are unable to make cognitive inferences can 
perceive colour constancy (Neumeyer 1998; Dannemiller 1998). It is claimed that non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hilbert (2005) borrows the traditional view of perceptual constancy from Berkeley  
(1709 reprinted in 1979) and Russell (1912). While Berkeley focuses on visual size 
constancy, Russell focuses on the appearance of changing colours. However, this 
chapter does not discuss whether these philosophers’ ideas are correct. The points that 
this thesis takes from the traditional view are that (1) colour (or size) is not inherit in 
objects themselves, rather they are dependent on the circumstance to which the coloured 
object and the spectator belong, such as lightning (Russell 1912: 8-9); and that (2) 
perception of constancy is a “cognitive or intellectual accomplishment rather than a 
visual one” (Berkeley 1709 reprinted in 1979: 52-66). More recently, Piaget claims that 
all perception of forms, size, positions, colours, etc., is acquired through “the 
combination of reflex activity with higher activities” (Piaget 1953: 62). In this respect, 
perceptual constancy can be experienced by perceivers with cognitive capacities who 
can understand the circumstance. I do not contend that this view is entirely correlated 
with the conceptualists’ idea of colour experience. However, it might be thought that 
non-developed cognitive perceivers such as infants and animals may not be able to 
experience constancy because they lack such cognitive and intellectual capacities. That 
is to say, an enabling condition for perception of apparent colour and constant colour is 
dependent on understanding the circumstances of the constancy on the traditional view.   
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human creatures are clearly able to react to colour constancy and thus that they 
experience it. 
The important point of these studies, for the purpose of this dissertation, is that 
perception of colour constancy can be considered independently from cognitive 
inferences that require conceptual capacities for two reasons: first, that creatures are able 
to be in a perceptual state about constancy without deploying or entertaining any 
concepts at all; and second, that the perceptual content of such a creature’s mental state 
cannot be engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities due to the fact it is 
unable to access perceptual content with concepts because it does not seem to possess 
the same concepts that we have. Hence, the perceptual contents of such creatures may 
not be engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities. In this sense, the practical 
examples seem to provide evidence of the non-conceptual content of experience. 
In the next section, I examine two experiments that offer typical examples of a non-
conceptual creature’s perception of colour constancy. There are many examples that 
show animals perceive colours, involving chimpanzees, birds, frogs, and cats—even 
insects (Walsh and Kulikowski 1998). However, I will only examine cases involving 
honeybees and human infants. In some sense these examples seem rather trivial for 
showing the non-conceptual content of colour experience, yet not only do they clearly 
show the basic mechanism of colour vision (which is independent from the perceiver’s 
consciousness), they also clearly show how experts in different fields (even non-
conceptualists) view the content of experience differently from the conceptualists. More 
specifically, the expert and the non-conceptualist take only the functional perspective on 
experience, whereas the conceptualists take the expository perspective on experience. 
We will find out that the non-conceptualist and the experimenter alike have a very 
problematic perspective on animals and human infants’ experience through examining 
these examples, say the problem that arises when taking only the functional perspective 
on experience. In particular, they believe that there is a very strong relationship between 
physical causality and perceptual contents. I criticize this position mainly by exploring 
two examples of non-cognitive creatures: honeybees and human infants. In the case of 
honeybees, I critically examine whether the physical relation between perceivers and 
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objects characterizes the content of subjects’ mental states, i.e. the physical relation 
could confirm that subjects are in a mental state about the relation. In the case of infants, 
I consider whether a physical reaction to certain stimuli implies perception of that 
stimulus. This approach is particularly useful for criticizing the UPC (Unconscious 
Perceptual Content) and SV (State View) types of non-conceptualism.   
 	  
II-1.2. Non-Cognitive Creatures’ Perception of Colour Constancy	  
Our knowledge of colour vision in animals is usually obtained from behavioural 
experiments. Through these experiments, we know that the differences between the 
visual sensory organs in all creatures result in a different stimulation for each creature, 
i.e. a visual stimulation is restricted to a visual organ system. In fact, this is a lesson 
which science has taught us that creatures that have the same the visual organs, have the 
same visual stimulus of light, for example, diurnal birds’ visible windows, like pigeons, 
extend into both ultra-violet and infra-red regions of the spectrum, spanning 350–720 
nm (Allen 2007). Birds, fish, and many other mammals may perceive much wider 
ranges of the spectrum than humans. Some insects, especially bees, can see ultraviolet 
colours that are invisible to the human eye. Having a better system of vision may imply 
having a better perception of colour. This also implies that not only do such animals 
have discrimination ability when it comes to colours, as we have, but they can also 
perceive a more fine-grained difference between colours. Clearly, being able to perceive 
fine-grained colour differences implies being able to have contents involving fine-
grained colour differences in a perceptual state. Most empirical research into this 
problem suggests that the mechanism of colour perception is correlated to the contents 
of the colour perception. Here what we shall be concerned with is whether animals that 
can see detailed and fine-grained features of colours, but that do not possess the same 
concepts that we have, can perceive colour constancy as we do, i.e., whether they can 
have perceptual content of colour constancy as we do.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Of course, this does not mean that our perception of colour constancy is entirely 
conceptual. The issue here is whether nonhuman creatures, who are unable to access 
their perceptual contents in the same way humans do, have the same representational 
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If having a perceptual content of colour in non-human creatures is entirely dependent on 
only an enabling condition, as opposed to the traditional positions on the issue, non-
conceptualism, particularly UPC and SV types, may be supported by some practical 
examples. I briefly examine two typical examples of a non-cognitive creature’s 
perception of colour constancy and consider whether the method or the results of those 
experiments confirm the existence of non-conceptual content of experience.  
 
II-1.2.a. Honeybees 
In 1966 Mazokhin-Porshanjakov carried out an experiment with honeybees. The 
experiment aimed to find out whether honeybees are able to recognize the yellow 
dandelion flower, by its colour, under conditions of shade and sunshine. The bees were 
trained to find sugar-water in a glass dish on a yellow paper under direct sunlight. In the 
test, nine square pieces of coloured paper (eight green ones of different brightness and 
one yellow one) were shown on a rotating table. The yellow paper was shaded by a 
black rectangle screen. One striking feature of this experiment was that the bees found 
and landed on the yellow paper without hesitation, even though the paper looked less 
yellow or more green according to the different lighting conditions (Neumeyer 1998). 
The aim of this experiment was to show that perception of colour constancy is not 
altered by cognitive judgment; rather, it is closer to non-cognitive and automatic 
perceptual processes (Mazokhin-Porshanjakov 1966). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contents as humans have. We could have A-consciousness for accessing perceptual 
contents (if they really exist). However, it is doubtful whether animals are able to access 
perceptual contents consciously. In this sense, if animals have the same representational 
content as we have, then it can be concluded that those contents can be non-conceptual 
contents of experience.	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The above result tells us that perception of colour constancy is a natural visual process 
that does not rely upon cognitive judgment or consciousness (Neumeyer 1998), i.e., 
perception of constant colour is independent from the subject’s conceptual capacities.33    
So we could have an assumption that if animals, or any creatures who are considered to 
be unable to access their perceptual contents consciously, can enjoy experience of 
constant colours, and if they are able to represent the constant colour in the same way 
that humans do, then the representational contents of their perceptual states are not 
reportable.34  Hence, their perceptual contents may be examples of non-conceptual 
contents. In fact, a non-conceptualist (Crane (1992) in particular) holds that non-
conceptual content “eludes linguistic expression” and that it is not revisable by any other 
“inferential or evidential relations” (Cf. Toribio 2007: 446). Because of this, it could be 
that non-conceptual contents belong to mental states where the expository perspective is 
entirely excluded, therefore they would never be engaged with Type-2 (the capacity of 
understanding relational structure of perception and belief) and Type-3 (The capacity to 
categorise the object of perception) conceptual capacities. And, if contents of such states 
share the same contents with conceptually sophisticated creatures, then the content of 
those states may be non-conceptual because it implies that the way of representing a 
perceived object is not engaged with any type of conceptual capacities. From the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 However, the fact is that we may not know whether the bees landed on the yellow 
paper consciously or intentionally. This issue will be discussed more in section II-2.2.  
34 However, Block considers some animals, e.g., chimps, to have A-consciousness. He 
says that “very much lower animals are A-conscious” (2005: 238) without a concept of 
consciousness. But he does not clarify how such animals are able to report their 
perceptual contents as humans do. Most non-conceptualists who focus on animals 
experience hold that non-conceptual contents are the same representational contents as 
humans’, but not graspable or expressible using the same concepts humans have. In this 
sense, Block’s conclusion about chimps is just one possibility of many, and so, seems to 
be unsuitable grounds for drawing conclusions about the conceptual character of 
experience. 
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perspective, Peacocke argues that if “some of their perceptual states have contents in 
common with human perceptions”, we can draw the conclusion that “some perceptual 
representational content is non-conceptual” (2001: 614). 
The above experiment, and the non-conceptualist position more generally, make the 
assumption that there is a causal relationship between the objects and the animals’ 
representational contents of experience that we observe and from this assumption 
conclude that we have the same perceptual content as animals. At any rate, whether or 
not bees lack conceptual capacities, it seems quite clear that they are not dependent on 
concepts to find35  the target objects. If we assume that they are totally non-conceptual 
beings, as the experimenters do, then this may provide positive proof of the non-
conceptual content of experience. 
In the next section, I will examine human infants’ perception of colour constancy. 
 
II-1.2.b. Human Infants 
Non-conceptualists such as Peacocke (1998b and 2001) and Hurley (1998 and 2003), 
assume that human infants can enjoy perceptual experience as we do without possessing 
or deploying or entertaining concepts at all.36 Hence, if human infants are able to 
perceive, or at least recognize, a constant colour, which philosophers have traditionally 
thought that only conceptual creatures can perceive, and if some scientific approach 
proves this, then it will provide strong evidence for believing non-conceptualism – 
indeed, a large number of studies have tried to answer the questions of whether infants 
and adults have the same perceptual abilities, (e.g. perceptual constancy). Typically, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I will distinguish the difference between ‘finding an object’ and ‘having an experience 
of an object’ alongside the detection ability in Chapter III. 
36 Although it seems clear that human infants do not possess the same concepts that 
adult humans have, it is not quite clear why philosophers like Peacocke and Hurley think 
that they cannot have concepts of any kind. 
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experiments about infants’ perceptual abilities use “habituation to one pattern and 
subsequent dishabituation (recovery of visual attention) to a novel pattern, or 
familiarization to a series of stimuli that have one in variant property in common, 
followed by the presentation of a pattern that is novel in the sense of not possessing the 
invariant property” (Slater 1998: 8). I will briefly examine the psychological 
experiments on human infants’ perception of colour constancy in order to evaluate this 
perspective on the non-conceptualists’ case.  
Dannemiller (1989; See also: Yang et al. 2013) tested for colour generalization in 
human infants following illuminant alteration. The fundamental purpose of this 
experiment is to answer the question ‘when do children acquire colour constancy? In the 
experiment, infants between 2 and 5 months old were exposed to a computer display of 
coloured objects. Infants are known to prefer looking at something new or different, so 
the experimenter focused on how long the infants paid attention to changes in lightning 
and the object colours.         
In the experiment, Dannemiller found that 5monthold infants recognized the same 
bichromatic pattern after a change of illumination, but that they treated a change in 
reflectance under the original illumination as a novel object, that is to say, this group of 
infants paid more attention to the changes in objects rather than changes in lightning. On 
the other hand, 2monthold infants treated the same surface viewed under a new 
illumination as a novel surface, that is to say, this group paid equal attention to changes 
in the lightning and the object’s colours. 5monthold infants could generalize the surface 
colour after the illumination changes, but 2monthold infants could not. 
From this, Dannemiller concluded that colour constancy can be discriminated after five 
months of life in human beings. This result is consistent with research showing that 
colour vision develops during the early postnatal months (Brown 1987). In addition, 
human infants are thought to lack the ability to think critically and conceptually at this 
age. The important point is that being able to perceive colours is prior to linguistic 
development. Moreover, there is evidence that a certain area in the brain that allows us 
to perceive colour constancy – the so-called ‘V4’, which lets us perceive colour,–works 
instead of a cognitive area when we perceive colour constancy (Komatsu 1998). Human 
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infants’ V4 in this period works in the same way as human adults’ do. If colour vision is 
not affected by any cognitive inference, and 5monthold infants can discriminate37 colour 
constancy, then these might be practical examples of the non-conceptual content 
experience under the condition that experience here is just ‘mere seeing’, such as 
‘concept-free mental state’ (Cf. Dretske 2000). 
The results from the experiments on honeybees and human infants may be tied in closely 
with particular types of non-conceptual content (e.g., UPC, SV, and P-conscious 
experience)—assuming that we treat such creatures as having personal level of 
experience. Moreover, if we confirm the existence of perceptual contents in such 
creatures’ perceptual states by empirical research, then not only does their behaviour 
toward the given stimuli imply that we may prove the existence of perceptual contents 
by observing their behaviour but also that they are able to consciously access perceptual 
contents. These cases may then serve as practical examples of non-conceptual contents 
that cannot be engaged with the three types of conceptual capacities.38  
In the next section, I focus on a particular tendency involved in the above experiments. I 
then indicate three possible problems involved in this type of non-conceptual argument 
and I discuss whether these empirical studies are appropriate for explaining the content 
of experience. This discussion will eventually show why we should not consider the 
experience of non-human creatures to be relevant when evaluating the conceptual 
character of experience.   
II-2. Visible or Experiential? 
Following the previous results, I will indicate three problems involved in the type of 
argument for non-conceptual content that we have been considering. First, it is a causal 
relationship which holds between the stimulation response and the content of experience, 
and this makes the range of perceptual contents ambiguous. Secondly, these arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to conceptualism, discrimination ability is a type of conceptual ability. I 
examine this issue along with the re-identification condition, in depth in Chapter V. 
38 I will be returning to these experiments in II-4.  
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involve a misinterpretation of intentional causation between the behaviour of a non-
cognitive creature and the properties of an object. Lastly, there is a confusion in the 
notion of recognition as it is used in the human infants experiment. Along with the first 
problem, this confuses a continuous physical reaction with a type of recognition, and it 
also entails the contradiction that non-conceptual creatures can exhibit conceptual 
behaviours, particularly Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity). We 
shall see that the empirical data of non-cognitive creatures’ perception of colour 
constancy is inconclusive for showing either ‘what is represented in their perceptual 
states’ or the existence of non-conceptual contents of experience. 
On the basis of these three problems, I conclude that we cannot prove the non-
conceptual content of experience by appealing to a non-conceptual creature’s perception 
of colour constancy. 
 
II-2.1. Does a Causal Relation define Experience?	  
What we see from the honey-bees experiment is a possibility of discrimination of 
constant colour in the bees’ vision, but we may not see ‘what is represented’ in their 
visual experience. Moreover, the only thing that we find from the experiments is a 
causal relationship between the bees’ reaction and the yellow paper. What I want to 
argue is that this causality does not guarantee high correlation between the stimulation 
response and the content of experience. Of course, the experimenter or the non-
conceptualist might not claim that there is a guarantee of correlation; rather they may 
only be claiming that a reasonable explanation of such creature’s perceptual content 
depends on the causal relationship. However, this account does not show that the honey-
bees possess the mechanism of perceptual experience of colour constancy because it 
lacks an explanation of how we, and animals, can discriminate constant colour from 
apparent colour. Beyond all possible doubts, what we could find from the experiment 
would be the bees’ well-trained and proper reactions to the colour ‘yellow’ rather than 
the contents of their experience. As such, this would not guarantee any certainty about 
whether the bees really had experienced colour constancy. They may not directly say or 
report what aspects of an object they perceived. They cannot describe it in a manner that 
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we would find persuasive. Of course, this does not mean that their behaviour toward the 
yellow paper (the sugar-water dish) does not tell us anything about their perceptual 
contents about the constancy. For example, we might be able to figure out what they are 
seeing through observing their behaviour.   
 
II-2.1.a. The Problem of Experience as Perceptual Mechanism	  
Nevertheless, what the experiment does show us is that the bees can discriminate39 
between constant colour and apparent colour without using conceptual capacities, even 
though we may not explain how they perceptually judge the constant colour and the 
apparent colour. That is to say, we might be able to confirm that those creatures could be 
in a perceptual state involving a constant colour by observing their behaviour, viz. their 
behavioural response to a particular stimulus might suggest that they are able to be in a 
perceptual state without any type of conceptual engagement; hence their experiences 
could have non-conceptual content. However, in order to confirm the existence of 
perceptual content in such states, we are dependent on conscious access, i.e., conceptual 
engagement in the expository perspective. 
Strictly speaking, analysing the visual mechanisms and behaviours of creatures towards 
certain stimuli may allow us to infer what it is that those creatures are experiencing. 
However, it would be difficult to identify just what is represented in their visual state, 
through an analysis that depends only on the functional perspective on experience. It is 
certain that the mechanism of colour vision is different from the mechanism that 
composes colour experience. The mechanism of vision may cause colour experience but 
it is doubtful that this mechanism always determines the content of colour experience. 
For instance, take a highly efficient camera like that found in a mobile phone. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  If we treat animals as creatures with discrimination ability this raises another issue. 
One of the features of concepts is discrimination ability. This ability has to be 
accompanied by recognition ability. If animals are able to discriminate an object from 
others, then the content of their experience might be conceptual content, rather than non-
conceptual. I will explain more about this with reference to the relationship between 
‘discrimination ability’ and ‘the condition of possessing concepts’ in Chapter V.	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camera is able to find human faces automatically even when the target is moving. Also, 
it discriminates each individual’s face when taking a group photo. It operates well in 
every situation. If so, can we say that the camera experiences the faces because the 
camera recognises the constant face underlying those changes? Or is my mobile phone 
in a perceptual state of seeing a face? We may believe that this mechanism of finding a 
constant colour or face is required to have experience. But we seem to hesitate to treat 
such a mechanism as involving a genuine experience, i.e. what we call experience does 
not involve only its physical mechanism. It must include perceptual content. If so, then 
what is the difference between the camera and the honeybees if we only consider the 
functional perspective on experience? Are we really able to confirm perceptual contents 
of constancy in their perceptual states through taking only the functional perspective on 
experience? 
If we treat their behaviour toward to a certain stimuli as involving the existence of 
perceptual content, then this leads us to accept the stimulation responses as perception. 
That is to say, perceptual information of which we are not consciously aware can be 
included in the range of perceptual content for evaluating the conceptual character of 
experience. In addition, we do not seem to adopt all the perceptual information as 
contents of experience.40  
Of course, I do not intend to deny that such information plays a role in the process of 
experience, but this is an excessive extension of the range of perceptual content. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 This is a prominent feature in the expository perspective. In fact, we sometimes 
describe only part among all the perceptual information carried by experience, hence 
there can be missing contents in our description of experience, e.g., contents of P-
conscious experience or the fineness of grain in colour. Also our description of 
experience does not only seem to contain the phenomenal property of object itself or 
mere terms such as sounds and colours, rather we describe them in a great variety of 
terms such as a car honking and burnt sienna. This feature of the expository perspective 
will be discussed at the end of this chapter and chapters III and IV. 
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The problem, then, is that such perceptual information, or a creature’s reaction to a 
certain stimuli, may be included in experience. Again, contents of experience must allow 
accessibility in order to confirm what is in perceptual states; however, the possibility of 
conscious access was excluded in the cases of honeybees and human infants in the 
empirical studies because it is argued they are conceptually and cognitively 
unsophisticated creatures unlike us. Notwithstanding this, why should we consider their 
behaviour as having perceptual contents?  
 
II-2.1.a. The Problem of Perceptual Content as a Stimulation Response	  
Let us reconsider the human infants case. Can we say that 5montholds can experience 
colour constancy just because they can recognize the same bichromatic pattern, or 
because they have a working area V4? In other words, does a creature’s physical 
reactions to external stimuli really determine its experience? And does our analysis of 
such a creature’s behaviour or visual mechanisms really guarantee that it is in a 
perceptual state? Like the mobile phone in the previous example, all our senses always 
react to environments. And all sensibilities are determined by the ability of our sense 
organs. However, it is doubtful that a physical reaction to stimulus is perceptual 
experience. For example, we may not perceive oxygen sensuously. But our respiratory 
organs are always reacting to the gases in the air. We are not consciously aware of the 
gases, or even the respiratory system. But we may know others breath through the nose 
by observing or analysing other’s breath. Also, the existence of oxygen is demonstrated 
by the fact that we are breathing, even though we are not aware of its presence. Do we 
always experience oxygen while we are breathing? Or, are we in a perceptual state of 
oxygen? It seems not. We do know, however, that we are breathing, and we know of the 
existence of oxygen, but these facts do not cause the experience of oxygen, and they do 
not entail the presence of the perceptual content of oxygen. In the same way, animals 
and infants having certain visual conditions, for example, bees seeing ultraviolet colours 
invisible to the human eye, does entail that bees have the visual experience of an 
ultraviolet object. Of course, creatures have exposure to perceivable worlds according to 
their own enabling conditions of perception. However, we may not be able to have 
experience of oxygen or other gases in the air unless we are consciously aware of them, 
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even though our physiological mechanisms are always reacting to them.41 So it seems to 
me that the non-conceptualist’s assumptions about the causal relationships between 
creatures’ behaviour and the object property come from misconceiving such ‘states of 
exposure to the perceivable world’ and equating these with ‘experience’. In the same 
way, this confused notion of perceptual experience leads to the mistaken assumption that 
an enabling condition for perception which allows us to have perception of colours (e.g., 
SSRs, light, and retina)42 can be correlated with the content of perceptual experience. 
Here we find a second problem.   
 
II-2.2. Misinterpretation of Intentional Causation	  
The second problem is that an enabling condition of perception seems to imply a type of 
intentional attitude in the subject. Intentionality is a feature of the mind “by which 
mental states are directed at or are about, of, or refer to, states of affairs in the world” 
(Searle 1998: 64). For example, in the experiment with honeybees, the bees’ reactions 
are described as if they have an intentional attitude to the colour ‘yellow’. However, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Of course, ‘awareness’ is required to possess the concept of physical properties. To be 
more concrete, we are able to know (or assume) that we are in a state of breathing (or 
oxygen) through the conceptual engagement, not through the physical properties of 
oxygen. How are we aware of the physical property of breathing (oxygen particles, an 
activity of alveolus, filtering impurities in a lung, etc.) without such engagement? We 
are able to approach the content of a mental state of oxygen by possessing concepts (or 
relevant knowledge) about breathing. Hence, through the conceptual engagement, we 
can know that our perception is physically correlated with its caused object.	  
42	  In a recent work, Roessler argues that we can find three levels of enabling conditions 
for perceptual experience involved in Evans’s (1982) simple theory of perception: 
objects, features, and facts (Roessler 2009: 18-22). It is not that an enabling condition 
that I discuss in this thesis must belong to one of the three levels of enabling condition. 
Rather, my use of the term ‘enabling condition’ refers to physical factors of perception 
such as the wavelengths of light and visual cells.	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Searle pointed out, not all conscious states are intentional, and vice versa. Hence, 
whether or not the bees behaviour is conscious, they are in an intentional state. Since the 
bees act on the world, there is good reason to believe that they are in mental states with 
intentionality, but that does not entail they are conscious and nor does it determine 
whether their mental states are directed at the yellow paper or the sugar water.43  
The important point is that the bees are disposed to find sugar-water and not a yellow 
colour. In common sense terms, honeybees are ultra-sensitive to honey-like things. 
Hence, the indisputable intentional cause that stands between the bees and the paper is 
not yellow, but sugar-water. That is to say, the bees’ mental states are directed at sugar 
water and not the yellow paper. But it is described as if their ability to find sugar-water 
was directed intentionally to the yellow colour. The point is that we know they can find 
sugar-water and represent that. Somehow they can work with correlations learned 
between sugar-water and the constant yellow. However, it is quite unclear whether this 
behaviour involves intentional direction to the yellow paper. So, if we merely look at the 
bees’ behaviour, we would not be able to determine the intentionality of their experience, 
viz. we are not able to guarantee that they are intentionally related to an object simply by 
appeal  to physical causation.  
The result of the experiment of the conceptually unsophisticated creatures is based upon 
this misinterpretation of intentional causation because premises such as ‘animals can 
enjoy perceptual experience’ or ‘contents of their perceptual states have contents in 
common with human perceptions’ are just assumptions and ‘as-if attribution’ 
(McDowell 1994a and 1994b: 199) without verifying the existence of representational 
contents of such creatures’ perceptual states. As such, it seems that applying these ideas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Cf. “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastic of the Middle 
ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object 
(which is not to be understood here to be a thing), or immanent objectivity” (Brentano 
1973: 78–79). 
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in order to explain whether the content of colour experience is conceptual is 
inappropriate. Hence, without verifying representational contents of such creatures’ 
experience (if they really have experiences), the conclusion drawn from the experiments 
have to be reconsidered, because the experiments on non-conceptual beings are based on 
this misinterpretation of intentional causation between non-human beings and target 
objects. 
 
II-2.3. The Problem of Recognition in the Case of Human Infants	  
While the conclusion drawn from the experiment on honeybees is dependent on a 
misinterpretation of intentional causation, the use of the human infants case seems to 
involve a fundamental ambiguity in the experimenters’ usage of the concept of 
recognition. In fact, the visual organs of the infants in the experiment detect or perceive 
a certain repeated phenomenon that I would call a ‘pattern’. The process of looking at 
the pattern is what the experimenter calls recognition. Of course, many philosophers and 
psychologists have understood the notion of recognition in different ways. Among these, 
I wish to address the cognitive scientific account of recognition as its method is used in 
the experiment. According to this account, the functionality of pattern recognition is 
scientifically accepted. It plays an important role in our explanation of the functioning of 
biological neural systems, and is very significant to research into a central area of 
artificial intelligence. Scientific experiments with both humans and animals show that 
pattern recognition is a ‘very established capability of the mind’ (Margolis 1987). In 
addition, we do not seriously doubt that the perception of colour constancy is a type of 
pattern, which leads a subject to recognize it. We also may not doubt that the brain is 
able to recognize patterns, to react to patterns, to remember patterns, to repeat patterns, 
to associate patterns, and so on. 
 
II-2.3.a. Implicit Knowledge	  
Noe (2004), in his Action in Perception, advocates a view of colour constancy that in 
outline is very similar to that of Helmholtz (Noe 2004: Ch. 4; See also: Hilbert 2005). 
He claims that we have a certain implicit knowledge of the patterns found in the changes 
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of apparent colour with a viewing condition. Hence, we are able to use this implicit 
knowledge in order to “experience the actual colour of the object as, so to speak, that 
condition which governs or regulates the way these changes unfold” (2004: 128 cited in 
Hilbert 2005). Noe claims that colour constancy is not a sensory phenomenon we find in 
the usual examples of white walls that are differentially illuminated and the like, and 
“the correlations that we implicitly know and that support our conclusions about the 
‘actual’ colour are learned from experience” (2004: 127; See also: Hilbert 2005: 153–
154). The notable point here is that the experience of both a constant colour and an 
apparent colour implies that perception of both colours is affected by implicit knowledge, 
of the patterns they belong to. Hence, if colour constancy or the changes of apparent 
colour could form a type of pattern in material objects, then the recognition of constant 
colour seems not only to be an automatic visual process but also to be a mind-dependent 
process of vision. And if pattern recognition is a capability of the mind, then the 
perception of constant colour as a type of pattern recognition may be considered a type 
of thought: namely, Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity). Moreover, 
this assumption does not harm the idea that there may be a particular kind of mental 
entity with the physical role of detecting constant colour. 
 
II-2.3.b. The Two Contradictory Perspectives on Non-conceptual Creatures’ 
Recognition	  
It might be doubted whether the capability of pattern recognition implies the capability 
of possessing representational content 44  because the non-conceptualist and the 
experimenter do not take recognition to have the same representational content as a 
particular object, i.e., recognition might not involve the same perceptual content. Their 
assumptions are dependent on physical reactions to target objects. And the recognition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The non-conceptualist and the experimenter have not discussed representational 
contents. However, if we take experience of pattern recognition as a conscious 
experience, for instance, a result of Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of 
spontaneity), then it is possible to have a representational content when having the 
pattern recognition experience. 
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could only be in a subpersonal state where a perceiver cannot access its content. 
However, it seems clear that if pattern recognition is a well-developed capability of 
mind, then it can be considered to be, at least, conscious experience. Further, if the 
content can be proved scientifically, for example, in human infants’ perception of 
constant colour, it may also be proven that a subject and even an infant are able to be in 
a mental state of that pattern, e.g., constancy. Hence, it could be considered as a content 
of thought. Bermúdez also claims that: 
“A creature has perceptions with conceptual contents […] to the extent that its 
perceptual representations of the environment are determined by its 
classificatory and recognitional abilities.” (1999: 367)  
If this perspective is acceptable, then the experiment may support the conceptual 
character of human infants’ experience rather than the non-conceptual character of 
experience.   
At this point, the experiment on infants might be interpreted in one of two contradictory 
ways: First, that physical recognition may involve some type of content which is 
engaged with Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity); and second, a 
type of non-conceptual content can exist without the engagement of the mind. The 
fundamental reason for this contradiction is that the scientist and the non-conceptualist 
alike lack any specific reason to treat human infants as non-conceptual beings. Moreover, 
they sometimes do not clarify what a non-conceptual being is. That is to say, they treat 
human infants or animals as non-conceptual beings because they do not possess the 
same concept as human adults have, but they describe such creatures’ behaviour as 
having similar conceptual capacities 45  that human adults usually have, such as 
classification, discrimination, and recognition.  
The second reason is that their notion of recognition is not quite clear in that it refers to 
either having the same representational content of the same object or the same physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This capacity is different from the three major types of conceptual capacities. This 
would be more close to what we call conscious actions.	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reaction to the same property of an object. If recognitional abilities imply having 
conceptual content, as Bermúdez claims, then states of recognition could have 
thoughtful content, and therefore be conceptual, according to Type-1 conceptual 
capacity (the capacity of spontaneity). Otherwise, if it refers to the same reaction 
involving no representational content, then it might be no different from the ‘find a face 
function’ of the digital camera in a mobile phone.  
There is a very interesting point in that even non-conceptualists take different 
perspectives on the notion of non-conceptual creatures and the explanation of such non-
conceptual creatures’ behaviour toward a target object. That is to say, non-conceptualists 
treat such creatures as totally non-conceptual beings, but they describe nonhuman 
creatures’ physical reaction stimuli as if the creatures have experience involving 
representational contents to which human adults’ conceptual classification apply. That is 
to say, when such psychologists and non-conceptualists define non-conceptual beings, 
they usually say that animals do not have the same concepts that we human adults have. 
But when they describe such conceptually unsophisticated creatures’ behaviours toward 
a target object, they seem to treat such creatures as if they would be able to categorise 
the object of perception. So these two different perspectives make us confuse ‘what non-
conceptual beings really are’. Nevertheless, I would not want to say which perspective 
might be better to take in the cases of the bees and the infants. My point is that, although 
we take these contradictory perspectives on conceptually unsophisticated creatures’ 
experience, there is no way to find what is really in such conceptually unsophisticated 
creatures’ perceptual states because we are not able to share the expository perspective 
with such non-conceptual creatures – we can only presume. Again, in order to evaluate 
whether perceptual content is conceptual, we must consider the expository perspective 
on experience: however, in the case of human infants, we are not able to access their 
perceptual content under the condition that it is represented. So it is also doubtful 
whether they have perceptual contents on the basis that they have the same visual 
response to particular stimuli.  
In this respect, it seems that the experimenters are too dependent on very unclear 
definitions of recognition and experience. If such creatures are totally non-conceptual, 
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then they may not be able to recognize a particular pattern. If not, they could recognize a 
pattern; and might therefore be conceptual beings. As such, I want to argue that the 
attempted confirmation of non-conceptual content through unreliable and ambiguous 
assumptions is inappropriate. This does not mean their assumptions are totally useless. 
There is one more important point that we need to discuss in light of this. In some sense, 
the reason why the scientists treat the perception of such creatures as non-conceptual is 
that they do not consider what a conceptual capacity is in perceptual experience. It 
seems to me that the possession or existence of a conceptual capacity that I will call, ‘the 
conceptual engagement’ at the time of experience plays an important role in confirming 
the conceptual character or non-conceptual character of experience. 
In the next section, I first consider how non-conceptualists have treated the notion of 
non-conceptual content in relation to such creatures’ perceptual experience. Of course, 
the non-conceptualist Peacocke does not use the empirical studies of non-cognitive 
creatures, but he has the same view as the experimenters that animals are totally non-
conceptual beings who do not possess the same concepts as humans. I will criticize this 
view and argue that it depends on two false premises: (1) that animals’ behaviour such 
as ‘mere seeing’ can be experience, and (2) that the way we confirm whether animals 
have experience is to look at the causal relationship between their physical reaction and 
the given objects.    
  
II-3. Why Non-Conceptual Content?	  
Peacocke (1998) claims that the contents of non-human creatures’ perceptual states are 
non-conceptual because such creatures lack a concept of objectivity, even if they can 
share perceptual content with us. Hurley (1998 and 2003) also shares this view, but 
concentrates more on the ‘context-bound reason’ for action in animals. While non-
human animals and human infants can enjoy perceptual experience, Hurley claims that 
they lack full conceptual abilities possessed by human adults. Perceptual states, she 
argues, do not require “an ability to deploy concepts in a manner that is context-free and 
general” (1998: 187). Also, there might be intentionality, or what she calls “practical 
reasoning” (2003: 231), in an animal’s action towards a target object. Because of this, 
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she concludes that the perceptual experience of those creatures can be non-conceptual. 
On the same note, Bermùdez (1998) also argues that we may find non-conceptual 
contents in the behaviour of pre-linguistic children and nonhuman creatures, but he 
focuses more on the empirical findings of such creatures’ experience, particularly the 
‘subpersonal information-processing mechanism’. As with the experimenters from 
section II-2, he concludes that there is a non-conceptual content that a subject cannot be 
consciously aware of; therefore, like the arguments considered in the section II-2, all 
these arguments for non-conceptual content comparing nonhuman creatures’ behaviour 
are objections to Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity). 
However, the obvious fact that we need to focus on here is that the assumption ‘such 
creatures can have a particular perceptual content’ may only be understood by us using 
our own conceptual classifications. We may not know what is really represented in their 
perceptual states. 
In this section, I explore the non-conceptualist’s use of non-conceptual creatures’ 
perceptual experience, and then carefully consider the matter of the description of 
perceptual experience in non-conceptualism. The purpose of this section is to indicate 
the crucial problem of such views, namely that they treat such creatures as totally non-
conceptual beings, but they describe their physical reaction to external stimuli as if they 
had experience by using their own conceptual skills. This shows that non-conceptualists 
take different perspective (1) when they treat such creatures as totally non-conceptual 
beings, and (2) when they describe nonhuman creatures’ physical reaction to stimuli. 
They make the strong assumption that animals are non-conceptual beings unlike us, but 
their description involves an ‘as-if attribution’ that the creatures have experience 
involving representational contents to which human adults’ conceptual classification 
apply. These contradictory perspectives on non-cognitive creatures’ experience are 
based on the same assumption which we identified underlying the empirical research 
considered in section II-2, Also this shows that the non-conceptualists have 
contradictory perspectives on animal experience. This is very important to the criticisms 
of the non-conceptualists in this chapter.  
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II-3.1. Objectivity	  
Peacocke (1983: Ch. I) also compares animals experience to human beings’ in a slightly 
different way from the empirical studies on the non-conceptual creature’s perception. 
But this approach involves the same problem with the experimenters that we identified 
in the section II-2. 
According to Peacocke, all visual experiences include sensational properties of objects, 
and each experience has properties that are not represented in its content. Human  
experience may have more rich representational contents of objects than an animals’, but 
if both human and animal experience represent the same phenomenal properties of an 
object, then what they have in common in their perceptual states are “literally the same 
representational properties” (Peacocke 2001: 614). Peacocke says: 
“While being reluctant to attribute concepts to the lower animals, many of us 
would also want to insist that the property of (say) representing a flat brown 
surface as being at a certain distance from one can be common to the 
perceptions of humans and of lower animals. . . . If the lower animals do not 
have states with conceptual content, but some of their states have contents in 
common with human perceptions, it follows that some perceptual 
representational content is nonconceptual.” (Ibid) 
One reason for adopting this account is that a minimal requirement for having 
conceptual contents is a ‘grasp of objectivity’ (Peacocke 2001; See also: Speaks 2005). 
Of course, the perceptual states of animals could have an objective representational 
content; however, they are commonly thought to be unable to conceive representational 
content as objective. Unlike emotions (e.g., my happiness, sadness, touching, etc.) that 
exist in a subject’s mental state when the subject feels them, colours and shapes are 
objective qualities (or realities) that exist without any conscious awareness of them (e.g., 
perception, according to the Kantian view of objectivity). It is hard to believe that 
animals could consider what they perceive (e.g. constant colours), as objective qualities. 
In addition, they cannot conceive of themselves subjectively unlike us. Indeed, a 
perceiver does not require a grasp of objectivity in order to be in a perceptual state. 
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Hence, perceptual contents sometimes are not objectivity-invoked contents, according to 
Peacocke. So, it may be considered non-conceptual. Peacocke also argues that “the 
primitive aspects of representational content in perception, which our subjective 
experience shares with mere animals, do not involve the grasp of objectivity required for 
conceptual content” (2001: 264). Animals have been thought by both the conceptualist 
and non-conceptualist to be unable to understand objectivity because they seem to be 
incapable of active and self-critical thinking.46 In short, objectivity is understood only by 
creatures who are able to process active and self-critical thinking; hence contents which 
involve objectivity are conceptual. The position being defended Peacocke here is, first 
that animals do not seem to have the capability of active and self-critical thinking47; and 
second that perceptual representational contents that we and animals share are not 
objectivity-invoked contents, and so, can be non-conceptual.   
 
II-3.1.a. Perceptual States without Objectivity	  
Peacocke (2001) insists that we need to distinguish the difference between ‘content 
which is objective’ and ‘possession of a concept of objectivity’. In this sense, he insists 
that the non-conceptual character of experience in animals and human beings is based on 
the discrimination abilities between the two. Peacocke wants to argue that, in comparing 
animal and human experience, we might also be able to have contents that concern the 
objective world without possessing a concept of objectivity, i.e., we could be in a mental 
state about the objective world without deploying or entertaining any concepts at all. 
Peacocke seems to believe that this is a type of perceptual state. 
If this is correct, what we need to focus on is why Peacocke turns this objectivity into a 
question of the conceptual character of experience. He would probably say that concepts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The conceptualist McDowell shares Peacocke’s view on animals’ perceptual contents. 
He insists that “we can say that we have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity 
to features of our environment, but we have it in a special form” (1994a: 64). This 
special form is the faculty of spontaneity that distinguishes us from animals.   
47 This view is shared by McDowell (1994a). 
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are sufficient for objectivity in experience because he seems to infer the non-conceptual 
character of experience from the non-objectivity of experience. In which case we may 
ask Peacocke whether or not a perceptual content is conceptual if it can be grasped by a 
concept, regardless of whether or not it is objective. That is to say, if we think that there 
is any chance of Type-3 conceptual capacity (the capacity to categorise the object of 
perception), i.e., there is a possibility that any perceptual content can be grasped by 
concepts in the expository perspective on experience, there is no reason to exclude the 
conceptual character of experience. However, the issue raised in this chapter is that it is 
difficult to verify the expository perspective on animal experience. Of course, as I 
indicated in the section II-2, an animal’s perceptual content is not suitable for evaluating 
the conceptual or non-conceptual content of experience even though they can be in a 
perceptual state without any conceptual engagement. 
 
II-3.1.b. Perceptual Content and Objectivity	  
McDowell (1994a) has also emphasized the understanding of objectivity as a conceptual 
capacity. This perspective―namely that a perceptual content is constituted of concepts 
involving objectivity― is surely the most crucial point of conceptualism that could 
allow the non-conceptual character of experience from the functional perspective. 
According to McDowell (1994a)’s idea of conceptual contents and objectivity:   
(1) Perceptual experiences have genuine contents. 
(2) If perceptual experiences have genuine contents, then these contents must be 
objective. 
(3) If the contents are objective, they must be conceptual. 
Therefore, the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual. 
Both the conceptualist and non-conceptualist may agree with (1). Also, subjects may 
need to have a high level cognitive capacity (Peacocke 2003) like memory or 
categorization beyond mere perception, in order to satisfy (3). However, Peacocke 
argues that there is no plausible reason to believe that subjects must be able to 
understand objectivity in order to have a perceptual experience that has contents which 
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are objects. This seems right. In fact, we are not required to possess the concept of 
objectivity in order to perceive the objective world or to be in a perceptual state about 
the world. Perception does not seem to be prevented by a lack of objectivity because the 
basic understanding of ‘objectivity’, generally, is a necessary precondition for rational 
critical thought. Hence, objectivity could exist only in thought, but it is doubtful that 
perceptual states are types of thought, as stated by CV (Content View).48 Peacocke tells 
us that, “perceptual states provide the necessary basis for more flexible forms of thought; 
but they can also exist in the absence of those more sophisticated abilities” (2003: 
615).49 Because of this, he claims that perceptual states might have content without the 
concept of objectivity. If conceptualists fail to directly call this assumption into question, 
it may imply that there must be contents in any level of the visual process. And if a 
perceptual state is distinguished from thought, it could possess a content, which can then 
be non-conceptual. Hence, Peacocke’s argument might support a type of non-
conceptualism that takes the functional perspective on experience.  
In the next section, I examine another version of non-conceptualism suggested by 
Hurley (1998 and 2003), namely ‘practical reasoning’ in animals’ behaviour. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 A content of perceptual experience is entirely different from a conceptual content that 
belongs to thoughts or beliefs (e.g. propositions). This idea coincides with what Speaks 
calls ‘absolute non-conceptual contents of experience’ stating that “the contents of 
thoughts are propositions, whereas the contents of perceptions are not” (Speaks 2005: 
364). 
49	  It is still difficult to accept that perception is sometimes entirely independent of 
thoughts. However, the fact that perception could occur without thoughts does not imply 
the non-conceptual character of experience, because perception is possible without any 
thought-form, but its contents are approachable in personal level under the condition that 
the expository ability belongs to thought, viz. the content of subpersonal state could be 
engaged with Type-3 conceptual capacities that categorise the object of perception 
during the processes of experience. This will be discussed through chapters III to V.	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II-3.2. Practical Reason	  
While Peacocke focuses on understanding objectivity as a conceptual capacity, Hurley 
(1998 and 2003) concentrates more on normative conceptual and inferential capacities. 
She begins with the premise that nonhuman creatures seem to lack the full conceptual 
capacities possessed by human adults. But she defines animals as intentional agents with 
‘practical reason’.50 We have seen that the main reason for holding conceptualism is that 
perceptual contents must be conceptual in order to be a reason for belief. Hurley does 
not deny this view. What she argues is that this does not entail that reasons for action 
must be conceptual even though reasons for belief must be conceptual (1989: Chapters 7 
to 9). Practical reason, as she defines it, is not a type of inferential rationality, rather it is 
a reason for action that the agents have toward a target object, i.e., a type of 
intentionality. As we have seen in the section II-2.2, intentionality is a feature of the 
mind, and not all conscious states are intentional, and vice versa. In this sense, animals 
are totally non-conceptual beings but they can be in intentional states, therefore they can 
act for reasons. She says, 
“An intentional agent who lacks context-free conceptual and inferential 
abilities and does not conceptualize her reasons can still act for reasons that are 
her own, reasons from her perspective…Reasons for action can be context-
bound and lack conceptual generality.” (2003: 231) 
The conclusion she wants to draw here is that an animal’s behaviour toward a particular 
object can occupy reason for acting. However, this does not necessarily entail or require 
an ability to reason about, or justify, what should be done in a particular situation (2003: 
232; see also Hurley 1998: 139). And non-conceptual content, as Hurley understands it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  She appeals to this notion of practical reason in order to argue that the space of reason 
is not co-extensive with the space of inference. Hence, practical reason, as she defines it, 
is an ability that is distinct from an inferential skill that conceptually sophisticated 
creatures such as human adults have (See: Hurley 2003: 231).	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is “not needed for, or able to serve, epistemological purpose, and that conceptual 
content51 is needed” (2003: 232). She gives an example of a monkey: 
“Suppose a monkey observes that conspecific A is dominant over B and that B 
is dominant over C and, never having observed A and C together, registers that 
A is dominant over C, and is able to use this information in instrumentally 
appropriate ways in relation to various goals. Nevertheless, she might be unable 
to generalize the ability to make transitive inferences to foraging context, such 
as tree A has more fruit than tree B, which has more than tree C, so tree A has 
more fruit than tree C.” (2003: 238-239) 
Because of this, she argues that animal’s behaviour towards a particular object involves 
a practical reason for its actions, hence, she concludes that an animal could have 
perceptual content about that object. However, animals do not possess the same 
conceptual capacities as adult humans, such as inferential skills; hence they are 
considered as non-conceptual creatures. If animals lack such inferential thought, then we 
may conclude that animals are totally non-conceptual beings even though they are able 
to act for reasons. 
If Hurley is right, then there is a possibility that animals could be in a perceptual state 
with non-conceptual content. This argument could show the existence of perceptual 
content in the honey-bees case because they also seem to have practical reasons for their 
action toward sugar-water. Hence, this argument may be an objection to Type-1 
conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) as well as Peacocke’s argument, and 
Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational structure of 
perception and belief) because perceptual contents can be a reason for action, rather than 
a reason involving inferential thoughts that form beliefs.  
In the next section, in connection with both Peacocke’s and Hurley’s arguments, I 
critically examine the possibility of having non-conceptual contents, alongside 
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  Hurley also does not give us a clear definition of ‘conceptual content’ unlike 
McDowell and Brewer. Rather she focuses on conceptual abilities that we can find in 
animal behaviour (Cf. Hurley 2003: 232-233).	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Bermùdez’s argument that subpersonal states must have contents that can be non-
conceptual. 
II-3.3. Are Sub-Personal States Experiences?	  
Bermùdez (1998) draws on Peacocke’s notion of non-conceptual content, but he 
concentrates on explaining the behaviour of pre-linguistic children and non-human 
creatures, relying heavily on empirical results in developmental psychology and 
cognitive science. His idea of non-conceptual content is very close to that in our 
previous discussion of the experiments in the section II-2. In light of these results, he 
argues that “not only the notion of non-conceptual content is suitable the personal level 
domain of perceptual experience, but also, for the domain of subpersonal computational 
states posited by information-processing accounts of vision” (Bermùdez 1995 cited in 
Toribio 2007: 448). He finds it a feasible idea that, if subpersonal information-
processing mechanisms really can process information, then the states of these 
mechanisms must have contents that can be non-conceptual. Also, this state or 
mechanism is not required to consider any objectivity of objects. As I mentioned above, 
it is quite reasonable that this mechanism could occur without any conceptual 
engagement. And the claim that the information obtained by the senses can be processed 
in subpersonal states is acceptable. Also, it does not seem to be directly correlated with 
forming empirical beliefs, but it could be possible to have a practical reason for action 
using this information. 
However, what we have to pay attention to here is that this type of non-conceptualist 
seems to claim that there must be contents in a subject’s perceptual states if we can 
guarantee that she is seeing an object or they are acting upon a particular object. That is 
to say, it seems that what they call ‘information’ is the content of those states; and these 
contents can be non-conceptual in certain mental states, subpersonal, or even at a certain 
level of visual processing.52 However, it seems unclear what exactly ‘information’ really 
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  This is a very typical thought in this type of non-conceptualism. But the problem I 
want to raise here is how subjects are able to access the contents of such states without 
conceptual engagement. And if the contents of such thought are graspable using 
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refers to here: it can either be a visual response or content unaccessed by the Type-3 
conceptual capacities that categorise the object of perception, or both. What Bermùdez 
argues is that “not only the notion of non-conceptual content is suitable the personal 
level domain of perceptual experience, but also, for the domain of subpersonal 
computational states posited by information-processing accounts of vision” (Bermùdez 
1995 cited in Toribio 2007: 448). If it only refers to information in subpersonal states, 
we should consider how it is different from the non-conceptual content in the personal 
level of experience because the content of the personal level experience has the 
possibility of being engaged with the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the 
object of perception at a later time. And we ought to attempt to find a way of how we 
can access content of subpersonal experience without depending on the expository 
perspective on experience. However, there seems no way of knowing the content of 
subpersonal states because the content of those states is not accessible by its perceiver. 
What is more, these non-conceptualists believe that there are contents in such states 
without considering the expository perspective on experience. This perspective leads us 
to cross the borderline between the consciousness and unconsciousness when we 
evaluate the conceptual character or the non-conceptual character of experience. 
This feels like a very ineffective method for evaluating the conceptual character of 
experience because this perspective seems to involve two problems. First, it could treat a 
perceiver’s physical reactions (or what Hurley calls ‘action’) to certain objects as a type 
of perceptual state or experience. But I think that this is over-interpretation of perceptual 
content. We get the results of those experiments, developed by non-conceptualists and 
other scientists, through observation, but this has a bearing on our conceptual 
classification. Moreover, an animal’s reaction to a given stimulus, or what is represented 
by the stimulus, can only be described by us. That is to say, whether or not they have 
experience, the ‘content’ of their experience is totally dependent on our conceptual 
classification and description. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concepts at the personal level of experience, why does the conceptual character of these 
kinds of contents have to be removed? This implies significant ambiguity in the 
distinction between ‘inaccessibility of contents’ and ‘lack of conceptual capacities’.	  
85	  
	  
Second, we may not be able to guarantee that the result of the experiments or the non-
conceptualist’s assumption really proves animals experience. It simply shows how we 
and animals can perceive the world without utilizing the concept of objectivity or 
inferential skills, but it does not show how the content of perception is constituted in 
their experience. What we can only confirm, given  their behaviour, is that they can react 
to the given object. 
In the next section, I argue that there is a problem of description and a contradiction 
involved in their premises.  
 
II-4. The Content of Experience and the Conceptual Character of Description	  
As we have seen, the previous examples of non-conceptual creatures’ perception of 
colour constancy may lead to the assumption that our contents of experience are 
sometimes non-conceptual. This approach, namely applying non-conceptual beings’ 
experience to human experience, seems as plausible as any other explanation, to non-
conceptualists. However, we have also noted a tension in the non-conceptualist account 
in that (1) non-conceptualists treat such creatures as totally non-conceptual beings, and 
(2) the non-conceptualist describes non-human creatures’ physical reaction to stimuli as 
if the creatures have experience involving representational contents to which human 
adults’ conceptual classification apply. Of course, I do not deem it unnecessary to define 
whether such creatures are totally non-conceptual. But the point is that the description 
based on physical causality is easily open to misconstruing such creatures’ behaviour as 
conceptual activity because it is possible that descriptions involving our conceptual 
classification could entail conceptual capacities. In some cases, concepts involved in 
such descriptions seem to satisfy the recognition condition for conceptual capacities 
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suggested by Crimmins (1989) and Millar (1991)53 that most non-conceptualists accept. 
This could be another reason for believing that we need to exclude non-conceptual 
creatures’ perception of colours in order to explain our content of experience. 
Let us reconsider the experiments in section II-1.2. In the experiments, the creatures 
were free to react to the stimuli of colour appearance. We may not believe such reactions 
are a type of discrimination ability that uses conceptual capacities. In this instance, it 
could be possible either that conceptually unsophisticated creatures can perceive colour 
constancy without utilizing concepts or that it is possible for them to have a conceptual 
content of the constant colour. But this might lead us to another trap. The second 
possibility exists only when our conceptual classification is applied to an animal’s 
reaction to stimuli. Whether or not such creatures could utilize concepts, the terms 
‘discrimination’, ‘yellow’, ‘colour’, and ‘constancy’ are our conceptual classification, 
not such creatures’.54 The descriptive statement such as ‘honeybees found and landed on 
the yellow paper without hesitation’ could be also considered in terms of which of our 
conceptual classifications were applied. But these classifications might not be relevant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  An	   animal’s ability to find constant colour itself does not seem to satisfy this 
condition, however, our description of their behaviour seems to imply that animals can 
discriminate the objective property such as a constant colour ‘yellow’ in every situation 
where the concept ‘yellow’ can be applied. In this sense, there can be partially 
conceptual activity that could satisfy the recognition condition.	  
54	  However, Philosophers like Gaskin (2006) believes that animals have the same 
conceptual content of experience as we have. On his account, their experience can be 
transcendently constituted as having conceptual contents by our powers of designation 
and classification, to the effect that they can be counted as having experience with 
conceptual contents even though they are unable to express their empirical contents 
linguistically. I will not argue this in depth because the confirmation of the existence of 
perceptual content must allow accessibility by its perceiver in this thesis. In this sense, 
perceptual representational content confirmed by others’ description cannot be 
perceptual content for evaluating conceptual character of experience in this thesis.	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the creatures because we cannot share their representational contents only depending on 
the functional perspective. Where we can have agreement with them is not in content, 
but in our observation or description of their behaviour in relation to the world. 
Now we can consider a mechanical device that explains an animal’s reaction to stimuli 
more reasonably. Suppose that there is a programmed device that utters ‘Be careful, this 
is hot’ when it is placed by a very hot object (approximately over 60°C). This device 
does not form any inferential beliefs derived from the programmed order 60°C. It only 
activates according to the programmed order; it cannot violate the programme by itself. 
Yet we can explain and prove how this device can find a hot object and discriminate it 
from other temperature objects. However, the problem is that we may not prove that this 
device can have experience of ‘hot’ based on its mechanical features.55 It seems quite 
obvious that being able to discriminate or to perceive a particular property does not 
directly entail having a content of such perception or discrimination, viz. an enabling 
condition for perception does not define the content of that perception. Explanations of 
the non-conceptual creatures’ perception drawn by non-conceptualists and the 
experimenter are no different from explanations of the device’s inner workings using our 
conceptual classifications.  
If we concede that they have some discrimination ability, or if our conceptual 
description of their behaviour is accepted as the correct explanation of their perceptual 
state, then aren’t they able to use concepts for grasping coloured objects? Or can we 
prove that they are genuinely experiencing? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 	  Of course, this device could even discount ambient temperature in order to 
‘discriminate’ a constant temperature rather than showing the apparent temperature. 
Hence it could be thought that perception of constancy is not affected by a subject’s 
conceptual capacities. However, the question that I want to consider here is whether this 
device, or the honeybees, or even ourselves, could have contents of the constancy as a 
content of experience even if it could be perceived without any conceptual engagement. 
I discuss this issue in more depth, alongside perceptual variation, in the next chapter.	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Our conceptual description of their behaviour seems to lead us to believe that we 
consider them as if they have contents of experience about a particular property such as 
a constant colour, or as if they undertake conceptual activity, such as discrimination. 
Unfortunately, in the case of animals, we can only confirm a physical reaction to objects; 
we do not see what is really represented in their perceptual states. At this time, the only 
perspective we can take seriously toward animals’ behaviour is a ‘sideways-on-view’ 
(McDowell 1994a: 166-170) to which our conceptual classification applies. Hence, we 
are not able to confirm what is really represented in animals’ perceptual states because 
we cannot share a description of their experience (using the expository perspective) 
through reflection. Moreover, there is also the problem of whether animals have the 
same inferential skills as us, even if we can suppose that they are able to express the 
contents of their perception in a similar manner to the device described. 
In this respect, it might appear that it is not reasonable to argue that animals have 
perceptual experience on the basis of observation of their physical reactions to the world.  
  
II-5.  Why Does it have to be Non-Conceptual?	  
Until this point, this chapter has examined the non-conceptual arguments focusing on 
perceptual contents that do not allow any conscious access by the perceiver, i.e., 
perception excluded by the expository perspective.  These can be objections to Type-1 
conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) and Type-3 conceptual capacity (the 
capacity to categorise the object of perception). 
In particular, I indicated that there are three problems involved in the appeal to empirical 
studies of conceptually unsophisticated creatures such as animals and human infants: (1) 
the causal relationship between such creatures’ behaviour and the constant colour, (2) 
misinterpretation of intentional causation, and (3) the use of ambiguous definition of 
recognition. I argue that the empirical studies involving these problems are inconclusive 
for supporting non-conceptual contents because we are not able to conclude that the 
existence of perceptual representational content in conceptually unsophisticated 
creatures on the basis of the empirical studies. The empirical studies of animals take the 
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range of experience too widely to justify us in concluding the presence of perceptual 
representational content.  
I also briefly examined three types of non-conceptual arguments comparing non-
cognitive creatures’ experience for demonstrating the non-conceptual character of 
experience: objectivity (Peacocke 1998), practical reason without inferential thoughts 
(Hurley 1998 and 2003), and information-processing in subpersonal states (Bermùdez 
1998). As well as the empirical studies, these arguments are tied in closely UPC and SV 
type non-conceptual contents. Eventually these arguments will challenge Type-1 and 
Type-3 conceptual capacities. Through examining these, I indicated the crucial problem 
with these arguments, specifically that this perspective on a non-cognitive creature’s 
experience seems to be based on the same tendency that the experimenters have in 
section II-2, and, moreover, that this raises a serious tension within the non-conceptualist 
account. We have seen that the tension arises because non-conceptualists treat such 
creatures as totally non-conceptual beings, but they describe their physical reaction to 
external stimuli as if they had experience by using human adults’ conceptual 
classification. 
To conclude, I have explained why we have to reject the view that the existence of 
perceptual content can be fully explained through empirical research or an observation 
of the relationship between animals’ behaviour and target objects. This is because the 
notion of experience that this thesis employs does not only refer to a simple mental state; 
rather, it is “the class of mental state or events” (Flanagan 1992: 200) that compose 
experience. In this respect, the difficulty lies in explaining how ‘experience’ could refer 
to only one particular stage of experience. We should consider both perspectives on 
experience for evaluating the conceptual character of experience because we are 
sometimes unable to confirm the existence of perceptual content by considering only the 
functional perspective. And most of the non-conceptual approaches that this chapter 
examined hold that a content of perception can be non-conceptual because an enabling 
condition for perception seems not to be engaged with any type of conceptual capacities 
by subjects, e.g., the digital camera. 
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In connection with the next chapter, the point we need to take from this discussion is the 
non-conceptualist’s argument that we do not need a particular concept or conceptual and 
inferential capacity to have perceptual experience, so the content of our perceptual 
experience can be non-conceptual. This claim might be underpinned by the fact that an 
enabling condition for perception is passive. In fact, to be a perceiver, there must be an 
object: for example, a yellow dandelion, there must be light that can reflect the surface 
of the flower, and we have to possess a certain visual system that is able to react to the 
reflectance. But these enabling conditions of colour perception are not sufficient 
conditions for colour experience. Of course, I have agreed that perception sometimes 
occurs passively, i.e., experience as considered from the functional perspective. 
However, is the content of perceptual experience composed passively? That is to say, 
why isn’t the information obtained by stimuli processed actively in the mind? Why are 
we passive in our own thoughts? In addition, non-conceptualists do not explain why the 
conceptual engagement in the information would be excluded from the visual experience 
process. 
In the next chapter, I discuss in more depth how the content of our experience is not a 
simple physical reaction to external stimuli that we see in animals; it is a conceptualized 
content that is engaged with conceptual capacities. As a result, all the perceptual content 
in experience can possibly be engaged with conceptual capacities—particularly Type-3 
conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception. So it must be able to be 
grasped by concepts that the subject possesses. That is to say, there could be non-
conceptual content if we only take the functional perspective on experience, but we can 
see how the content in the process of experience can be engaged with conceptual 
capacities if we consider the expository perspective. Using the example of perceptual 
variation, particularly in colour, in the next chapter I will claim that we have clear 
conceptual contents of perceptual experience. 
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Chapter III. Colour Variation and Conceptual Content 
	  
Is the Content of Colour Experience Entirely Defined by its 
Physical Properties? 
  
In connection with the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to focus on the 
expository perspective on experience in order to evaluate the conceptual character of 
experience even though its functional perspective is not engaged with any type of 
conceptual capacity at all. While chapter II considered perceptual contents that are not 
consciously accessible (i.e. A-Consciousness and the exclusion of the expository 
perspective on experience), this chapter focuses on cases where subjects can have 
different contents of experience in the expository perspective even though they share the 
same perceptual contents when taking the functional perspective, for instance, when they 
share the same enabling condition of perception. That is to say, subjects could have 
different perceptual contents even if the subjects having the systemically same vision 
that are exposed to the same stimuli. As such, this chapter emphasizes Type-3 
conceptual capacity (the capacity to categorise the objects of perception) in colour 
experience that perceived contents are graspable by concepts that the perceiver possesses. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section III-1 focuses on colour physicalism, which has 
held a dominant position in explaining the colours of objects. According to this view, 
colour itself is a property of objects and has the phenomenal character of making objects 
appear to perceivers as they are. In explaining such features of colours, some neuro-
physiological analysis of visual organs and scientific analysis of light seem to give 
persuasive explanations that support colour physicalism. Some philosophers (in 
particular Byrne and Hilbert 1997 and Tye 1995, 2000, and 2004), believe that the 
content of colour experience is necessarily related to the physical property of colour; 
they claim that “colours are type of surface spectral reflectance (SSR) and colour content 
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and colour phenomenology necessarily go together” (Byrne and Hilbert 1997: 264).56 I 
critically examine how this view supports the idea of non-conceptualism.  
In section III-2, I raise the problem of colour variation in order to bring up two 
implications involved in the non-conceptualist’s use of colour physicalism: First, that 
colours are mind-independent properties of material objects; and second, that the 
physical property of colour is directly engaged in constituting the content of colour 
experience. Through exploring the example of variation, we may also see that there must 
be the two perspectives (the functional and the expository) on colour experience. I argue 
that the physicalist seems to ignore the importance of the expository perspective in 
constituting the content of experience.    
Section III-3 discusses two things. First, I consider the non-conceptualist’s two 
responses to the colour variation problem. One simple solution uses the analogy of a 
similar case involving mechanical devices, the other appeals to the normality of 
perceivers. Through examining these, I explore why non-conceptualists adopt the 
physicalist account of colour perception in developing their view. Second, I critically 
examine these responses, alongside two objections and one consideration. I argue that 
the analogy leads us to take an equivocal position on matters of contents of experience. 
The question ‘what kind of content do perceivers have in their visual experience?’ is not 
fundamentally about simple, sensuous, and automatic reactions to external stimuli like 
that displayed by the devices (as we saw in Chapter II) used in the analogy; rather it is 
about how it is accessed in a subject’s perceptual experience. This is more closely 
related to the expository perspective on experience than the functional perspective 
because being able to explain the content of perception (either it is physical or 
description) means being able to access the content conceptually, even if it is true that 
colour perception could occur without any conceptual capacity because our contents of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Like the non-conceptualism examined in the previous chapter, these philosophers have 
the same tendency to think that an enabling condition of perception could define a 
content of experience, but this allows the possibility of a subject’s conscious access, e.g., 
A-consciousness.	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experience do not represent numerical analysis that is offered by perceptual data 
processing. That is to say, we do not recite calculation results of perceptual mechanisms 
when having an experience. As such, the colour variation case clearly shows Type-3 
conceptual capacity (the capacity to categorise the objects of perception). In addition, in 
the case of colour variation, it could be thought that one of two normal perceivers’ 
colour experience is just an optical illusion if it does not correspond to the other normal 
perceiver’s contents of experience. However, there is no clear criterion for 
discriminating illusion from genuine experience in the case of colour variation. 
In the concluding section III-4, I emphasize the point derived from section III-3 that we 
do not experience physically fixed colours: rather colours that we experience are 
dependent on possession of concepts and also upon the circumstances in which they 
occur. I then claim that the contents of colour experience are not responses of visual 
neurons to the physical properties of colours as we concluded in the second chapter; 
rather, they are an application of concepts to stimuli and objects because we may 
conceptually access colour content with concepts when taking the expository perspective 
on experience. This is the difference from the cases considered in the second chapter, in 
which that we could only take the functional perspective of experience. Hence, although 
there can be non-conceptual processes at the occurrence of perception because the 
physical features of vision (an enabling condition of visual perception) that leads a 
subject to be in a visual state, the subject is able to nevertheless access the content of 
perception conceptually, in line with Type-3 conceptual capacity (the capacity to 
categorise the objects of perception). 
As a result, what we can perceive can be proven by scientific and neurophysiological 
analysis; but on the other hand, how we understand a content of perception is defined by 
our description of that perception. 
 	  
III-1. SSRs and Colour Perception	  
There is evidence to suggest that the surface spectral reflectance (SSRs) of objects 
concretely defines their colours – this view is called ‘reflectance physicalism’. 
According to reflectance physicalism (Byrne and Hilbert 1997 and 2004), the reflectance 
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of a certain object is independent of any colour signal that is affected by different 
lighting, and our visual systems which perceive constant colours are designed to detect 
this reflectance (Tye 2000). This type of physicalism seems very attractive to 
philosophers and psychologists because the prevalent view of colours – that colours 
belongs to objects – is underpinned by scientific theory.       
One of the strengths of reflectance physicalism is that it explains colour constancy very 
well. For example, the faces of a white box may have two or more different colours 
under some light (that is, its own colour and apparent colours); nevertheless, we perceive 
the object as having one colour (white). This colour constancy is not explained by 
wavelength and amount of light, but can be explained by surface spectral reflectance 
(SSR), which is an illumination-independent property.57 If we check the SSR of the 
faces of the box, we can easily find out what colour the box really is. The reason why we 
perceive it as white is because it reflects a certain amount of light, and our visual 
systems are designed to detect such reflectance.58 
 
III-1.1. SSRs and Perceptual Content	  
According to reflectance physicalism, the phenomenal character of colour experience is 
necessarily correlated with the physical properties of an object (Byrne and Hilbert 1997). 
If this is so, perception of constant colour is entirely determined by SSRs and the 
mechanism of vision; hence, a perceptual state representing constant colour is of a 
different type from belief content because the representational contents involved in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  All objects reflect light. However, the amount of reflected light or the reflected 
wavelength is not the colour of the object. “The surface spectral reflectance (SSR) of an 
object is given by specifying, at each wavelength in the visible spectrum, the percentage 
of light the object reflects at that wavelength” (Byrne and Hilbert 1997: 265). The SSR 
of an object does not change even if the object is taken from indoor illumination to a 
sunny outdoor place.	  
58	  According to Bradley and Tye, “the colours we see are tailored to the colour detection 
system evolution has given us” (2001: 481).	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perception are constituted by information generated by enabling conditions that are 
determined by the properties of the object rather than a subject’s mental processes. In 
addition, Byrne and Hilbert insist that “…the colour content and colour phenomenology 
of visual experience cannot come apart” (1997: 267). Tye (1995) also considers the 
phenomenal character of colour rather than its epistemic aspect, but he claims that 
phenomenal character is not neurophysiological, biochemical, or physical, rather it is in 
the representations: he says, “[…] phenomenal character is identical with 
representational content that is poised, abstract, non-conceptual and intentional” (Tye 
2000 cited in Macpherson 2003: 619).59 
This perspective shares the scientist’s and experimenter’s idea that the phenomenal 
character of an object which makes a subject to be in a perceptual state could be 
determined by certain of its properties. As we have seen in section I-2, contents of 
experience, constituted without any conscious access may be considered non-conceptual 
because subjects are not dependent upon their mind in order to have representational 
content of an object (e.g., a red apple) – this is the non-conceptual character of 
perception. Therefore, if colour perception is dependent on a physical property and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Of course, Tye (1995) changed his mind about the physicalist thesis that our feelings 
are in the brain at all. He now defends the representational view of experience that 
phenomenal consciousness is not in the neurons, but belongs to the representations. 
Nevertheless, he claims that contents of experiential states do not entail Fregean senses, 
e.g., modes of presentation, which has been traditionally considered as conceptual 
content. Also he insists that we are capable of many more feelings about colours than 
concepts that we possess, hence content of those states can be non-conceptual. Tye’s 
perspective on phenomenal character seems to share the same idea with Block’s (1995) 
P-conscious experience and Evans’ (1982) fine-grainedness argument. Yet, I do not 
discuss how Tye could deal with reflectance physicalism for arguing his notion of non-
conceptual content. Rather, what this chapter focuses on is Tye’s argument is that it 
seems to ignore the expository perspective on experience. While phenomenal states are 
non-conceptual, there is still the possibility of A-consciousness in experience. Hence, 
there is no need to exclude this possibility in experience.	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visual mechanism (enabling condition), the content in the perceptual state can be 
considered as non-conceptual. This may be an objection to Type-1 conceptual capacity 
(the capacity of spontaneity). 
In this respect, physicalism shares basic ideas with non-conceptualism (the UPC and SV 
versions in particular) including the non-conceptualists that I examined in chapter II, and 
it could also provide strong evidence to support them. Of course, there could be a 
methodological difference between explaining the mechanism of colour perception and 
explaining the contents of colour perception. However, as I pointed out at the beginning 
of this thesis, having colour experience or being in a perceptual state means having a 
particular content of that experience or state. Hence, if a subject has a perceptual content 
about a particular object, which is correlated with its physical (or phenomenal) character, 
then we may infer that she represents the physical property correctly, i.e., its physical 
property is directly reflected in the content of her perceptual state. And if the property is 
totally disengaged with any type of conceptual capacity, then she may have non-
conceptual content of an object.   
 
III-1.2. Two Implications of Reflectance Physicalism	  
There are two implications of this view: First, that colours are mind-independent 
properties of material objects which are not influenced by the conceptual engagement 
when having an experience of colours; and second, that the physical property of colour 
is directly engaged in constituting perceptual content. If these claims are right, then 
physicalism could support non-conceptualism of the UPC (Unconscious Perceptual 
Content) or SV (State View) type. This is so because we could then find non-conceptual 
content when not considering the expository perspective on experience.  
As well as relying upon a conceptually unsophisticated creature’s perception of constant 
colour in chapter II, it seems to me that the non-conceptualists who strongly depend on 
the reflectance physicalism also have the same tendency to think that an enabling 
condition for perception could define perceptual content and that a content of experience 
could be substituted for any stage of perceptual experience.  
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As I mentioned in chapter I, conceptual content is typically meant to be the content of 
thoughts or beliefs, and so, it is mind-dependent. However, if colours are mind-
independent properties of an object and could be directly reflected as constituting a 
subject’s perceptual content (i.e., there is no conscious subjective or ‘conceptual’ 
engagement I call ‘the conceptual engagement’, in the occurrence of colour perception) 
then she could be in a perceptual state that has non-conceptual content.  
Colour physicalists (e.g., Byrne and Hilbert) and the non-conceptualist (in particular Tye) 
argue that colours exist mind-independently, colour and colour phenomenology cannot 
come apart, and that phenomenal character is identical with the representational content 
of experience. Now, I would like to raise a question for this perspective on colour and 
experience: namely, why does having a perceptual content that corresponds to its 
physical properties imply the existence of non-conceptual content in experience? Again, 
if a subject has a particular content that is not directly reflected in its physical 
characteristics, then the content could be considered to have been engaged with her 
conceptual capacities; so, it might be conceptual. Whereas if the subject has a perceptual 
content obtained by mind-independent properties of the object, then why does this have 
to be necessarily non-conceptual? In other words, why does the non-conceptual 
character of perception define whether or not perceptual content is conceptual? In this 
sense, it is important to critically examine this type of perspective because there is no 
reason to exclude the conceptual engagement of experience unless it can satisfy both 
perspectives of the non-conceptual character of experience. That is to say, the fact that 
perception could occur without conceptual engagement does not imply that the subject 
of perception may not be conceptually engaged with that perception. 
In the next section, I give an example of colour variation as a counterexample to the 
physical explanation of colour experience, and consider whether physicalism is suitable 
for confirming non-conceptual content in colour experience. 
 
III-2. Colour Variation	  
The aim of this chapter is not to argue that physicalism is the wrong perspective on the 
content of experience: in fact, it could clearly give an objective explanation of the 
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mechanism of colour perception and lead us to confirm that the colours we perceive 
exist mind-independently. Nevertheless, the problem that I want to elucidate here is that 
there are some aspects of colour experience that may not be explained sufficiently by 
physicalism. I will highlight this by considering cases of perceptual variation where 
neither party is perceiving even though people have the same phenomenal features of an 
object, but their perceptual contents of that object are different. Perceptual variation is a 
phenomenon whereby perceivers have different experiences, for instance colour 
experiences of the surface of an object, even though they are in the same circumstance, 
or a subject having two different colour experiences of the same surface of an object. 
The most typical example of this can be found in the ‘Munsell Colour Chart’.  
 
 
 
 
 
                           <Chart 1> Munsell Colour Chart 
Not only can we see how normal people can discriminate a particular colour (for 
example, yellowish) from others (reddish, greenish, bluish, etc.), we also find that they 
are able to discriminate delicate differences in the range of yellow (dark yellow, light 
yellow, etc.) through this chart. For example, when subjects are asked to select a pure 
yellow colour (one that is not mixed with any other colours), their selections are hugely 
different. Human beings have a common visual mechanism that includes cone cells, the 
retina, and so on; but although we have the same cone cells, there is an inappreciable 
difference in the amount of photopigment in an individual’s visual system. This might 
explain the individual’s different perceptions of the same colour on a physical level.   
III-2.1. Two Problems of Colour Phyicalism Concerning Colour Variation Cases	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However, one problem in the above case is whether the physical property and the neuro-
biological property of vision are properties of enabling conditions for perception. As 
well as the result of the empirical studies in chapter II, what we can know from the 
physicalists’ account is that there exists a causal relationship between SSRs and our 
vision. So, if conditions – e.g., ‘18% of SSR’ and ‘normal condition of vision’ – are set 
for the perception of the colour red, then we are able to be in a perceptual state of red. In 
fact, we are able to detect a certain property of an object, (e.g., 18% of SSR), however, 
this fact does not give us an answer as to why we could interpret such reflectance ‘18%’ 
as ‘scarlet red’ in experience. That is to say, it is doubtful that the way that it explains an 
enabling condition for colour perception is suitable for explaining content of colour 
experience. 
Another problem comes up here. It still remains a problem even if the reason for the 
variation can be explained by a neuro-biological condition. That is, we commonly name 
a certain colour of an object ‘red’ even though there is an individual difference in the red 
we see. If we suppose that an experience of the colour ‘red’ is altered by the amount of 
photopigment in a subject’s visual system, and if naming a certain colour is just 
conventional, then the colour terms that we use are undiscriminating. In other words, 
there is a clear individual difference in experiences of red that we can comprehend 
physically, but we call every experience of red ‘red’ according to convention. If this is 
right, then perceived colours might not exist ontologically (Hardin 1993). 
 
III-2.2. Two Perspectives on Colour Variation Case	  
The reason for the above worries is probably caused by the two perspectives on 
experience. Indeed, the colours that we perceive are limited to an enabling condition 
such as SSRs and our vision – physcialism is right in this case. However, colours that we 
understand or grasp can be richer or poorer than colour information provided by an 
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enabling condition. In other words, there is a possibility that the content of the functional 
perspective is different from that of the expository perspective.60 
Hardin (2003) draws on this issue. He claims that most physicalists are caught between 
the incompatible demands of common-sense realism. He explains: 
“One is that colours should be features of the surface of objects that are 
independent of human perception. SSR satisfies this demand. The other one is 
that colours are normally what we experience them to be. This requirement is 
not met by SSR. In particular, the phenomenology of colour, including 
relations that colours bear to each other, is not well modelled by features and 
relationships among SSR.” (2003: 201) 
The colour variation problem is taken as a case in point because subjects do not always 
have the same representational contents that correspond to SSR or the chips in the 
Munsell chart on every occasion. For example,61 when two normal perceivers see a chip 
C (e.g., H/20 in the Munsell chart) under identical viewing conditions (without looking 
at other different hues at all, e.g., bluish or yellowish), it looks uniquely green to one of 
them but, to another, it looks bluish green. Of course, the way both perceivers represent 
C can be psychophysically distinguishable from each other (in terms of whether it is 
represented as a unique hue). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This is closely related to the problem of the range of perceptual content discussed in 
chapter II. 
61	  Cohen (2006: 309-310) gives three types of colour variation examples: (a) variation 
between subjects of different species, (b) interpersonal variation between subjects of our 
own species, and (c) intrapersonal variation in a single human visual system. He uses 
these examples for defending ‘colour relationalism’ against colour physicalism. This 
chapter does not consider the relationalist’s account of colour, but only considers second 
and third types for challenging colour physicalism. More details see: Cohen (2006: 307-
319).	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Also, there is another case in which a single perceiver can represent the same chip C 
differently according to its viewing conditions.62 The chip looks uniquely green to the 
perceiver when it is placed against a particular background, but does not look the same 
colour to the same perceiver when it is placed against another background. The way that 
the perceiver represents the colour of C in the first viewing condition is 
psychophysically distinguishable from another viewing condition. From these results, 
Cohen argues the following:  
“There is a range of representational variants of a single stimulus C. If colour 
physicalism is true, then at most one of these variant representations veridically 
represents C’s colour. But [...] it is extremely hard to imagine what could 
(metaphysically) make it the case that one of the representational variants is 
veridical at the expense of the other. Any choice seems objectionably ad hoc.” 
(2006: 310) 
Although the functional perspective on experience could satisfy the demand of the 
physicalist, the expository perspective is not always correlated with the functional 
perspective.63 Hence, perceived colours could involve a perceiver’s interpretation of the 
information transmitted from perceptual mechanisms using concepts. More clearly, we 
can freely represent colours at the occurrence of perception without any engagement 
including a subject’s conceptual access and the relational property―properties 
“constituted in terms of a relation between colours and subjects” (Cohen 2006: 307). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cohen gives few examples of this effect. See: 
http://aardvark.ucsd.edu/~joncohen/color/ albers_examples.html. 
63	  However, Cohen (2006) does not emphasize any expository perspective on colour 
variation at all. He just focuses on what is involved in such representational variation on 
the relationalists’ perspective of colour perception. What he argues is that perceptual 
representation is not only dependent on the physical property, but is dependent on the 
circumstances to which the subject and the colour belong. I argue that this circumstance-
dependent representation eventually shows the importance of the expository perspective 
in chapters IV to V.	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However the problem in the variation is that our interpretation or understanding about 
the perceived colour (representation of the colour) sometimes is not correlated with its 
physical property. In short, the content of the functional perspective could be different 
from the expository perspective even though both share the same phenomenal property 
of the object. The colour variation problem clearly shows not only the problem of the 
range of perceptual content and experience hidden in the arguments for non-conceptual 
content raised by this thesis but also why we need to consider the two perspectives on 
experience in order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience.    
However, the problem of colour variation is not irresolvable from the physicalist’s stand 
point. Philosophers who take a physicalist perspective on colour perception provide two 
possible responses to this difficult issue. One solution appeals to the normality of colour 
perception. Philosophers who take the physicalist perspective postulate a normal 
condition and a standard perceiver to support reflectance physicalism (Millikan 1984; 
Block 1999; Rumelin 2006). Another solution uses an analogy of a similar case that is 
simply solved in a physical way. There are several analogies of this approach such as 
speedometers, thermometers, and etc. Among these, I particularly focus on the example 
of thermometers as an analogy to colour variation, as suggested by Byrne and Hilbert 
(2004). In the next section, I critically examine these possibilities. 
  
III-3. The Physicalist’s’ Two Responses to Colour Variation	  
In this section, I develop Hardin’s argument by using the example of colour variation, 
and then critically examine the two non-conceptualist solutions to such variations. I then 
criticize this type of non-conceptualism by indicating two crucial errors involved in this 
view. The purpose of this section is to investigate the basic non-conceptualist view of 
the content of experience which is strongly dependent upon the physical property of 
colours. It seems that this type of non-conceptualist view has a similar form to those like 
that of Peacocke, Bermúdez and Hurley, as seen in the previous chapter. 
 
 III-3.1. Appealing to Normality	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Not only are the individual differences observed in colour experience a problem for 
reflectance physicalism, there is also another problem that arises in attempting to explain 
the nature of colour. Suppose that subjects K and S are standard perceivers.64 When 
these subjects see a ripe grapefruit, both are able to discriminate it as the yellow that is 
applicable to D/10 in the Munsell Chart (See: chart 1). But suppose K and S are asked 
what shade the yellow is. Perhaps K answers that it is reddish yellow, while S answers 
that it is pure yellow.65 In this case, we can draw the following conclusions:   
(1)  K and S perceive the same surface of the object differently. 
(2)  The surface of an object does not have two different shades simultaneously. 
(3) We cannot name either K or S as a privilege perceiver because both are standard 
perceivers. 
Physicalists, or any other type of philosopher, might not deny the above propositions. 
But the problem is that these propositions cannot all be true. (2) suggests that one of the 
perceivers has an incorrect experience of the surface. If so, (3) is also controversial. Of 
course, these problems are not unanswerable. 
The solution could be that: (a) both K and S represent the colour of the surface correctly 
or (b) one of them represents it correctly, but the other does not or (c) both are wrong 
(Hardin 1999). Which of these answers is correct? The important point is that both 
perceive different shades of the object, even though they roughly perceive it to be in the 
category ‘yellow’. Hence, the object that corresponds to both experiences may not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  The term ‘standard perceivers’ is used in a statistical sense. A standard perceiver is, in 
normal cases, distinguished from the minority group who have opposed colour vision. 
For more detail, see e.g. Millikan (1984), Block (1999), and Rumelin (2006).	  
65	  Of course, there is another thing to think about: S’s ability to detect the shadow as 
pure yellow could imply that S could detect it as pure yellow due to the fact that he 
possesses the concept of pure yellow. Hence, the ability to detect pure yellow could be 
concept-dependent perception rather than physical property-dependent. I discuss this 
issue more detail alongside the definition of pure hues in section III-3.2.	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explained by its physical properties. It is not clear, though, that physicalism may solve 
this problem adequately. Let us consider the case for (a) again. Perhaps we can say that 
the fruit looks reddish yellow to K in a certain circumstance, but it looks pure yellow to 
S in another circumstance. Nevertheless, the problem remains that the surface of the 
object does not have two different shades simultaneously unless shade (defined 
operationally by pure hue judgements) is relative to a perceiver. 
Let us consider (b). This solution implies that either K or S perceives the colour of the 
fruit correctly. However, here we need to set the further condition that one of them must 
be a standard perceiver, even though both are normal perceivers. We would also need to 
determine the criteria for the classification of a standard perceiver. This might be 
determined by looking at a large number of people. However, the criterion for a ‘normal’ 
perceiver does not seem to be so easily obtained. How can we pick out one normal 
perceiver from a great many people? In addition, what is the normal condition for the 
colour ‘yellow’? The criterion of the normal perceptual condition is too wide to reflect 
fine-grained shades of yellow. Further, if the normal criterion is defined too widely, then 
it would be hard to determine a normal standard that could define a certain colour. Yet, 
if it is defined too narrowly, we encounter a situation whereby most people may not 
have a standard of normal perceptual condition. The idea of a normal condition seems 
arbitrary.66 
As such, the conditions for a ‘normal perceiver’ face the same problem. It is hard to say 
that both perceivers have correct experiences of the surface colour of an object; hence 
we should say that one of them might be wrong. It is surely arbitrary to claim that one of 
them is a privileged perceiver.67 Of course, the selection of one perceiver as ‘normal’ is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  There may be non-arbitrary conditions like ‘natural daylight’ (Allen 2010). However, 
there is one point that claims our attention: such natural daylight can only be expressed 
in physical terms such as ‘cd’, ‘lm’, or ‘lux’. Although such daylights exist, the problem 
of whether we can detect such light epistemologically still remains. Also, the amount of 
natural daylight is variable according to changes in temperature or magnetic field.	  
67	  If both perceivers are different in age, gender, or race, and if this can be criterion of a 
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not simply random, because it appeals to the majority, but it falls prey to the accusation 
of being simply arbitrary; it is difficult to maintain that the criterion involves a 
conventional standard. Yet what concerns us is not the problem of finding a normal 
standard for a general definition of a colour. Rather, the point is that colour perception 
may not be explained by SSR if there is no general standard by which we can judge 
which colour experience is correct. However, physicalists believe that colours are not 
properties perceived by standard perceivers. They appeal to a kind of normality that is 
independent of perceivers; so, they claim that normal observers—who are naturally 
selected by evolution and have a normal perceptual system—are able to detect real 
colours correctly in normal conditions. The capitalized ‘Normal’ is distinct from the 
word ‘normal’. The notion of Normality was developed by Millikan (1984). Normality 
is a state that is designed by natural selection and is used for explaining whether such a 
system is successful. Physicalists utilize a concept of ‘Normality’ to express this idea 
rather than ‘normality’ because it would seem arbitrary to identify normal environments 
and normal perceivers. But it might not be arbitrary to accept an assumption that there is 
a privileged class of normal perceivers in the history of evolution in colour perception. 
Tye says the following: 
“Today, those among us who have a Normal colour detection system and who 
use it in a Normal environment track the colours accurately. To know who such 
people are, we would need to know much, much more about the evolution of 
colour vision than we know today (Byrne and Tye 2006). Perhaps we will 
never know the relevant facts. Still, there is a fact of the matter as to who 
counts as Normal by Mother Nature’s lights. So, even though it would indeed 
be arbitrary for us now to pick out certain humans and say that they get the 
fine-grained colours right, still there is a clear-cut privileged class of Normal 
perceivers and no deep problem posed by true blue.” (2006: 175) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
standard perceiver, we might manifest types of discrimination such as ageism, sexism, 
and racism (Block 1999). Hardin also claims that “if this question is to be answered at 
all, it can be answered only by convention” (1988: 80). 	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From this perspective, Tye suggests one possibility, namely that the individual 
differences of colour experience could be manifest on two different levels. One of these 
is a broad colour (coarse-grained) level, like ‘red’, and the other is a narrow shade (fine-
grained) level, like ‘scarlet red’ (Block 1999: 46; Tye 2006).  
 
III-3.1.a. Two Levels of Colour Experience	  
Physicalism explains the broad level by the ontological property of SSR and the narrow 
level using epistemological properties. This discrimination, used for explaining colour 
experience, might solve the problems of (1) the individual-difference of colour 
experience and (2) the fact that an object seems to have two different colours 
simultaneously. The reason why our (with the exception of ‘Normal’ perceivers) 
perceptual system is reliable on the broad level, but less reliable on the narrow level, is 
that the “visual system is not evolutionarily designed to detect such fine-grained level of 
shade reliably” (Tye 2006: 177). For example, in the evolutionary approach, colour 
constancy is thought to have fulfilled its role in the faculty of sight both historically and 
successfully. Constant colour belongs to the coarse-grained level, like ‘yellow’, and not 
the fine-grained level, e.g., ‘reddish yellow’. The colour ‘yellow’ looks slightly different 
on the fine-grained level because the wavelength of ‘reddish yellow’ has a different 
wavelength from ‘greenish yellow’ according to available light, whereas the constant 
colour ‘yellow’ can be sufficiently explained by SSR even though its apparent colour 
can be changed by illumination. 
 
III-3.1.b. The Limitations of the Normal Visual System	  
Tye’s suggestion still seems to be insufficient for explaining why two normal perceivers 
like K and S have two different experiences of the same surface of yellow in normal 
viewing conditions. Both K and S represent the surface as yellow, but they represent it 
differently at the fine-grained level. And because of the fact, as Tye said, that our normal 
visual system is not designed to detect such fine-grained colours reliably, we may not 
say whether K or S represents it correctly, even though we know all the facts about the 
evolution of vision. 
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In the next section, I critically examine this assumption along with the analogy, and then 
consider whether it successfully explains individual differences in perceiving colours. 
  
III-3.2. The Analogy	  
Byrne and Hilbert (2004) use an analogy to solve this problem. They found a similar 
case in the representation of a thermometer. Let us examine the following table: 
    t1                          t2   t3 
Thermometer 
A 
25 25 25 
Thermometer 
B 
24.8 25.0 25.2 
<Table 1> Thermometers 
Suppose that thermometer B can measure below the decimal point, but A cannot. As 
time goes on, B shows a very subtle difference from t1 to t3. Strictly speaking, these two 
thermometers calibrate different temperatures, but even so, we do not say that A shows 
an inaccurate measurement; it is just that B can discriminate the temperature more 
precisely than A. Hence, these two thermometers are not contradicting one another. In 
this way, individual differences in colour perception at the fine-grained level are not in 
question because they are just individual differences in colour sensitivity. Hence, their 
colour experiences are also compatible, like the thermometers. The difference between 
K’s and S’s experience of colour can also be explained using the following table: 
   D10/ t1 D11/ t2 D12/ t3 
     S  Pure  Yellow Pure Yellow Pure Yellow 
     K Reddish Yellow Pure Yellow Bluish Yellow 
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                 <Table 2> Colour Experience of Two Perceivers K and S 
In this example, how can the difference in discrimination ability of colour be explained 
by SSRs? The only common element in the table is that the perceivers are seeing D/11 in 
the Munsell Chart as falling in the range of yellow. However, K’s experience of yellow 
embodies more fine-grained contents, while S’s experience embodies only pure yellow 
from t1 to t3. If this is the case, they perceive the same colour, but their contents of the 
perception are different. However, we do not need to believe that one of them 
misrepresents the yellow colour. The fine-grained difference of perceptual content in the 
two experience’s is just a difference in the range of the SSRs of the yellow that is not 
beyond the range of the colour yellow. That is to say, either K’s perceptual content or 
S’s perceptual content of yellow is not outside the range of yellow that we normally 
perceive even though both perceive it differently. Hence, it might also be explained as 
the difference in sensitivity, just like the thermometers. That is to say, both perceived 
yellow correctly, but K is just better at discriminating the colour yellow than S.  
 
III-3.2.a. The Problem of the Analogy: No Criterion for Discriminating an Illusion 
from a Genuine Experience	  
This analogy highlights the physicalist’s belief that the problem of colour variation is not 
an ontological but an epistemological matter. Most physicalists hold the view that colour 
variation shows that it is hard to impute the colour of a surface to a particular colour. It 
seems that a particular colour looks like a different colour according to perceivers or 
conditions, and is similar to the case where a straight stick looks bent in water (Tye 2000: 
153–155). So it is the same colour. This is the claim that the occurrence of colour 
variation does not result from the physical property of colour. The problem occurs here. 
The analogy seems an inappropriate answer because it is only an optical illusion: the 
stick is not actually bent (Hardin 2003). The different colour experiences of the same 
object cannot be mistaken experiences in this way, and neither can they be corrected. In 
the case of the stick, we can take it out of the water and measure its angle to prove that it 
is 180 degrees. That is to say, there is a general, standard, and common criterion, which 
can prove whether or not the stick is bent. However, in the case of colour variation, there 
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is no sufficient reason to assume that one of two normal perceivers’ colour experiences 
is just an optical illusion if it does not correspond to another normal perceiver’s content 
of experience, viz. there is no criterion for discriminating an illusion from genuine 
experience in this case.  
 
III-3.2.b. The Problem of the Analogy: No Criterion for Being a Pure Hue	  
Furthermore, there is no criterion for a being pure hue in colour experience. According 
to physicalism the property of being coloured is the physical property ‘SSRs’, which 
corresponds to a certain shade. In the case of K, we can find that K’s perceptual content 
of reddish yellow has slightly changed from t1 to t3. Of course, this perception could be 
affected by lighting conditions or viewing position. However, K’s detailed content of 
experience cannot be explained using the analogy. That is to say, K’s and S’s different 
colour experiences may be explained on a fine-grained level and by sensitivity to colour 
terms, but K’s content of experience is hard to explain in physicalist terms, even though 
she is a standard perceiver. The notable point here is that not only could there be two 
different perceptual contents of a particular colour in two perceivers, but a perceiver 
could also have various contents of one particular property. Like the example of the stick 
in water, it might be easier to find out why K has various perceptual contents of yellow 
if there was a clear criterion that defined whether perceivers misrepresent the properties 
of an object. 
Is there any criterion like this in colour perception? What is interesting about this type of 
physicalism is that there is no clear definition (e.g. a certain profile of SSR) of ‘pure 
yellow’ even though perceivers are able to perceive it (or at least, they can discriminate 
it from others). That is to say, we are able to perceive the colour yellow depending on 
SSRs and our perceptual mechanism that is not engaged with the conceptual capacities 
at all. However, people sometimes may not refer to the same shade of yellow in the 
Munsell chart when they are asked to point to pure yellow in the chart.   
This clearly shows that there is a difference in the functional perspective and the 
expository perspective on experience. If we only take the functional perspective in the 
case of the colour variation, we know how people are able to be in perceptual states 
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about colours; but if we take the expository perspective on experience, then we find that 
people can have different perceptual colour content. As such, we should take both the 
functional perspective and the expository perspective on experience because we could 
know how subjects of perception could be in perceptual states about colours by taking 
the functional perspective on experience; and we could know what subjects have in their 
perceptual states by taking the expository perspective. In order to evaluate the 
conceptual character of experience, we should take the expository perspective primarily 
because we may not know what is in the subject’s perceptual state by only taking the 
functional perspective on experience. The functional perspective gives us the 
explanation of how the subject is able to perceive colours, and not their perceptual 
contents. As Hardin points out, the question “what kind of content do perceivers have in 
their visual experience?” is fundamentally about what is represented in subjects’ 
perceptual experience (2003: 201). And the confirmation of what is represented in 
experience is not the physical property, SSRs, rather it is dependent on the subject’s 
description of that perception.  
 
III-3.2.c. Representation and the Possession of Concepts	  
Let us reconsider the analogies of the thermometers and the cases of K and S. It is 
because we only confirm what the thermometer perceives by checking those digit 
numbers even if the thermometer could detect outside temperatures more minutely or 
crudely. Likewise, we may only confirm what both K and S perceive about the particular 
object by checking their descriptions, rather than any results offered by perceptual 
mechanisms and the benefit from the evolution. What we may find in the use of the 
analogy for the explanation of perceptual variation is that this approach seems confusing 
in terms of whether the sensitive perceiver K’s perceptual content is affected by her 
possession of concepts because there could be two different interpretations of the 
representations of thermometers. First, both A and B only have a mechanism for 
detecting the molecular energy of heat, which is less sensitive. Second, both A and B 
have the very same detecting mechanism68, but A ‘rounds’ the reading to the nearest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  This mechanism must be distinguished from the detection finding the informational 
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whole number before ‘reporting’ it, because A’s representation method only uses two 
digits for display (perhaps it is digital and has a two-digit display), whereas B can 
display all the detected energies more precisely because it possesses below-decimal-
point digits. In the first case, we may see that the detecting mechanisms of both A and B 
are not dependent on their display methods. On the other hand, in the second case, 
collected information from the detecting function could be represented by their display 
mechanisms, i.e., their different possession of digits. Hence, their representation method 
could also be different because of their differing possession of digits, even though both 
thermometers have the same detecting function.   
 
III-3.2.d. Is the Ability to Detect Properties an Experience?	  
There is one interesting point that we may find in the analogy approach. That is, it is 
hard to believe that such a detection ability could also be a representational ability. 
Dennett (1991: 34) also points this out and claims that an ability to detect is not an 
ability to represent. For instance, a property like the molecular energy of heat can endure 
in the external world without the thermometer specifying it, whereas a property like 
25°C is constituted by the mechanical device that can detect 69  it. The natural 
representation of a property, according to Dennett, is “its compressed description—the 
description encodes the property” (Dennett 1991: 32–34; Ross 2000: 191). That is to say, 
what we can call representation is a type of description-encoded property of objects; 
hence the detection of such molecular energy cannot be a representation because this 
mechanism does not need to possess any description at all in order to detect such 
properties. On this account, it may be considered that perceptual representation involves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
content of objects, e.g., perceptual content (70 tree rings) and the informational contents 
of the rings (the tree is 70 years old). The detection ability to find the informational 
content could imply conceptual character of the functional perspective. For details about 
the detection for the informational content, see e.g. Jarvie, Milford, and Miller (2006:  
160-163).	  
69	  ‘Detect’ has to be understood differently from the former. Here it could mean concept-
charged perception, i.e., Type-1 conceptual capacity—the capacity of spontaneity.	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a possibility of description, hence, non-describable content may not be representational 
content. When I quote Block’s definition of two types of conscious access in chapter I, I 
indicated that conscious accessibility implicates reportability; hence reportable contents 
can be conceptual according to the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the 
objects of perception. From this point of view, describable contents are consciously 
accessible. For this reason, detection could not be in the range of experience because it 
does not involve any representational content even though we are able to perceive 
colours through detection abilities, that is to say, the detection is just an enabling 
condition for perception, rather than a condition for constituting the content of 
experience. 
 
III-4. The Possibility of Conceptual Engagement in Detection Abilities 	  
However, the problem involved in the analogy is not that simple. The reason for 
considering the physicalist’s account for explaining non-conceptual content is that   non-
conceptualists (including Peacocke, Hurley, Bermùdez, Tye, Byrne and Hilbert) are 
more focused on the cause of perceptual representation, rather than represented contents. 
As Bermùdez noted: 
“Conceptual and nonconceptual content are distinguished not by whether they 
are representational, but according to how they represent.” (1995: 335) 
On this perspective, there is still the possibility of non-conceptual content at the 
beginning of perception because the detection ability could induce a perceiver to be in a 
perceptual state about the detected content even though the detection itself does not 
contain any representational content at all. Here, the reason for focusing on colour 
variation cases is clearly shown. We are able to consciously access the representational 
content obtained by the detection ability even though the content is constituted non-
conceptually, that is to say, even the content constituted by the detection could allow A-
consciousness. This is the reason for considering the expository perspective on 
experience, say, the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception. 
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We can simply apply these ideas to the example of K and S. Although both perceivers 
are normal and have the same detecting function for colours, their perceptual contents 
could be different according to their possession of concepts for colours. Not only are 
they able to differently interpret the given information obtained by their visual 
mechanisms, they could also represent the information differently according to the 
concepts that each possesses. In addition, it also shows that there could be conceptual 
engagement in the process of colour experience. Furthermore, colour variation is clearly 
about represented contents in two normal perceivers’ perceptual states, and it shows that 
physical and causal properties are not transparent in a perceiver’s content of experience. 
In this sense, this thesis suggests that we need to consider the two perspectives on 
experience. The mechanism of the occurrence of perception―how we could have 
representational content― could be common to us all; whereas we could all have 
different understandings of that perception―depending on how we categorise the 
perceptual information obtained by the former. Experience must be considered from 
these two perspectives, therefore, the content of experience must allow conceptual 
engagement by its subject. In this respect, the description of experience is not merely in 
terms of simple colours or physical properties of the objects; rather it is in terms of our 
conceptual access ‘how we can engage with perceptual information using concepts that 
we have’. I conclude this section by quoting Heidegger: 
“We never […] originally and really perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones 
and noises, in the appearance of things […]; rather, we hear the storm whistling 
in the chimney, we hear the three-engine aeroplane, we hear the Mercedes in 
immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than any 
sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door slam in the house, and 
never hear acoustic sensations or mere sounds.” (Heidegger 1977: 156; quoted 
in Smith 2002: 105) 
  
III-5. The Possibility of Conceptual Engagement in Colour Variation Cases	  
Because of the problem that I have discussed above, what I focus on in this chapter is 
not the problem of properties of colours in evaluating the content of experience: instead, 
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it is (1) how the object is perceived and (2) how we can access the perceptual content 
about that object. The problem of depending on the physicalists’ perspective occurs in 
both (1) and (2) because colour variation clearly shows the conceptual character of 
experience if it may not be explained appeal to physicalism. First, the important point in 
colour variation is that two perceivers could consciously access their perceptual contents 
even though the occurrence of perception is closely related to mind-independent 
properties of objects. This is the possibility of conceptual engagement of experience, say 
Type-3 conceptual capacity. As well as the cases involving non-human creatures in the 
previous chapter, I accept that perception could occur without any conceptual 
engagement, but I do not accept that its content can be accessed non-conceptually. That 
is to say, it allows a perceiver’s access consciousness toward the obtained contents via 
her visual mechanism such as the detection ability.   
Second, detecting a particular colour does not entirely imply the representation of that 
colour. As Dennett (1991: 32–34; See also: Ross 2001: 190–192) points out, there are 
two detectable types of properties: one requires that the property of the object be 
specifiable; whereas the other, simple detection, does not require that the property be 
specifiable, in order to detect the property of the object. Representation is a case of the 
former; the latter is not distinct from the function of the digital camera that we examined 
in Chapter II. What colour experience refers entirely to is represented colours caused by 
perception. In this sense, it seems not only that the physical approach fails to find non-
conceptual content in the whole process of experience, but also that it is not applicable 
to represented contents of experience. 
In perceiving colours, neurophysiological properties and the scientific analysis of light 
could give us the explanation of how we are able to have perceptual contents, but they 
are not sufficient to explain how we are able to engage with the content of colour 
experience. If our contents of colour experience are constituted by only the physical 
properties of objects and our visual organs, then subjects may consider these properties 
to compose experience epistemologically. But are subjects aware of how visual neurons 
respond to stimuli while they are perceiving colours?  
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The problem with this type of assumption is that it tries to prove that colours are 
identical with SSRs, and that SSRs directly determines the content of experience. 
However, perceivers may have different colour experiences of the same surface colour, 
even though that colour emits the same SSR, viz. perceivers do have different 
phenomenal and representational contents even though they have the same physical 
response to the same physical property of colour. In addition, if colour variation occurs 
in the identical condition, then there must be a certain physical stimulus which causes 
such differences. Physicalism must explain this. It seems to me that this perspective also 
focuses too much on an enabling condition for colour perception. As such, non-
conceptualists who take this position also focus only on the functional perspective of 
experience. If the content of experience is not reflected in physical conditions, which 
enable that experience transparently, then why should we accept this type of non-
conceptualism?  
If I am right throughout the discussions in Chapters II and III, we should disassociate an 
enabling condition for perception from a condition for constituting the content of 
experience. In some senses, these look like the same mechanism because they put a 
subject in a perceptual state of a certain colour. But our way of approaching the two is 
different. While the ability to perceive (viz. an enabling condition of perception) is 
entirely dependent on a perceiver’s perceptual mechanisms – such as sensory organs and 
the physical properties of objects like SSRs – the content of perception relates to how we 
understand or grasp the information obtained by an enabling condition. The former is 
functional and passive, but the latter is more active, descriptive, and expository. The 
latter seems to occur after a perceiver has a perception of an object, hence it is defined 
by the concepts that she possesses for the object and how she describes it. And what she 
experiences is defined by her description. The content of an experience is the outcome of 
the whole process of experience, and so, should not be characterized by only one of 
them. For this reason, we are able to evaluate the characteristic feature of perceptual 
content through considering these two perspectives on experience. 
Most non-conceptualists that this thesis has examined so far are concerned with the 
functional perspective on experience; by contrast, conceptualists focus on the expository 
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perspective on experience. The next chapter discusses this issue more philosophically 
through examining the ideas of several neuro-philosophers, whose account involves two 
stages of perceptual experience, and does not rely solely on empirical results. However, 
such arguments exhibit the very same tendency as those of the experimenters, 
physicalists, and non-conceptualists we examined in Chapters II and III, in that they 
consider inaccessible stages of perception as if those stages contain the content of 
experience, or at least as if those stages process information obtained by vision. I claim 
that not only does this tendency ignore the expository perspective on experience, it also 
implies an ‘as if attribution’ to the existence of contents in mysterious states.   
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Chapter IV. Perceptual States and Their Contents	  
How Can the Contents of Perceptual States be Conceptualized? 
  
In Chapters II and III, I examined how non-conceptualists who defend UPC 
(Unconscious Perceptual Content) and SV (State View) type non-conceptualism make 
fundamentally wrong assumptions regarding perceptual content. First, they equivocate 
an enabling condition for perception with a condition that constitutes the content of 
experience. Second they assume that there could be representational contents beyond the 
reach of conscious access or A-consciousness. That is to say, they depend only on the 
functional perspective on experience, which does not allow any type of conceptual 
engagement. They do not consider the expository perspective on experience according to 
which the subject can access the content of perception by her perceptual mechanisms. 
This tendency seems to fix the range of non-conceptual content at the occurrence of 
perception alone―that is, how a perceiver physically reacts to the object of perception 
rather than her higher-level understanding of it. This excludes any possibility of the 
expository perspective, that is to say, the existence of representational content and what 
the subject really experiences could be confirmed by taking the expository perspective 
on experience. I have suggested that we need to consider both the functional perspective 
and the expository perspective in evaluating the conceptual or the non-conceptual 
character of experience because what we call experience does not belong to only a 
particular stage or process. Therefore, the content of experience should be the product of 
the all the processes involved in producing it.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why a perceiver’s description or interpretation 
of a perceived object has to be a content of experience rather than a purely physical 
analysis of perceptual mechanisms. The main reason for this is that the possibility of 
perception of an object could be confirmed or predicted using scientific analysis, while a 
content of experience could only be confirmed by a perceiver’s description about their 
perceptual state.  
Recently, the above perspective on experience seems to be explained in terms of two 
different levels suggested by psychologists and philosophers, e.g.  Marr (1982), Block 
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(1995), Pylyshyn (1999), Lamme (2003 and 2004), Raftopoulos and Müller (2006), and 
Raftopoulos (2009). But they also have the same tendency as non-conceptualists to 
consider perceptual content in unconscious states (e.g. UPC and SV types), and divide 
perceptual experience into two different stages in order to prove the non-conceptual 
character of experience. The first stage, which they call the ‘early visual system’, could 
be defined by taking the functional perspective on experience (here they include 
unconscious states such as subpersonal states; hence it is a slightly more inclusive notion 
than P-conscious experience and mine). The second stage, which they call ‘late vision’, 
is similar to what Block (1995) calls A-conscious ‘experience’.70   
According to them (especially Raftopoulos and Müller 2006), if a perceptual state or an 
experience has contents that are provided by a subject’s visual system, which cannot be 
cognitively penetrated, then that state or experience has non-conceptual content. But if a 
content of a state or an experience is provided by the system, which is cognitively 
penetrated, then that state or experience has conceptual content. So cognitive penetration 
could be one criterion for determining to which of these two stages a given perceptual 
experience belongs and, in turn, for determining whether a given content of a perceptual 
experience is conceptual or non-conceptual. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Dretske also offers a similar distinction. He thinks that ‘simple seeing’ is different 
from ‘conscious experience’. Simple seeing is “distinct from, but nonetheless 
fundamental to, an organism’s higher-level cognitive and conceptual activities” (2000: 
98). Conscious experience, as it stands, occurs when a subject is conscious of an object 
(which could be a particular character of an object rather than the object itself), i.e., 
being in a conscious state of some sort and “it isn’t the objects you’re aware of, the 
objects you see,	  and therefore qualia you experience […]; it is the facts you’re aware of, 
what you know about what you see” (2000: 188–189). This distinction will be very 
useful when discussing the existence of representation contents of the early visual stage 
(in this chapter) and the two perspectives on the fine-grained arguments (in the next 
chapter).	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As a result, these philosophers allow a Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the 
object of perception, but focus on the non-conceptual character at the occurrence of 
perception; hence these neurophilosophers idea of non-conceptual content may be an 
objection to Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) because there is 
perception without cognitive penetration, or as I would say, perception without the 
conceptual engagement. Only perceptual content in cognitively impenetrable states is 
considered non-conceptual content by these philosophers. 
This chapter explores non-conceptual content as defined by neuroscientists and 
philosophers that belongs to only non-conscious states which our conceptual capacities 
could not engage with, and then discusses how we could define perceptual contents in 
such states without depending on the expository perspective on experience.   
This discussion will proceed as follows: As the starting point of the discussion, the 
section IV-1 will reiterate the reason why we need to consider the two perspectives on 
experience. This will help us to define the range of contents of experience in this chapter. 
The second section raises an initial problem for conceptualists: they seem to 
overemphasize the expository perspective; as such the possibility of the existence of P-
conscious contents in A-conscious experience is excluded. This shows not only that 
conceptualists have a different perspective on experience from the non-conceptualists 
but also that this perspective becomes the latest target of the non-conceptualist. This is 
the biggest issue that this thesis responds to.  
In contrast with the second section, the third explores the neurophilosopher’s perspective 
on the range of experience – non-conceptual content in the early visual system in 
particular. Through examining this, I note two things: (1) there could be conceptual 
engagement in the whole process of experience, and, (2) the assumption, that there must 
be perceptual contents in the early visual system that can be correlated with the content 
of late vision. However, the content of the early visual system is not accorded with the 
perceptual content for evaluating the conceptual or non-conceptual character of 
experience even if the content really exists.   
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In the last section, as a summary of the discussions from sections IV-1 to IV- 4, I insist 
that the neurophilosopher fails to prove the non-conceptual content of experience 
because of the possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the object of 
perception. Nevertheless, this section reveals that there remains some non-conceptual 
character of experience: namely, the coexistence of inaccessible and accessible content 
in conscious experience. Ultimately, this chapter proposes a strategy to respond to the 
non-conceptual character of experience when we only take the functional perspective on 
experience. 
  
	  IV-1. Experience and Content 
	  
In order to have a visual perception of a certain object, we have to be in a certain 
circumstance that includes an enabling condition of perception, which are adequate 
lighting conditions, SSRs, and the perceiver’s normal visual organs. These conditions 
permit a perception of the object in a perceiver’s mental state. In addition, it would be 
possible that perceptual contents defined by taking only the functional perspective could 
imply that having representational content in experience is sometimes not engaged with 
any type of conceptual capacity. This could be a useful idea for classifying conceptual 
and non-conceptual content. One particular stage of experience  would then be seen to 
take the functional perspective as involving only non-conceptual contents, whereas the 
other stage of experience (e.g. personal level of experience) would then seen to take the 
expository perspective as involving only conceptual contents. 
However, are the contents of the former transparent to the latter? Or, are we having the 
different contents in every different stage of experience? If so, which one is more close 
to what we call contents of experience? 
 
IV-1.1. The Importance of a Subject’s Description  
In general, we understand how we perceive the world using scientific methods. However, 
does this scientific understanding confirm what we really experience when we perceive 
an object? For example, perception of a scarlet rose in front of a seven-year old child 
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and a fifty-year old painter might be confirmed by physical properties of the rose and the 
normality of their visual organs if we could guarantee they are really seeing the rose. 
And we are able to make an assumption that they could have the same representational 
content of the rose through the scientific fact or observation. However, can their 
description of the rose meet our expectations? Do they really experience the rose in the 
same way? An enabling condition for the perception of a scarlet rose allows us to predict 
what they are able to perceive or to represent. But the issue is whether a content of a 
perceptual state is entirely transparent to a subject’s description of it. The child might 
possess concepts such as red, flower, rose, etc.71; whereas, the painter might possess 
different concepts for the rose.72 
 
IV-1.2. Two Problems for the Expository Perspective 
	  
At any rate, to confirm what they experience when faced with the scarlet rose, we are 
dependent upon their description of it. In this case, two problems could arise: (1) the 
application of different concepts to an identical object, and, (2) the aspects or properties 
of the object they perceive or represent. (1) causes a problem concerning the use of 
concepts for having conceptual content―that is, what is the proper use of concepts to 
make the content of experience conceptual? (1) will be discussed in section IV-2.1 
alongside the richness argument because that calls the use of unsophisticated concepts 
into question. In contrast, (2) is more closely related to the notion of experience. This is 
because one notion of experience involves all the aspects of an object, while another 
notion is confined to only a particular feature or aspect of an object. In addition, there is 
a limit to categorising all the objects of perception within the personal level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The assumption that a child’s possession of a concept of the rose is limited to these 
simple concepts might be a misconception or ‘as-if attribution’ about them. 
72	  It could be thought that the possession of various concepts is a type of cognitive skill 
of perceiving the rose as having various aspects (Cf. Dretske 2000: 189).	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experience, say Type-3 conceptual capacity does not cover all the elements of a 
perceivable field.73 
 
IV-1.3. The Non-Conceptual Character of Perception and the Conceptual 
Character of Experience 
The two problems above show that the condition for being in a perceptual state is 
sometimes different from the condition for composing a description of that state. I focus 
on these problems in order to show that the contents of experience are conceptual 
interpretations or descriptions of a subject’s perceptual state, and hence that we have to 
access the functional and expository perspective at two different levels. That is to say, 
perception can occur independently from a subject’s conscious access, and we are able 
to know this fact via scientific analysis or observation; but information obtained by 
perceptual systems has the possibility of conceptual engagement at the subject’s 
personal level of experience. As such, the subject is able to have conceptual content of 
experience. In some sense, these two perspectives are the same because their contents 
could be confirmed by a subject’s conscious state.74 But the way to access each is 
different. While the ability to perceive is mostly dependent on a perceiver’s perceptual 
mechanisms (e.g. physical features such as area V4 and physical properties of objects 
like SSRs), how things are represented, the ability to have contents of experience is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  This raises issues for defining the range of experience for evaluating the conceptual 
character of experience in this thesis.	  
74 Philosophers like Prinz (2007a and 2007b), Rosenthal (2002 and 2005), and Block 
(1995) argue that perception—of the very same kind that occurs in ordinary conscious 
perception—can occur without consciousness. According to these philosophers, this fact 
is proven by scientific research. These seem to share the idea of the non-conceptualists 
that I examined in previous chapters II and III. Of course, I am not entirely opposed to 
this assumption. However, my emphasis here is not on checking whether there is 
conscious access in connection with an enabling perception, but on finding a way in 
which we can access the contents of perceptual states. Hence, there must be conceptual 
engagement in such access. 
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about what is represented. I would say that content of experience does not only involve 
perceptual information obtained by the former (an enabling condition), rather, it is more 
closely related to the latter―say, a perceiver’s interpretation of the perceptual 
information― because the representational content of experience may vary according to 
the way in which way the perceiver accesses perceptual contents (in line with the colour 
variation example in section III-2). The way of accessing perceptual contents involves 
the way that we understand, or grasp, the content of perception. In this sense, the former 
is passive and sometimes unconscious, whereas the latter is more active, conscious, and 
descriptive. In addition, the former can be proved by scientific and neurophysiological 
analysis; on the other hand, the second, is defined by our description of perception. The 
latter surely occurs after a subject has a perception of an object, hence it could be 
defined by the concepts that the subject possesses for it, and how she interprets the 
represented contents using her concepts. And what the subject experiences has to be 
defined by her description as we saw in the colour variation case of the sections III-3 
and III-4. Of course, some non-conceptualists (e.g. Peacocke, Hurley, Bermudez, Crane, 
and Raftopolous) accept the conceptual character of a subject’s description of a 
perception, but do not agree that the content of a perceptual state is entirely conceptual. 
It is not clear what role concepts play in a perceptual state, and it is not easy to evaluate 
the conceptual character of experience that are not described. Yet the important point is 
that if any contents in a perceptual state (including P-conscious states) allow for the 
possibility of conceptual engagement (particularly Type-3 conceptual capacity that 
categorise the object of perception i.e., they may be grasped by concepts75 at later time) 
there is no reason to infer the existence of non-conceptual content of such a state. This is 
the first issue to be considered in this chapter.76 
With regard to this, I examine three non-conceptualist arguments against this type of 
conceptualism. Through examining these, I discuss (1) whether non-conceptualists treat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  If we treat information processing in a subpersonal state as a type of perceptual 
content, the information could be transmitted to conceptual content,	  if it really exists.	  
76	  Existing conceptualism, particularly that of Brewer (1999), also emphasizes this point.	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a content that would be defined by the functional perspective as being the same content 
offered by the expository perspective, and (2) whether they invest the claimed non-
conceptual character of experience with ‘undescribed contents’ and the ‘possibility of 
having representational contents’. 
In the next section, I briefly examine how conceptualists define the range of perceptual 
contents through examining two types of conceptualism: belief conceptualism and 
experience conceptualism, in order to indicate the conceptualist’s tendency to emphasize 
the only expository perspective rather than the functional perspective on experience. 
This tendency results in a limited approach to content, (e.g. perceptual information 
involved in perception). Therefore, taking only the expository perspective fundamentally 
permits the possibility of existence of non-conceptual content in the whole process of 
experience.   
 
IV-2. Perceptual Information and Contents of Experience	  
This section explores how the range of experience and perceptual contents has been 
defined in existing conceptualism, and then reveals the problem that would be raised by 
the non-conceptualists who defend SV and UPC type of non-conceptualism. 
 
IV-2.1. Belief Conceptualism 
	  
Most philosophers hold that beliefs and concepts are closely related, such that if a 
subject has a certain belief that x is F, then for any object x and any property F, she must 
possess one or more concepts and must be able to deploy these concepts in that belief. 
The content of her belief is conceptual when concepts and beliefs are related in this way. 
This is called ‘belief conceptualism’ (Crane 2010). This type of conceptualism claims 
that belief about a certain phenomenon would be different from another according to a 
subject’s possession of concepts about it. Siegel gives the following account of belief 
conceptualism: 
“One can believe that whales swim without believing that large sea-dwelling 
mammals swim, even though whales are large sea-dwelling mammals. 
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According to a common defense of belief conceptualism, the relevant beliefs 
differ in which concepts the thinker is deploying, and that explains how it is 
that someone can have one of these beliefs without the other.” (2014: section 6) 
On Siegel’s view, belief conceptualism ultimately concerns our individuation of beliefs. 
Belief individuation is affected by concepts that the subject possesses. Hence, belief 
content is conceptual. Peacocke (1992) has a similar view. According to him, when we 
attribute beliefs to subjects, we are dependent on the concepts that the subjects possess. 
This is called ‘belief attribution’. He says: 
“Suppose you sincerely attribute to Ralph the belief that whales are mammals. 
It is plausible that the truth of this attribution depends in part upon Ralph’s 
satisfying the possession condition for an appropriate concept of whales and for 
a similar concept of the property of being a mammal.” (1992:  xiii) 
Peacocke suggests, then, that we attribute a belief to a subject of the belief according to 
the concepts that she possesses. Hence, a subject must possess a concept in order to form 
a belief. Siegel also points out an importance of concept-possession for forming beliefs. 
She says: 
“Suppose the thinker lacked the concept ‘whale’: she had no idea what whales 
were, nor even that there was such a thing. Arguably such a thinker could not 
believe that whales swim, that whales are blue, or anything else about whales.” 
(2014: section 6) 
If a subject lacks a concept for a perceived object or phenomenon, then she is not able to 
form a belief or thought about the object or the phenomenon. Martin also argues that 
“where one lacks a conceptual ability, one thereby lacks a thought involving it” (1992: 
238). Therefore, possession of concepts is required to form beliefs, hence belief content 
is constituted by concepts that the subject possesses, according to belief-conceptualism.  
 
IV-2.2. Experience Conceptualism 
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The second type of conceptualism is called experience conceptualism (or perceptual 
conceptualism), which says that for any object a and any property F, a subject has an 
experience of a being F only if she has concepts of a and F and deploys these concepts 
in her experience. Proponents of this view hold that the contents of perceptual 
experience are of the same kind as the contents of belief. Conceptual contents in this 
type of conceptualism have components complying with the Fregean criterion of identity 
for senses, i.e., these are Fregean concepts (Toribio 2008). This idea entails that 
possessing a concept F involves exercising an ability to think of a thing as F. Hence, the 
content of perceptual experience conforms to a strong version of Evans’ Generality 
Constraint (Evans 1982: 104; see also: Toribio 2008: 352). That is to say, if a subject is 
able to think ‘a is F’, then this implies that she has two distinct abilities: (1) to think of a; 
and (2) to think of the thing as F, and the possession of a concept is explained by these 
abilities (Heck 2007: 123). Hence, this type of conceptualist holds a view that the way a 
subject represents the world can be specified by her possession of concepts.  
 
IV-2.3. The Relational Structure of Perception and Belief 
	  
Of course, this distinction does not imply that these two types of conceptualism are 
incompatible. But the problem involved in this distinction is that if we only 
acknowledge, as most CV non-conceptualists do, belief-conceptualism—, then having a 
perceptual content must be distinguished from having a perceptual belief. Sometimes we 
might even have a different perceptual content from the judgment that it entails: for 
example, when a subject sees an objectively straight stick half-submerged in water, the 
stick may appear bent (Cf. Heck 2000). Although the subject who knows that the stick is 
objectively straight perceives the stick as if it is bent, she does not form a belief or a 
judgment that the stick is bent. Also, we are able to know the fact that such illusions can 
occur even when the subject knows the truth about what she is seeing (Crane 1988). On 
this view, a perceptual content is not directly reflected to a content of belief; hence a 
perceptual content cannot be a reason for its belief. In this sense, perception sometimes 
does not have conceptual contents or produces a corresponding belief.   
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The reason for focusing on the relationship between perceptual content and belief is not 
to establish whether they are different, rather, it is to establish whether a content of 
perception is entirely unrelated to the conceptual character of experience ― the 
possibility of being engaged by any of the three types of conceptual capacities. This is 
because having different content from belief does not necessarily imply the non-
conceptual character of perceptual content. We are freely able to access perceptual 
content using concepts at the personal level of experience even though it is represented 
differently from perceptual judgment or belief. 
 
IV-2.4. Perception without Conceptual Engagement 
	  
The problem with experience conceptualism that I want to highlight is that it does not 
consider that perception could occur without any conceptual engagement; it does not 
consider this because it is possible to have perceptual contents that are irrelevant to our 
conceptual and rational thoughts. That is to say, the conceptualists ignore the non-
conceptual character of experience that perception sometimes occurs without conceptual 
engagement. Crane (1988 and 1992) gives an example of this. He says that we are faced 
with contradictory representational contents when we see the waterfall illusion:  
 
“If you stare for a period of time at a scene (waterfall) which contains 
movement in one direction, and then turn your attention to an object (a stone) 
in a scene which contains no movement, this object will appear to move in the 
opposite direction to that of the original movement.” (1988: 142) 
Whilst the stick in water example shows a conflict between two conscious states (viz. 
the state of believing that the stick is not bent and the state of the stick looking to be 
bent), the waterfall illusion shows a contradiction in the single content of one attitude 
since the perceived object seems to be both moving and not moving at the same time 
(Crane 1988: 143-144). That is to say, the waterfall illusion is a case where an object 
(the stone) looks as if it is moving and not moving at the same time. Hence, the subject 
has an experience with contradictory representational content. According to Crane (1988 
and 1992), if the content of experience is conceptual, then we may not be able to apply 
128	  
	  
incompatible concepts, e.g., ‘moving’ and ‘not moving’, to the misperceived object at 
the same time. However, there is a possibility that a rational subject may apply 
incompatible concepts to the same object in her experience. Because of this possibility, 
Crane argues that “the waterfall illusion is a counterexample to the thesis that concepts 
are involved in the content of perceptual experience” (1988: 145). He then defines 
perception as a ‘sub-rational’ process which is not governed by “the operation of the 
higher faculties” such as rational and conceptual thoughts (1988: 146).77 Hence our 
rational and conceptual capacities are sometimes irrelevant to perception, and the 
content of perception is non-conceptual. This shows that non-conceptual contents that 
are defined by the functional perspective exist independently from the possibility that we 
are able to access perceptual content conceptually at the personal level of experience. 
The perceptual mechanism for contradictory perceptual appearances is not dependent 
upon our conceptual capacities, that is to say, the perceptual mechanism that makes a 
subject to be in the perceptual state of the contradictory phenomenon sometimes does 
not allow conceptual engagement even though the contradictory phenomenon still 
appears at the personal level of experience. As such, we have contradictory phenomena 
at the personal level of experience.  
As such, what I want to draw from these two types of conceptualism is that the range of 
perceptual content is also different in both camps, as are the definitions of content and 
experience: namely, the perceived phenomenon and the interpreted phenomenon. 
In the next section, I examine an argument for experience non-conceptualism, namely, 
the richness argument (Dretske 1981; Martin 1992) which focuses on the weak point of 
experience conceptualism. This discussion will establish the possibility of inaccessible 
content in conscious experience even though we are able to entertain concepts in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Crane thinks that this idea of ‘sub-rational’ process can be supported by Fodor’s view 
that “the operations of the perceptual system are ‘informationally encapsulated’; that is, 
the informational content of perceptual states cannot be affected by the contents of states 
in ‘central mind’” (Crane 1988: 146; Cf. Fodor 1984: 64-86).	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expository perspective on experience.  I then discuss whether this fact casts doubt on the 
conceptual character of experience.    
IV-3. The Richness Argument	  
The key point of the richness argument is that experience can represent rich information 
about the world although we are not able to deploy concepts that capture all of the 
information that experience can convey (Dretske 1981; Martin 1992; Bermùdez and 
Macpherson 1999). I consider the richness argument in two ways as suggested by 
Dretske (1981) and Martin (1992): ‘awareness of fact and things’ and ‘recollecting a 
particular item from memory’ in order to show why these philosophers believe that there 
could be non-conceptual contents even if we consider the expository perspective on 
experience.    
 
IV-3.1. Awareness of Facts 
Dretske (1981) argues that our experience can convey information about a large number 
of properties of the external world, but that it is doubtful whether we can possess and 
deploy proper concepts for the all such properties. To make this clear, he (1993) 
suggests two types of awareness in perception: (1) awareness of facts, and, (2) 
awareness of things. Awareness is a type of conscious state, in this argument. For 
example, S sees x (or that p) means that S is conscious of x (or that p). Hence, to have an 
experience of a thing is to be conscious of that thing; and to have an experience of a fact 
is to be conscious of that fact. However, ‘S is conscious of x’ does not mean that ‘S is 
conscious that x is F’. Awareness of a thing that is F does not require an awareness of 
the fact that ‘x is F’. For example, suppose that S sees a brindled cow on which there are 
twelve brindles. Each brindle is clearly visible. Not bothering to count the brindles, S 
does not realize that (or is not aware of the fact that) there are twelve brindles. In such a 
case, although S is aware of all twelve brindles (or things), she is not aware of the 
number of brindles (which is a fact). The purpose of this distinction is that a perceptual 
state is a conscious state that does not require the deployment of proper concepts. 
Through this distinction, Dretske shows that our visual perception is a type of awareness 
of a thing that does not need any conceptual relation to it in order to perceive the object. 
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That is to say, being in a conscious state does not always guarantee that perceptual 
contents of this state are entirely conceptual or conceptually graspable. 
IV-3.1.a. A Condition for being a Content of Experience 
This idea presents a similar view to the one offered here in some respects (e.g. SV type 
or P-conscious experience) because it seems to imply that not all the properties of 
perceivable (or conceptually thinkable) objects do need to be conceptually understood or 
grasped in order to figure in the content of perceptual experience. All objects and their 
phenomenal characters are perceivable if a subject’s perceptual equipment is working 
well. The important point, however, is that we are in a perceptual state about the external 
world, but not all of the properties that we can perceive directly enter into the content of 
perceptual experience, even though we are aware of the circumstances in which such 
properties are involved. 
IV-3.1.b. A Condition for Being Conceptual Content  
In addition, there is no clear reason why the subject would be required to deploy a 
particular concept in order to have conceptual content of the brindled cow. That is to say, 
there could be partly inaccessible contents in conscious experience even though those 
are clearly represented and graspable by concepts. Nevertheless, should we take this to 
imply the non-conceptual content of that experience? Is it not enough to have a 
conceptual experience by grasping only particular features using concepts? 
To have a particular conceptual experience, it partly depends on what concepts the 
subject deploys for a given object. Moreover, the representational contents conveyed by 
perception would be different according to which features the subject is aware of. That is 
to say, what makes a subject be in a perceptual state is those features of an object, or of 
the relevant circumstances, that she is aware of instead of anything factual that her 
experience could convey. 
Also, there is no specific reason to believe that the number of brindles is the most 
appropriate concept that can specify the content of the experience correctly because the 
conceptual content of experience does not mean that perceptual contents or particular 
phenomena must be grasped by particular concepts in order to be conceptual contents: 
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instead,  it might be a matter of how we can use an appropriate concept in order to grasp 
perceptual content, in line with the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the 
objects of perception. Neither do we need to deploy concepts for everything that we can 
perceive. In evaluating the conceptual character of experience, what we need to consider 
is whether the subject can grasp representational contents using her concepts, i.e., the 
possibility of taking the expository perspective. It is also unclear why multiple 
representational contents must be grasped conceptually in order to create a conscious 
experience in a subject. If the subject has multiple representational contents in her 
experience, then are these in different experiences or within the same experience?   
In this respect, whatever the subject fails to notice or grasp in experience does not 
directly imply some type of non-conceptual content, and it does not show that she does 
not have an experience of the circumstances, because the absence of a particular 
property from the representational content does not imply no experience or the non-
conceptual character of that experience. 
 
IV-3.1.c. The Problem of ‘Fact’ in Experience 
Additionally, the notion of ‘fact’ in the richness argument is arbitrary because 
possession of a proper concept to grasp a particular property seems similar to deploying 
a correct concept, which is correlated with the object, but they are different. Moreover 
the term ‘fact’ could be understood in many different ways according to which position 
we take, such as a mathematical fact, a scientific fact, a geometrical fact, and so on. 
There seems no clear definition of fact at work in Dretske’s example. It is also doubtful 
that the content of a particular experience must involve a fact (any type of fact) about 
that experience, that is to say, there is no clear reason to believe that all the facts (e.g. 
mathematical and geometrical facts) about an object have to be represented in the 
subject’s visual state which do not fall within the range of perceptual contents. Suppose 
that a subject, who has knowledge of a molecular theory of heat, is aware of the heat of 
hot water (a phenomenon) in a bath, but not aware of the molecular motion (a scientific 
fact) of the water. We do not believe that she is unable to have an experience of heat 
even though she is not aware of the scientific fact ‘molecular motion’. This does not 
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imply no experience or non-conceptual content about the heat in the bath. We may not 
judge that she is unaware of facts about heat. Enabling experiences about a particular 
phenomenon seem not to be dependent on the possession of a correct concept or detailed 
knowledge about it. The richness argument makes unreasonable demands on the 
conceptual character of experience in terms of the conditions that constitute experience. 
When we talk about the content of experience, we are focusing upon a particular event 
or item which is perceived, and not upon all aspects of the environment that we could 
perceive or all of the knowledge we could deploy about that experience.   
 
IV-3.1.d. The Possibility of Conceptual Engagement is Present 
	  
Regarding Dretske’s argument, I want to suggest that we must consider whether it is 
possible that perceptual contents can be grasped by concepts that a subject possesses, 
even though those contents are not sophisticatedly or appropriately grasped initially. 
There could, I claim, be one or more descriptions available of the representational 
contents of experience. That is to say, representational contents could be conceptualized 
any time when subjects are able to use concepts in relation to their perceptual 
contents―as I said, there is still the possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity (the 
capacity to categorise the object of perception) if she is aware of the representational 
contents. Subjects are able to describe their perceptual contents in various ways using 
concepts. So, before we confirm the non-conceptual character of the rich information, 
we must consider whether the rich representational contents could be conceptualized at 
the personal level of experience. It seems, for example, that the numbers of brindles are 
countable (hence reportable), therefore the representational contents of the brindles may 
be accessible and conceptualized by the subject’s A-consciousness, unless the subject 
lacks relevant numerical concepts.78 In this sense, Dretske’s example also involves the 
possibility of the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Of course, non-possession of numbers does not imply having non-conceptual content 
concerning numbers of brindles because the number of brindles could not be a fact that 
is accessible to the perceiver if she did not possess the concept of numbers. As I 
mentioned in Chapters II and III, the problem of possession of proper concepts for a 
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In the next section, I critically examine Martin’s argument concerning memory. 
 
IV-3.2. Memory 
	  
As well as Dretske’s example of a brindled cow, Martin’s example (1992) aims to show 
that we could have non-conceptual contents even though we may deploy concepts at the 
time of experience. Martin (1992: 754-755) gives an example of Mary who is playing a 
game with dice, one of which is 8-faced and another is 12-faced. However, she is not 
able to distinguish the difference between the two dice. She just treats all the dice having 
more than six sides, and thinks that they are just many-faced. Mary does not have the 
concept dodecahedron even though she is playing with both the dodecahedral dice and 
the octahedral dice. However, she can distinguish between the dice according to 
coloured spots on their faces – one has four kinds of spots, another has three. Hence, the 
difference that she focuses on concerns colour spots, rather than the number of faces. 
Martin says: 
“At that time Mary did not have the concept of something's being twelve-faced. 
Nevertheless there is reason to suppose that that is how things appeared to her, 
unless there are defeating reasons to oppose it.” (1992: 755) 
Martin uses this example to argue that Mary might lack the concept dodecahedron when 
she played the game, however, it is also possible for her to have the representational 
content of twelve-faced dice without possession of the concept dodecahedron. Hence, 
representation of some characteristic feature of an object does not necessarily require 
possession of any particular concept.  
Martin also argues that it is also possible that Mary realizes that the 12-faced dice was a 
dodecahedron when she recalls her experience of the game, after acquiring the concept 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
target object does not only relate to all the entities represented in a perceptual state or 
physical properties of that object, it also relates to whether the perceiver can grasp the 
represented entities (though not all of them) through her possession of concepts.  
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dodecahedron. Her memory of the experience of the 12-faced dice can then be altered to 
an experience of a dodecahedral dice. Hence, it is possible that “a subject’s later 
conceptual sophistication often does alter her memories” (Martin 1992: 755). In this 
sense, Mary’s initial experience of the dice could, according to Martin, be non-
conceptual because (1) the shape of being dodecahedral was represented as it is even 
though she did not possess the relevant concept, and, (2) she could not apply an 
appropriate concept to the object when she had her original experience.  
 
IV-3.2.a. Does the Application of a Non-General Concept to a Perceived Object 
Define Perception with Conceptual Engagement?  
	  
However, we may find many counterexamples to the example above. We can imagine a 
case where a subject does not possess any concept or knowledge about a particular 
object at all, but nevertheless is able to grasp the object using the concepts that she 
possesses. For example, if a subject who does not know the Korean language looks at 
the word ‘바보’ written in black ink on a white sheet of paper, she can distinguish the 
word from the paper but does not know what it means. If another person who knows 
Korean looks at the word ‘바보’, he may feel angry, because it means ‘fool’. 
Nevertheless, the person who does not know Korean could at least discriminate79the 
word from the paper, even though she does not possess any concept or knowledge about 
it.80 The word ‘바보’ could be perceptually represented as it is to the subject without any 
conceptual engagement even though she is able to discriminate it from other objects, e.g. 
black coloured letters and the white paper. Are these not enough for having a conceptual 
content of an experience? That is to say, if she later comes to learn Korean and 
remembers the experience of seeing the word and now feels angry that she was being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Again, one of these conceptual abilities is the discrimination ability in conceptualism. 
I discuss this, alongside demonstrative concepts, in Chapter V.	  
80	  In this case, we can see that perception involves a discrimination ability, even though 
it is not affected by the subject’s possession of a concept. This will be discussed more at 
the end of chapter V.	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called a fool, it does not follow that she has a non-conceptual representation of being 
called a fool when she first saw the word. She did not have a non-conceptual 
representation, rather, she might have had two different representational contents ― the 
black letters and a fool ― with regard to the Korean word. 
 
IV-3.2.b. The Non-Conceptual Character of Perception and the Possibility of Type-
3 conceptual capacity 
	  
I have agreed that there could be non-conceptual content at the occurrence of perception. 
In Mary’s case, it is certain that her initial experience of the dice was not engaged with 
the concept dodecahedron even though she represented it as twelve-faced. However, 
although Mary, and the subject in the example above, did not possess appropriate 
concepts for the represented contents, they could still grasp them as ‘many-faced dice’ 
and ‘black letters’. That is to say, the contents of both subjects’ experience can be 
grasped by concepts that they possess even if those concepts were not very sophisticated. 
Without deploying an appropriate concept for the representational contents, there is still 
the possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity that the subject can grasp the 
representational contents using their own concepts. In this sense, perceptual contents can 
be grasped conceptually by the subject of perception even though perception itself can 
occur without conceptual engagement.  
However, there is something that we need to consider in Dretske’s and Martin’s 
arguments even though there is the possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity of 
experience. Despite the fact that the non-conceptual contents in the cases of brindled 
cows and memory can easily be denied by the possibility of a Type-3 conceptual 
capacity, there remain two complicated problems in their arguments: namely, (1) Are 
single or multiple experiences involved in cases where perception contains multiple 
representational contents?, and, (2) Is it possible to have non-conceptual content in 
thoughts? 
In the next section, I briefly explain the relevance of the expository perspective to the 
above argument, and then examine these questions.  
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IV-3.3. The Possibility of Non-Conceptual Content 
	  
I have discussed the possibility of conceptual capacities when taking the expository 
perspective on experience even though having representational content is not affected by 
whether or not that content is conceptual. In addition, possession of concepts (in the 
examples of memory and Korean word, subjects were not able to deploy a proper 
concept for the target object because they did not possess the specific concept for that 
object) sometimes does not play the role of a function that constitutes the perceptual 
content of experience: nevertheless, the subject of perception is at least able to think that 
the Korean word is different from its background (a white paper) by using her 
discriminative abilities. Likewise, Mary was able to think that the two dice look different 
because of their different coloured spots by using her discriminative abilities.  That is to 
say, although concepts do not constitute the content of experience, she can think about 
perceived objects using the discrimination ability provided by perception, and she can 
access those contents that she perceives using this ability. This ability is also connected 
to the subject’s possession of concepts that could act as a mediator, so that she can 
access the object. So we can assume that a subject may grasp an object conceptually at a 
later time when she obtains a proper (or correct) concept for it. In the case of the subject 
who does not know Korean, she can know what ‘바보’ means if she has a Korean-
English dictionary. After she discovers the meaning, she does not see the word as black 
ink on the paper or as ‘this word’ anymore. As Martin (1992) argues, acquiring 
sophisticated concepts could alter one’s content of experience. She might not sense any 
ambiguity with regard to ‘바보’ now because she now has the correct translational 
concept of it. In this regard, it seems that these cases imply the conceptual character of 
experience because the content involves the possibility of conceptual engagement that 
can be grasped by concepts that the subject possesses. 
There are two issues involved here. First, in order to discuss the conceptual character of 
experience, we have to know what contents the subject has in her experience. There is 
no specific reason to believe Mary’s initial experience about the dice was a mere 
perception with which she was not conceptually engaged. She initially understood and 
thought of the dice as ‘many-faced’ dice, but later she mnemonically altered the 
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experience so that it involved ‘dodecahedral dice’. It seems that she has two different 
conceptual interpretation of a single experience. There seems no reason for treating her 
initial thought of the dice as non-conceptual.  
Second, if the dice was not conceptually accessed by Mary, then it is possible that Mary 
may grasp the representational content using her possession of the concept 
‘dodecahedron’ when she recollects her memory. So, it might be that the initial 
representational content of the dice was non-conceptual. However, there is no sufficient 
reason why a representational content that is unsophisticatedly grasped is not a 
conceptual content of experience, even though the subject was able to grasp and think 
about the content using her own concept. That is to say, why does only the use of a 
sophisticated concept guarantee the conceptual character of experience? 
 
IV-3.3.a. The Conceptual Character of Experience 
	  
It is probable that those who agree with Dretske and Martin believe that vision conveys 
information about all visible objects directly into a perceiver’s content of experience. 
That is to say, they hold the view that the possibility of vision or of having 
representational contents involves the possibility of having non-conceptual content 
because we are not always able to notice all of the features of an object that are 
represented in perception. Let us look at Mary’s case again. She initially had a proper 
concept, many-faced dice, of the target object, but she was also focused on the spots on 
the dice. In order to have conceptual content, why does she need to deploy concepts that 
correspond to all the representational content of perception? Do they constitute the same 
experience or a different experience? It is not quite clear why we should think that all 
representational content has to be grasped using sophisticated concepts in order to have 
conceptual content of a single experience. This is the key point that this chapter makes 
regarding perceptual contents. This is so because conceptual engagement, Type-3 
conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception in particular, that 
conceptualists defend does not involve the use of sophisticated concepts for having 
conceptual contents: instead, conceptualists focus on either how concepts that we 
possess may mediate our mind and the empirical world (McDowell 1994a) or how we 
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are able to grasp represented perceptual contents using the concepts that we possess 
(McDowell 1994a; Brewer 1999 and 2005). In this sense, both Dretske and Martin 
depend on a higher notion of conceptual character of experience (e.g. the use of highly 
general concepts) than conceptualists. 
 
IV-3.3.b. The Range of Experience 
Another point that I want to make about both Dretske’s and Martin’s examples is that 
non-conceptualist accounts of the range of perceptual contents are too wide, such that 
sometimes any of the facts (e.g. mathematical and geometrical facts) that could be 
represented in the visual field fall within the range of perceptual contents. This seems to 
set an excessively demanding criterion for something’s being a conceptual content.   
However, I believe that conceptualists such as McDowell and Brewer should consider 
this point because there is an undeniable possibility of conceptually inaccessible content 
existing in a single conscious experience even though subjects are able to grasp 
particular items using concepts. That is to say, although we treat a single experience as 
having a single representational content, there are other represented contents that would 
still allow conceptual access – A-consciousness, in the subject’s perceptual states. For 
example, in the case of the brindled cow, the representational contents of the cow may 
not only be ‘twelve brindles’ to the subject. The other characteristic feature of the cow 
might be represented, such as four-legs, a long tail, a cow horn, at the time of the 
perception. The subject may also be clearly aware of these features at a later time even 
though she was only aware of ‘twelve-brindles’ at the time of the original perception. 
Moreover, we may not be able to know which stage or level of experience contains those 
contents, but they would still meet the condition on A-consciousness. This results from 
the possibility that perception could occur without conceptual engagement. In this sense, 
there could be unconceptualized content because of this possibility.81 Indeed, there are 
some philosophers who adopt this perspective, and with it, a very broad account of 
perceptual content, which allows for the existence of non-conceptual content. They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 I will be returning to this issue at the end of this chapter. 
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focus on ‘awareness’ and ‘cognitive penetration’ as characterizations of conceptual and 
non-conceptual content of experience. While Dretske and Martin try to identify non-
conceptual contents in conscious experience (CPC (Conscious Perceptual Content) type 
non-conceptual contents), they acknowledge the existence of conceptual content in a 
conscious state but claim that there are non-conceptual contents in unconscious stages of 
perception. This involves a wider notion of perceptual content than Martin and Dretske. 
The characteristic feature of this approach is that it divides perception into two stages: a 
lower stage (like sensation) and a higher stage (perception). In dividing these two stages, 
the presence or absence of cognitive penetration becomes a criterion of each stage. I do 
not entirely agree with the view that there could be representational content that we can 
trace in the lower stage, however it is an undeniable fact that perceptual representational 
contents that could be engaged with conceptual capacities can be produced from the 
unconscious level of perception.  
In the next section, I briefly examine the two stages of perception suggested by the so-
called ‘neurophilosophers’. I discuss whether proponents of this type of non-
conceptualism assume that the information within the early visual stage (a non-
conscious, subpersonal, and non-cognitive state) can be perceptual representational 
content. I also consider whether they believe that phenomenal content differs from 
experiential content, so that contents of the early perceptual stage are non-conceptual. 
However, it remains hard to define this stage as a part of experience by which we can 
evaluate the conceptual character of experience, but it is clear that perceptual experience 
is “the result of some mediating mental process of inference or interpretation” of this 
stage (Drayson 2011: 243). 
	  
IV-4. The Two Stages of Experience 
	  
From the richness argument, it seems that Dretske and Martin believe that a perceptual 
state is a type of awareness. But this does not mean ‘awareness of an object’, rather, it is 
‘awareness of a characteristic feature’ of an object. This view is closely related to 
Block’s distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness. In particular, a 
perceptual content being non-conceptual, for Dretske and Martin, is a matter of having 
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P-consciousness whilst lacking A-consciousness. On this view, the non-conceptual 
character of experience means that perceivers are not required to deploy or exercise any 
concept in P-conscious experience. Second, concepts do not always specify a 
characteristic feature of an object in the visual field even though the perceiver has an 
intention towards that object. If there could be non-conceptual contents in such P-
conscious states, and if the presence of awareness has an important role in determining 
whether a subject is in a perceptual state, then it is important that we discuss how such 
intention and awareness could affect the content of perceptual experience. This is 
especially important because some psychologists and philosophers, whose views 
strongly depend on the neuro-physiological analysis of vision, believe that the absence 
of awareness in a visual process could demonstrate the non-conceptual character of 
experience, say perception without the conceptual engagement, and that this is a neural 
state that is cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn 1999). We have seen that the CPC type 
non-conceptualism that both Dretske and Martin hold would not be successful because 
there is the possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the object of 
perception in a conscious state. Yet, if we extend the scope of experience to an 
unconscious state of experience, then there would be a certain type of perceptual content 
that could not be engaged with the three major types of conceptual capacities. This is a 
wider notion of experience than Martin and Dretske hold, hence, this view may be 
interpreted as suggesting a possibility of a different kind of non-conceptual content from 
Martin and Dretske. If this is right, then content at such an unconscious stage could be 
non-conceptual, unless it does not allow any conceptual engagement from the perceiver. 
In the next section, I focus on Raftopoulos’s conceptions of visual stages and the notion 
of awareness.      
  
IV-4.1. Phenomenal Awareness 
	  
The traditional philosophical problem of perceptual content, according to Raftopoulos 
(2009), concerns how the world is presented to us in perception. Traditionally, 
Raftopoulos claims, the term ‘non-conceptual content’ has been used to capture “an 
aspect of the phenomenal content (namely, that to be in a state with phenomenal content 
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does not require either the possession or the exercise of concepts)” (2009: 164–165). 
According to him, the conceptualist view (e.g. McDowell 1994a; Brewer 1999) says that 
we perceive the world as structured by classification and categories. On the contrary, 
non-conceptualists like Peacocke (1998) argue that only non-conceptual content can 
account for the rich phenomenal experience associated with perception, hence the 
content of perception is non-conceptually structured and pre-linguistic. In addition, 
some non-conceptualists turn to a neuro-scientific account of vision, and suggest that we 
need to divide perceptual experience into two stages in order to prove that the contents 
of a non-conceptually structured perceptual stage do exist.82 According to Lamme’s 
notion of perception (2003 and 2004; Raftopolous 2009: 131–132), there are two kinds 
of visual processing in the brain: (1) the feedforward sweep (FFS), and, (2) recurrent 
processing (RP). This distinction may help us to answer the question of whether our 
conceptual framework engages with all stages of perception. Of course, I do not take 
this view to provide evidence for the existence of non-conceptual content. Instead, I take 
the two kinds of visual processing to use different modes or perspectives in order to 
emphasize that the functional perspective and the expository perspective on experience 
must be divided into two stages when explaining the contents of those stages since 
contents of perceptual states could be explained or confirmed using neuro-scientific 
methods – unlike contents of experience which are initially defined by a subject’s 
interpretation of those states. Hence, there must be conceptual engagement between the 
two stages. Moreover, through this distinction we can incorporate both conceptual and 
non-conceptual character of experience from both camps. The appearance of conflict 
between the two is deceiving because most state non-conceptualists take the functional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  According to Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999), the two stages are: (1) the early visual 
stage, which takes retina stimuli as inputs and computes details of light and shadow, 
SSR, and other physical properties, and, (2) ‘late vision’, which takes output of the 
earlier process and identifies objects and their features. In the case of (1), information is 
not cognitively available, like the content of belief. We cannot access or articulate the 
content of this stage. In the case of (2), there must be access to semantic information and 
memory processes, because the classes of objects we perceive and the features we 
attribute to them depend upon our conceptual schema.
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perspective. By contrast, conceptualists focus on the expository perspective. Therefore it 
is important to examine these stages and evaluate the respective notions of conceptual 
character of experience in order to build a bridge between both camps. 
 
IV-4.1. a. Feedforward Sweep and Recurrent Processing 
This section first explores the notion of feedforward sweep (FFS) and recurrent 
processing (RP), then attempts to show that the arguments from the neurophilosophers 
are also strongly based on a mysterious premise: namely, that there is a perceptual 
content in early vision.  
In FFS, the signal from visual sensation is transmitted from the lower levels of the brain 
to the higher levels. At this stage, no signal can be transmitted top-down to influence 
visual processing, and there is no conscious access from higher levels. This is similar to 
what Marr (1982), Pylyshyn (1999), and Raftopoulos (2009) call the ‘early visual stage’ 
which processes retinal images as inputs. The information contained in the retinal image 
falls within the scope of what we call sensation. Sensation includes parts of early vision. 
The properties of stimuli obtained at this stage never reach conscious awareness; “there 
are nonattentional selection mechanisms involved here that filter out information” 
(Raftopoulos 2009: 133). 
In the case of RP, the signals can flow in both directions. Lamme argues that conscious 
awareness occurs only during RP. In this process, there are two levels of awareness: 
‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘access consciousness’ (Block 1995; Lamme 2003 and 
2004).83 The former is associated with ‘local’ RP, which is limited to the lower level, 
while the latter is associated with ‘global’ RP, which higher levels can access. Through 
this distinction of FFS and RP, Raftopoulos defines a notion of awareness that aims to 
prove the non-conceptual character of perception. He says: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Raftopoulos adopts this stance. He calls these levels ‘phenomenal awareness’ and 
‘access awareness’ (2009: 132).	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“Awareness is defined as the occurrence of recurrent processing. Without RP 
there is no awareness. The processes in the FFS are necessarily unconscious. 
When there is RP, awareness arises. When RP is limited to early areas, we have 
phenomenal experience of the content of our perceptual states, and thus this 
form of awareness is called “phenomenal awareness”. When RP includes 
output areas, then attentional selection has an influence; because of attentional 
selection, there is “access awareness”. (2009: 132)  
The information of which one is phenomenally aware is a “short-lived, unstable, 
vulnerable, and not easily reportable form of visual experience” (Lamme 2003: 3). On 
the contrary, ‘access awareness’ (that is, the awareness that accompanies our normal 
experience) is more stable and easily reportable. However, it seems that both 
Raftopoulos and Lamme claim that we can have a type of awareness of contents at the 
early visual stage, but that these contents are not reportable or accessible. Unfortunately, 
neither provides a specific reason for thinking that this should be the case.  
 
IV-4.1.b. The Content of The Early Visual Stage 
	  
It seems that we cannot have these two types of awareness simultaneously. The issue 
that I want to raise here is that there is a strong assumption that ‘there is a perceptual 
content at the early visual stage’. But how can we prove the existence of such a content? 
That is to say, if the early visual stage is a type of FFS processing, we cannot be aware 
of it because there is no top-down influence on the processing, and so, there seems no 
way of knowing whether this stage processes any perceptual content. Also, if a content 
of this stage is just a retinal image (such as sensible information), then what makes it 
become perceptual content? In other words, a perceiver must be able to be consciously 
aware of such a content so that it can figure in her experience.84 Raftopoulos and Műller 
just argue that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  This is the condition for being a perceptual content and evaluating the conceptual 
character of experience that this thesis proposed in section I-2.2.	  
144	  
	  
“The content of many computational subpersonal states cannot be described 
conceptually. Natural languages do not conceptualize the contents of some of 
the early stages of visual processes. Thus, their content, whatever it might be, is 
non-conceptual.” (2006: 189). 
The important phrase in the above paragraph is ‘whatever it might be’. It seems that they 
assume that non-conceptual content could exist in a computational subpersonal state 
without defining what it really is. Further, if it just is an image or the information 
processed in subpersonal states, how do we know that the content of the early stage can 
affect the latter stage? Without a subject’s conscious access, we cannot prove the 
existence of content in subpersonal states nor can we know how the content of an early 
visual stage is related to the later vision. That is to say, taking only the functional 
perspective on experience does not give us an explanation of how we are able to have a 
content of experience through the early visual stage without depending on the expository 
perspective on experience. Raftopoulos just claims that the content of the early visual 
stage is cognitively impenetrable and must be identical to the content of conscious 
perceptual experience. But we can have ‘phenomenal awareness’ 85  of cognitively 
impenetrable early visual content. It seems to me that this is the mistake that 
Raftopoulos and Műller make. They describe subpersonal states or the early visual stage 
as stages that process sensible information such as visual neurons, and declare that we 
are not able to consciously access the contents of those stages. But they believe that 
early visual stages and the later vision share content. They problematically define the 
former as non-conceptual and the latter as conceptual without offering a clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 	  In general, the notion of phenomenal awareness has been understood as an 
experiential state, for example, ‘what it is like to perceive’. But for Raftopoulos, it seems 
to be more of a technical term that is less relevant to our concept of experience or 
consciousness (Cf. Drayson 2011: 244). In fact it seems rather unclear in his discussion 
because the notion of phenomenal awareness includes a wider range of perceptual 
content than that of P-conscious experience. However, it is obvious that the content 
Raftopolus takes to be non-conceptual is the same content that he takes to be cognitively 
impenetrable―not engaged with A-consciousness.	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explanation of how the former could be the same content as the latter. In Cognition and 
Perception, Raftopoulos just says: 
“Nonconceptual content has been defined in this book as the content of the 
states that are formed during early vision. Nonconceptual representational 
content has been defined as the content of the states of perception. Early vision 
extracts information from the environment in a purely bottom-up way, which 
thus excludes any top-down cognitive effects; early vision processes are 
cognitively impenetrable. Hence, the content of those states are necessarily 
nonconceptual. […] In this view, conceptual and nonconceptual contents are 
the products of two different stages of vision; the former result from late vision 
or observation, whereas the latter result from early vision or perception.” (2009: 
146) 
This classification of perceptual experience seems to imply that conceptual content 
exists at the late stage of vision, i.e. it is cognitively accessible (or penetrable), while a 
non-conceptual content exists at a stage where it is cognitively inaccessible. On this 
view, it seems clear that non-conceptual content exists at a stage which our cognitive 
capacities cannot reach. And this stage is a level of perception. However, the problem is 
the claim that the content of the early stage can be the same as the content of the latter 
stage. Also, Raftopoulos assumes that there is representational content in the early vision, 
but he also states that early vision is cognitively impenetrable. If so, how do we know 
what is represented in the early vision? 
 
IV-4.1.c. The Possibility of Conceptual Engagement Between Early and Late Vision 
	  
As I indicated above, if we only focus on the functional perspective, there seems no way 
to understand how we can have a content of late vision because we are unable to access 
the content of computational subpersonal states independently from the expository 
perspective on experience. Without conceptual engagement between these two stages of 
experience, we cannot prove whether the content of the former is the same as the content 
of the latter. This allows the possibility that Type-3 conceptual capacity categorises the 
object of perception. In this sense, the content of the early vision could have the 
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possibility of Type-3 conceptual capacity unless there is a way to find perceptual content 
of the early stage without depending upon the expository aspect. 
In addition, the early vision that Raftopoulos identifies is dependent on an enabling 
condition of perception; hence the content of early vision can be obtained passively if 
we assume that such visual information from the environment can be a perceptual 
content. In contrast to this, the content of late vision identified by Raftopoulos allows a 
perceiver conscious access; hence the content of late vision can vary according to which 
concepts she deploys. 
If the content of the former can be the same as the latter, as Raftopolous argues, this may 
allow Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational structure of 
perception and belief) because a content of the early vision that is not engaged with 
Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) and Type-3 conceptual 
capacity (the capacity to categorise the object of perception) can constitutively affect  
the content of the late vision, or potentially even higher levels of conscious stages such 
as beliefs (that can be affected by conceptual capacities). In this sense, Raftopoulos 
account of the two stages of perception allows Type-2 and Type-3 conceptual 
capacities.86  
What I want to address in Raftopoulos’ account is the claim that ‘certain subpersonal 
brain states or the early visual stage have non-conceptual content’ is not “the same as 
claiming that perceptual experience has non-conceptual content” (Drayson 2011: 246). 
Of course, this type of non-conceptualism is correct only if there is non-conceptual 
content at a certain perceptual stage. But why do we infer the existence of non-
conceptual content if the content of such a stage is the same as the content of the latter 
vision, which is affected by a cognitive capacity (or if there is any type of conceptual 
engagement), as Raftopolous claims? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Moreover, Raftopoulos also presents a controversial distinction between the contents 
of the two stages. He says that “phenomenal content is not the same as experiential 
content” (2009: 148). But he does not give an explanation as to how they are different.	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I claim that this approach shows that the content of a non-cognitive stage has the 
possibility of Type-2 and Type-3 conceptual capacities ― the expository perspective if 
the content is the same as the content of the latter vision. In order to perceive the world, 
certain information must be processed in a perceptual system, but first-person conscious 
awareness is not required to inspect this information. If this is right, is the content in this 
process non-conceptual? As I mentioned throughout the discussion of the sections III-4 
and IV-2, if there is any possibility that perceptual content can be grasped by taking the 
expository perspective, it should be considered as conceptual. If we are not able to 
evaluate whether the contents of subpersonal states can be grasped by concepts – 
because we are not able to access those contents – then such content would not be 
perceptual, and so, are irrelevant  for evaluating the conceptual or non-conceptual 
character of experience.87 Further, a certain stage of perception like a subpersonal state 
is either phenomenally conscious or non-conscious. If any content in a perceptual stage 
becomes conceptual through ‘access awareness’ (or any type of cognitive capacity or 
cognitive penetration) and is described as a conceptual content, then there is no reason to 
hold the existence of non-conceptual content in experience. 
 
IV-4.1.d. Representational Content in Subpersonal States?  
	  
There is one point that claims our attention. This is that the distinction of perceptual 
stages offered by Raftopolous and the other neuro-psychologists and philosophers seem 
to excessively extend the range of P-conscious experience into subpersonal states or 
information processing stages which our consciousness (including both P-consciousness 
and A-consciousness) cannot reach. A perceptual content of such non-cognitive stages 
that the non-conceptualists predict is not the same content as SV and UPC type non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  It is not quite clear whether existing conceptualism is committed to this issue. It seems 
only to be concerned with the structure of perception and the conceptual role of reasons 
for belief. However, how we evaluate the structure of perception and the role of 
concepts is first of all dependent on the existence of perceptual contents. Hence, it seems 
that existing conceptualism does not consider the subpersonal or sensual states of 
perception.	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conceptual contents because it is not quite clear that such stages could contain 
representational contents of experience. 
In the next section, I consider this issue , and  briefly examine the state view in order to 
consider two things: (1) whether the neurophilosophers treat cognitively inaccessibility 
(or impenetrability) of subpersonal states or information processing stages as a kind of 
non-conceptual content of experience, and, (2) whether they have considered any 
possibility of the expository perspective on experience because they hold the claim that a 
content of an early visual stage is the same as the content of later vision. This discussion 
has the significant implication that we need to confirm what perceptual contents might 
be in order to access the contents of experience, and provides an important reason why 
we have to be open to the possibility of conceptual engagement about perceptual 
contents in the processes of experience (assuming it is true that both the early stage and 
the latter stage could share the same content). I suggest that the main question at stake 
between conceptualism and non-conceptualism, namely ‘what kinds of content does 
perceptual experience have?’, has to be transformed into ‘must all stages of perceptual 
experience have the very same kind of content? 
 
IV-4.2. State Non-Conceptualism and Perception without Consciousness	  
The philosophers examined in this chapter tend to identify the representational content 
of perception with the contents that the subject can understand, i.e. the possibility of A-
consciousness. Indeed, this tendency may not be entirely wrong. The problem however, 
is that both the represented contents and the contents that the subject understands in 
experience must be the same if we are to identify them as being the same. However, 
present explanations of the former and the latter seem a little confused since they agree 
with the view that the former sometimes can be unconscious and subpersonal, but they 
do not seem to apply the same standard to explanations of the latter. It seems that the 
content of the latter must be understood as a conscious and personal level of a mental 
state. But the problem is that it is not obvious how we can prove or confirm the 
existence of perceptual content in unconscious states if we extend the range of those 
states into subpersonal ones. And there is no clear reason to believe that the contents of 
149	  
	  
unconscious states are identical to the contents of their experience. One reason for 
holding this view might be that even conceptualists seem to insist on believing that both 
perception and perceptual judgment share the same content. According to McDowell, 
“A judgement of experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but 
simply endorses the conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed 
by the experience on which it is grounded.” (1994a: 48–49) 
Brewer also begins with the premise that “sense experiential states have conceptual 
content”, and then claims that “a mental state with conceptual content […] is one whose 
content is the content of a possible judgement by the subject” (2005: 217).88 Hence, they 
do not seem to be concerned with how the contents of a perceptual state become equal to 
the judgments of experience. They only declare that perceptual states have conceptual 
contents. It seems to me that this view assumes that non-conceptualists hold the same 
tenets. 
 
IV-4.2.a. Representation in a Mental State  
	  
However, it is possible to claim (such as SV type non-conceptualism) that perception 
does not involve any characteristic features of experience. Regarding the non-conceptual 
character of experience, Heck (2000) offers two theories: one is the ‘state view’, and the 
other is the ‘content view’.89 In the case of the state view, the thought that the content of 
perceptual experience is non-conceptual implies the claim that one can be in “a 
perceptual state an adequate specification of whose content would necessarily employ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 	  Conceptual character of perceptual states will be verified in the discussion of 
discrimination ability and demonstrative concepts in the next chapter.	  
89As many philosophers have noted (e.g. Byrne 2003 and 2005; Speaks 2005; Crowther 
2006; Heck 2007), many recent debates about non-conceptualism are concerned with the 
content of a perceptual state. Arguments for the non-conceptual content of perceptual 
experience usually proceed via a demonstration of the concept-independence of 
perception.	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concepts one does not possess” (Heck 2000: 488). To possess a concept, Heck argues, a 
subject must be able to ‘entertain’ it, or ‘use’ it as an element of some thought. Hence, 
perceptual states are not required to entertain or use a concept. It seems that there is no 
room left for characteristic features of the expository perspective on experience in such a 
view. Most state non-conceptualists hold this view. Bermùdez also offers a version of 
the state view:   
“The general thought is that it is theoretically legitimate to refer to mental 
states which represent the world but which do not require the bearer of those 
mental states to possess the concepts required to specify the way in which they 
represent the world. These are states with non-conceptual content. A non-
conceptual content can be attributed to a creature without thereby attributing to 
that creature mastery of the concepts required to specify that content.” (1995: 
184) (Emphasis added) 
If the thought is simply that in order to have a representational content we do not need to 
depend wholly on concepts that we possess, then of course, I agree with this view. But 
the problem is with the notion of a mental state that Bermùdez and the other non-
conceptualists are using. What exactly do they mean by ‘mental state? Do they mean 
perception, sensation, pain, hunger, or desire? The answer is simple but relies on a very 
restrictive meaning. It refers to representation in a mental state. We can demand the 
conceptual or non-conceptual content experience only about a represented content in 
those states. 
According to the state non-conceptualist, we are not required to possess concepts to be 
in perceptual states; hence the representational content of those states is not affected by 
the concepts that we possess. It is important to note that the early visual system that the 
neurophilosophers define is beyond the range of representational content where we can 
evaluate the conceptual character of experience. State non-conceptualists are talking 
about representational contents, whereas neurophilosophers are talking about a much 
wider notion of perceptual contents, including perceptual information. So it seems hard 
to evaluate the conceptual character of perceptual content in the neurophilosopher’s case 
because we cannot access it. In this sense, the non-conceptualist in chapters II and III 
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and the neurophilosophers seem to have a very ambiguous notion of perceptual content. 
There could be no representational content in their notion of early vision and 
subpersonal states.  
 
IV-4.2.b. The Possibility of Non-Conceptual Content 
	  
It might be possible that philosophers who are only concerned with perception (i.e., 
those who take only the functional perspective on experience), might not accept the 
possibility of taking the expository perspective on experience. Also, it is still possible 
that there could be non-conceptual content in conscious experience even though we are 
able to conceptually grasp some representational content by taking the expository 
perspective. Indeed, we could only have perceptual states that do not need any 
expository perspective. That is, not all perception involves the expository perspective, 
and so, there is only the possibility of taking the functional perspective. This is why 
there could be non-conceptual content in perception.  
In addition, if perceptual information is processed in unconscious states, then such 
information can still be representational content of P-conscious experience, and 
potentially engaged with the conceptual capacities because we are not sure where these 
contents really exist. We know what perceptual information we get via perception only 
when our conceptual capacities engage with incoming information. In this sense, and 
despite the fact that we emphasize the expository perspective, there might be non-
conceptual representational content in both the early visual system and the late vision. If 
so, non-conceptual content and conceptual content could co-exist in both cognitively 
penetrable and impenetrable states. How do conceptualists overcome this issue?       
Macpherson (2012 and forthcoming) recently gave a very interesting example of the 
early vision. She accepts the neurophilosopher’s idea of two stages of perception, but her 
notion of early vision is quite different from theirs. She tries to show that there could be 
both conceptual and non-conceptual content in a particular type of cognitively 
penetrable state under the assumption that non-conceptual content exists.90 The next 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90She just aims to show that cognitive penetration can be compatible with non-
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section attempts to reveal the fundamental problem with conceptualism, namely the 
possibility of the coexistence of conceptual and non-conceptual contents using 
Macpherson’s example of a cognitive penetration state. 
 
IV-5. Non-Conceptual Contents and Cognitive Penetration 
	  
While neurophilosophers (particularly Raftopoulos and Müller (2006) and Raftopoulos 
(2009)) have argued that the contents of experience can be non-conceptual only if they 
are not cognitively penetrable, Macpherson (2012 and forthcoming) claims that there 
could be both conceptual and non-conceptual contents in a particular type of 
cognitively-penetrable state. She argues that we could have both conceptual and non-
conceptual contents in ‘early vision’91 via a particular type of cognitive penetration 
called ‘cognitive penetration lite’, using an example of an experiment with shapes. 
Through the discussion of this argument, this section reveals the initial problem of 
conceptualism despite the possibility of the expository perspective, then attempts to 
show how this issue can be overcome.  
 
IV-5.1. Cognitive Penetration Lite 
	  
Macpherson gives another model of cognitive penetration, which is called ‘cognitive 
penetration lite’, and explains how this is compatible with non-conceptual contents:  
 
(a) You have a certain propositional attitude that p (for example, you believe 
that something red is likely to be found at your present location). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conceptual content, arguing neither that the cognitive penetration claim is true nor for 
the existence of non-conceptual content. 
91 Please note that Macpherson’s notion of ‘early vision’ is different from that of 
Raftopoulos. She does not describe it as a subpersonal state or an unconscious state, 
rather, she clearly states that ‘early vision’ involves a representational content.    
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(b) p involves a concept R (for example, the concept of being red), in the sense 
that possession of R is required to specify the content that p and possession of 
R is required in order to have the propositional attitude that p. 
(c) The content of this propositional attitude causally affects your perceptual 
processes yielding an experience with the content that q (for example, that there 
is something red present) that involves R (in the sense that R is required to 
specify the content that q). 
(d) The content that q is a content that an experience could have without being 
affected by propositional attitudes in this way. (Macpherson forthcoming: 22) 
Here Macpherson seems to define cognitive penetration as one that has a ‘propositional 
attitude’ involving one’s belief; hence the content in perceptual states is a propositional 
attitude representation. 92 And the notion of cognitive penetration lite is that the 
experience affected by cognitive penetration can share content (or the same phenomenal 
character) with an experience, which is not affected by that cognitive penetration. 
Macpherson clearly takes a different perspective from the neurophilosopher. While most 
neurophilosophers (particularly Raftopoulos and Müller 2006; Raftopoulos 2009) hold a 
view that the early visual system is produced by a cognitive impenetrable mechanism of 
vision, 93  Macpherson considers that there could be higher-level cognitive states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92In general, conceptual content is the kind of content involved in propositional attitudes. 
Macpherson claims that “one reason for thinking this is that a crucial role is postulated 
for concepts in the having propositional attitudes: in order for a subject to believe or 
desire something, he or she needs to possess the concepts that are required to specify 
what it is that is believed or desired” (forthcoming: 5).	  
93Not all neuro-philosophers and psychologists hold this view. Pylyshyn presented a 
similar idea to Macpherson’s that early vision can be cognitively penetrated by one’s 
higher-level cognition. He explains cognitive penetrated perception as a brain 
mechanism, which shows that early vision can be cognitively penetrated, for “the 
function it computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals 
and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the 
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involving propositional attitudes such as belief and desires that “generate perceptual 
imagery which adds to, contributes to, or alters perceptual experience” (forthcoming: 1). 
Hence, there could be cognitively penetrable early vision on Macpherson’s account. She 
(2012 and forthcoming) gives a good example of this by using a psychological 
experiment carried out by Delk and Fillenbaum (1965):  
“Different shapes were cut out of a uniformly coloured orange paper. Some of 
these shapes were shapes of characteristically red objects, such as hearts and 
lips, and some were not. These shapes were placed against a uniformly 
coloured background that could be adjusted in colour from yellow, through the 
shade of the orange of the paper, and into red. Subjects were instructed to ask 
for changes in the colour of the background to be made until it matched the 
colour of the shape placed in front of it. Subjects chose a background that was 
redder when the characteristically red objects were placed in front of it than 
they did when the other objects were placed in front of it. The latter were 
matched to a more orange colour. (The more orange colour was, objectively, 
the more accurate match.)” (Macpherson forthcoming: 23) 
We can assume that the subjects’ beliefs about the characteristic colours of particular 
shapes like heart and lips penetrated their experience and led them to perceive some 
objects as redder than others, i.e. their beliefs causally affected the representational 
contents of their experiences. When they looked at the orange heart, their belief that 
‘hearts are red’ might have affected (or penetrated) the representational contents of their 
visual state and caused them to have the content ‘red heart’. The important point here is 
that we do not have contents of SSRs that we perceive, rather, we have perceptual 
contents of colours that we perceive. Hence, colour perception in early vision could 
occur via conceptual engagement rather than being entirely dependent on its physical 
properties, as we had seen in sections III-2 and III-4. This is the reason for discussing 
Macpherson’s idea of cognitive penetration and early vision. The aforementioned non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
person knows” (1999: 343). However, he alleged that these are said to “affect that which 
feeds into the early visual system, not the early visual system itself” (Pylyshyn 1999 
cited in Macpherson forthcoming: 12).	  
155	  
	  
conceptualists in chapter III as well as neurophilosophers have a tendency to treat early 
vision (sensuous) and subpersonal states as types of perceptual states of experience even 
though their contents are inaccessible and sometimes not different from physical 
reactions (or senses); therefore there is the possibility that these states would not entail 
representational contents. By contrast, Macpherson does not take the same view that 
there could be perceptual content in the state of physical reactions, rather, she clearly 
shows how perceptual content is represented in early vision. On her view, there is no 
sensible information or physical reaction to stimuli, rather, there is clear representational 
content even though such content can be both cognitively and non-cognitively 
penetrable. This classification would better define what should be perceptual contents 
than the neurophilosophers account of early vision, however, the problem of non-
conceptual content of experience still remains. As Macpherson (forthcoming) points out, 
there is still the possibility of non-conceptual content that is constituted by mere 
perception, e.g. the ‘state account of non-conceptual contents’ and the ‘independence of 
a subject’s possession of concepts’, as articulated by Bermúdez and Cahen (2012) who 
define non-conceptual content as occurring when the content is not a function of, or 
determined by, the subject’s possession of concepts. It is also clearly possible that this 
type of experience could be produced by mere perception (a visual mechanism involving 
SSRs, retinas, etc.) alone, “such as might occur in a simple, noncognitively penetrated 
experience of a heart that is cut out of red paper—an experience as of a red heart” 
(Macpherson forthcoming: 24). This state seems not to be conceptually penetrated. Also, 
as well as SV and UPC type non-conceptualism, here the possibility of non-conceptual 
content still remains. Given this perspective, Macpherson claims that there could be both 
conceptual and non-conceptual content in a cognitively penetrable visual state. 
This thesis agrees with this perspective. However, it is still doubtful how both 
conceptual and non-conceptual contents simultaneously in cognitively penetrable states 
because the existence of non-conceptual content can only be confirmed if such contents 
are in conscious states. Could there be any non-conceptual content that reveals its 
existence without conceptual engagement in conscious experience? In the next section, I 
explore this possibility through examining Macpherson’s argument for non-conceptual 
contents that are compatible with cognitive penetration lite. 
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IV-5.2. Non-Conceptual Contents in ‘Pure Perception’ 
Macpherson claims that cognitive penetration lite might be compatible with two kinds of 
non-conceptual contents: (1) the independence of a subject’s possession of concepts, and, 
(2) the state account of non-conceptual contents. In case of (1), she uses Bermúdez and 
Cahen’s (2012) notion of conceptual content, stating that she sees “the definition of 
conceptual content as occurring when the content is a function of, or determined by, the 
concepts of the subject” (Macpherson forthcoming: 31). Hence, if the content is not a 
function of, or determined by, the subject’s possession of concepts, then it is non-
conceptual. However, Macpherson claims that there is a hidden ambiguity in Bermúdez 
and Cahen’s notion of conceptual content because the contents can occur in two 
different events: ‘on that occasion’ and ‘in general’. So it is not clear whether they mean 
to refer to cases of ‘on that occasion’ or ‘in general’. 
Now we can consider a case in which cognitive penetration lite leads subjects to have 
cognitively-penetrable experience. On that occasion, the experience is produced by 
cognitive penetration lite, and therefore, contents of the experience can possibly be a 
function of, and determined by, the subjects’ possession of concepts. We can utilize the 
same point in the case of token experiences.94 Token experiences are usually considered 
to be cognitively-penetrable, because they individuate things that we perceive, such as 
the glasses that I am wearing or the red heart at which I am looking. If token 
experiences could be determined by a subject’s possession of concepts, then such 
experiences are conceptual.  
On the contrary, in general, “the existence of that type of experience—the type that has 
the same content and phenomenal character—does not need to be a function of, or to be 
determined by, a subject’s possession of concepts” (Macpherson forthcoming: 31) 
because that kind of experience could have been produced without cognitive penetration 
occurring, i.e., it can be produced by pure perception alone. In fact, it seems that we do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94Macpherson argues that “token experience may be produced by cognitive penetration 
lite” (forthcoming: 32). 
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not need to deploy or entertain concepts (or to have any propositional attitudes) in order 
to have pure perceptual experiences. If cognitive penetration leads a subject to have a 
token experience (the red heart that I am looking at) of a type (a red heart), and other 
token experiences can occur by pure perception alone, then the subject’s possession of 
concepts may play a causal role in her having a token experience. But “there seems no 
reason to think that, in general, coming to have that type of experience requires 
possession of concepts” (Macpherson forthcoming: 32). Hence, in order to have this 
type of experience, which is produced by cognitive penetration lite, a subject does not 
need to entertain concepts. As such, Macpherson claims that cognitive penetration lite 
can be compatible with non-conceptual content in the general case. If so, there could be 
both conceptual and non-conceptual content in pure perception that is cognitively 
penetrable.  
What I want to highlight in this argument is that there could be non-conceptual content 
under the condition that we do not consider the possibility of the expository perspective 
at all. Although we define the content of experience to be the product of all the processes 
of experience, it is still possible that being in a perceptual state can be non-conceptual. 
And this state could contain representational contents that could lead the subject to be in 
the personal level of experience. Hence, if the contents in those states are not 
conceptually accessible, then the content of those states could be non-conceptual content 
even if they are cognitively penetrable.  
One possible solution for this phenomenon that this thesis suggests is finding another 
conceptual character of perception, hence all the representational content in perception 
can be content of thought ― the principle of Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of 
spontaneity). Not only can this attempt respond to the possibility of coexistence of 
conceptual and non-conceptual content in conscious experience, but it could also satisfy 
the non-conceptualist’s demand for a wider notion of experience. As I have repeatedly 
stated, the purpose of this thesis is not only the development of existing conceptualism, 
but also to build a bridge between the two camps.     
As such, if this thesis could find conceptual character (or, at least the conceptual 
possibility that perceptual contents of pure perception become thought contents) in pure 
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perception ― even if we only take the functional perspective ― it will have 
accomplished its intended goal. For this reason, this thesis suggests that we need to take 
a slightly different perspective from existing versions of conceptualism in order to solve 
the problem of the non-conceptual character at the occurrence of perception. How will 
this be possible? 
To conclude this chapter, I give a brief summary which focuses on whether we are able 
to find any type of capacity that could be called ‘conceptual capacity’ even if there is no 
conceptual engagement at all. 
 
IV-6. The Conceptual Character of ‘Pure Perception’ 
	  
Throughout the discussions of the sections IV-2 and IV-3 (the richness argument and the 
neurophilosophical arguments for non-conceptual contents), I addressed two things: 
First, I emphasized the expository perspective that representational contents in 
perception could be grasped through a subject’s possession of concepts; hence there is 
no non-conceptual content unless perceptual contents do exist. If the richness argument 
is to be successful, it must show that the rich perceptual content cannot be grasped by 
concepts despite its existence only being confirmed when we take the expository 
perspective on experience. Hence the only problem is whether we are able to report the 
content of experience ― the principle of the Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises 
the object of perception. If we can consciously access the content (A-consciousness) 
then that suffices for having conceptual content of that state. Even if the state represents 
something which may not be grasped in terms of unsophisticated concepts of the subject, 
that does not imply it is non-conceptual. In this case, when we talk about the content of 
experience, we have to consider the expository perspective, that is, whether they are able 
to be grasped by concepts that the subject possesses.  
Second, it seems that we should not demonstrate the conceptual character of inaccessible 
contents. However, it is not quite clear whether non-conceptual contents in the 
neurophilosophers cases actually exist in perception. In chapter II, I have argued that we 
should avoid the view that there could be non-conceptual contents in non-cognitive 
159	  
	  
states like physical reactions or subpersonal states; in addition, it is very doubtful that 
such states have certain representational contents. The neurophilosophers we have 
examined in section IV-3.2 seem to extend the range of perceptual content beyond our 
ability to evaluate the conceptual character of perceptual content, as do the non-
conceptualists we looked at in Chapters II and III. What we need to pay attention to is 
the content of a subject’s experience, rather than an enabling condition for having 
representational content. 
When discussing these two points, I also argued that non-conceptualists defined 
perceptual contents too widely (in section IV-3). Because of this, they seem to treat 
some perceptual information as if those are represented in a subject’s perceptual state. 
Particularly in the case of neurophilosophers, their notion of the early visual system is 
sometimes not very different from a simple sensible reaction.   
However, there is another point to which we need to pay attention in the discussion of 
section IV-4. Perception could occur from both a subject’s possession of concepts and 
the visual mechanism without depending on those concepts. That is to say, being in a 
perceptual state (or having a representational content) could be affected by both a 
subject’s possession of concepts and perceptual processes occurring without conceptual 
engagement. Also, as we had seen in the example of the brindled cow in the section IV-
3.3.b, there could be, at least, one or more representational contents of the perceived 
object in a perceptual state even though the subject of perception is aware of only one 
feature of the object. This state clearly permits the possibility of the coexistence of 
conceptual content and non-conceptual content. Because of this possibility, I suggested 
that we need to find another perspective from the existing forms of conceptualism in 
order to respond to this issue. 
This thesis will find the conceptual character of experience even if we only take the 
functional perspective. This should be type of thought-form that leads a perceiver to 
think of perceived objects via a discrimination ability, hence all the representational 
content in perception can be content of thought ― the principle of Type-1 conceptual 
capacity (the capacity of spontaneity). If representational contents obtained by pure 
perception were discriminable, and hence thinkable by a subject, then this potentially 
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implies the conceptual character of experience, such as a possibility of inferential 
thought. Hence we would be able to identify the conceptual character of experience even 
if we only take the functional perspective. 
Again, perception could occur with or without conceptual engagement, but the way that 
we can access its content depends upon concepts. I do not claim  that the discrimination 
ability is a type of thought, rather, what I want to argue is that we are able to think about 
representational content through the discrimination ability that is operative in perception. 
In the next chapter, I focus on demonstrativism, which is a strong version of 
conceptualism, alongside some non-conceptualist refutations of this view, mainly 
because the arguments that this thesis has presented are supported by demonstrativism. 
Through these discussions, I examine the conceptual character involved in perception, 
namely discrimination ability, and then take steps towards offering an advanced 
conceptualism that could allow for the conceptual character at two levels of experience – 
the subpersonal and the personal.   
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Chapter V. Conceptualism as Demonstrativism	  
   
Throughout the discussions from chapters II to IV, I have emphasized that we can 
conceptually access perceptual contents when taking the expository perspective on 
experience even though such contents are represented without any conceptual 
engagement at the time of perception. I argued that the non-conceptualist arguments of 
Peacocke, Hurley, and Bermùdez in chapter II focus on consciously inaccessible 
contents that are beyond the range of what we call experience. In a similar vein, the non-
conceptualist arguments of Byrne, Hilbert, and Tye in chapter III over emphasize the 
role of representational content in perceptual states, rather than how it is understood. In 
addition, I emphasized, in chapter IV, that the non-conceptualist’s notion of experience 
or perceptual content is overly broad and flexible, e.g. ranging from subpersonal states 
to the personal level. I argued that the conceptual character of experience, particularly 
when taking the expository perspective on experience, is still secured even if we apply 
the narrow notion of a concept to the wide range of experience.    
However, I argued that there remained the possibility of the kind of non-conceptual 
content that we saw in section I-3.b―perceptual contents that are not reported, where 
this is understood as involving the co-existence of accessible and inaccessible content in 
A-conscious experience even though we take the expository perspective on experience. 
For example, in Sperling’s experiment in section I-3.b., subjects were exposed to flashed 
groups of letters, e.g.  in 3 by 3arrays, for very short periods. The subjects were able 
report that they could see all the letters, but they reported only about half of them. 
Although all of the letters were represented in their perceptual states, they were able to 
consciously access only half of the represented contents. This does not mean that the 
unreported letters do not figure in the content of experience. For subjects clearly have 
that particular content in their conscious experience because they reported that they 
could see all of the letters. This is why subjects can have P-conscious experience of the 
letters, but for only half of them to be consciously accessible  (in A-consciousness). This 
is why Sperling’s subjects can have both conceptual and non-conceptual content in their 
conscious experience even though we depend upon the expository perspective.  
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This chapter attempts to solve the problem raised in chapter IV ― how we can verify 
conceptual character in the expository perspective on experience if there is perceptual 
content that is not reported. In particular, this chapter focuses on the conceptualist’s 
stronger notion of conceptual character, namely, the relationship between demonstrative 
concepts and the conceptual character of experience, and how that differs from the non-
conceptualist’s approach. While a restricted notion of a concept and a broad notion of 
experience is usually held by the non-conceptualist, conceptualists are quite open to 
various accounts of what might be a concept, but define experience as the product of all 
the stages involved in its production.95 I agree with the conceptualist that the content of 
experience does not only refer to an individual stage of experience, rather, it stands for 
the outcome of the processing of all of those stages. This position could provide a 
starting point for the advanced conceptualism that I wish to develop. Further, the 
conceptualist’s account of demonstrative concepts allows us to find conceptual content 
in perception even if we only take the functional perspective on experience., 
As such, this chapter consists of three discussions about demonstrative concepts and 
makes one suggestion for developing conceptualism. In the first section I introduce a 
reason for taking the argument of demonstrative concepts and the fineness of grain 
argument (Evans 1982) as the central case of this chapter. 
The second section discusses the fineness of grain argument in depth, and then examines 
how conceptualists respond to Evans. I focus on three criticisms made by non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  In Mind and World, McDowell, introduces his conceptualism by way of the Kantian 
thought that empirical knowledge involves “a co-operation between receptivity and 
spontaneity” (1994a: 9). He then argues that contents of perceptual experience are not 
only obtained by sensible intuitions as operations of receptivity, but are also structured 
by conceptual capacities as operations of spontaneity. Receptivity could refer to the 
relationship between the properties of an object and a subject’s visual mechanism; on the 
other hand, spontaneity could be considered conceptual engagement by a subject’s mind. 
I apply McDowell’s idea of receptivity and spontaneity in order to confirm the 
conceptual character of experience.	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conceptualists (namely, the problem of indeterminacy, the conditions for possessing 
demonstrative concepts, and causal relationship between the use of demonstrative 
concept and experience) against demonstrativism (particularly those made by Peacocke 
(1998 and 2001), Kelly (2001a and 2001b), and Heck (2000)), and then consider 
whether these criticisms harm the conceptual character of experience. 
Last, I investigate a potential conceptual capacity involved in perception, namely, the 
discrimination ability which could produce inferential thought in perception. Although 
the non-conceptualists and conceptualists who will be examined in this chapter both take 
the capacity to use perceptual demonstratives to be possible only at the personal level of 
experience, I will attempt to find an implication involved in both Marr’s account of 
visual representation and the use of perceptual demonstrative that shows there is one 
possible conceptual capacity ― the discrimination ability ― that activates automatically 
at the time of perception. Therefore, we would be able to find a certain type of 
conceptual engagement even if we take the only functional perspective on experience. I 
will not attempt to argue that the discrimination ability is a type of conceptual capacity, 
rather, I suggest that we should consider that perceptual discrimination implies a 
conceptual capacity in perception. 
I will then develop an idea drawn from these discussions and chapters II, III, and IV, 
namely, the existence of a conceptual capacity that activates when perception occurs 
without the three major types of conceptual capacities in order to advance a form of 
extended conceptualism even though there could be the possibility of the coexistence of 
accessed and inaccessible content in conscious experience.       
 
V-1. The Fineness of Grain Arguments and Content of Experience 
This chapter begins by examining the fineness of grain argument (Evans 1982) and 
considers some conceptualist responses. The argument claims that the content of colour 
experience is sometimes more fine-grained than that of our concepts of colours. Of 
course, I agree that there are some colour experiences that are more fine-grained than 
our possession of concepts, however, if we have the right information or the name of a 
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target object, then we can make a conceptual judgment about it (in line with the Type-3 
conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception) even though colours are 
represented without any conceptual engagement. In this sense, the assumption that we 
cannot conceptually grasp all of the fine-grained differences in shades of colours makes 
it seem as if we don’t possess the proper names or physical theories that are relevant to 
perceived shades. So, the first problem brought by Evans seems to confuse being unable 
to name an object, a colour, or a content with there being non-conceptual content. 
Although this implies the non-conceptual character of experience, there is a possibility 
that we can use perceptual demonstratives to grasp the detailed shades of colours. 
Conceptualists such as McDowell (1994a) and Brewer (1999) argue that Evans fails to 
consider this possible use of demonstratives that characterize the content of perceptual 
experience, rather than just general ones, and suggest that perceptual demonstratives 
might allow us to grasp subtle difference between shades. Even if we encounter more 
fine-grained colours than we find in spectral reflectance or on the Pantone list, we can 
still conceptually grasp the target colour by using demonstratives such as ‘that shade’. 
Hence, if we use the demonstrative concept properly, we can conceptually grasp the 
target colour. 
However, the problem of fineness of grain in colour experience is not this simple. Even 
if we can grasp delicate shades of colours using perceptual demonstratives, it remains a 
problem whether or not they can play the role of a concept in experience as well as the 
role of a concept in thought. This will lead us to an important issue about perceptual 
demonstratives, namely their eligibility, to be considered to be concepts. I focus on three 
main problems that are presented by non-conceptualists: (1) the use of perceptual 
demonstratives causes indeterminacy (Peacocke 1998); (2) subjects cannot satisfy the re-
identification condition (i.e. a condition for re-identifying the same object on different 
occasions) as a condition for their possession (Kelly 2001a and 2001b); and (3) there is a 
causal problem between the use of demonstrative concepts and demonstrative 
experience (Heck 2000). However, I believe that these problems are caused by the non-
conceptualists’ narrow definition of concepts, and their ignorance of both context-
dependency and the constitutional aspects of colour experience. 
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Moreover, there is one aspect we need to consider in the use of perceptual 
demonstratives: This is that the discrimination ability must take priority over the 
recognition ability (i.e. an ability to recognise the same object on different occasions) 
when we consider the conceptual character of experience. There is no particular reason 
to believe that recognition ability is the only necessary condition for possessing 
demonstrative concepts ― it has to be accompanied by the discrimination ability. In 
McDowell’s conceptualism (1994a), the discrimination ability is inseparable from the 
recognition ability and is a type of conceptual capacity that is already settled in 
experience. Although McDowell takes the discrimination ability as a type of conceptual 
capacity when we consider personal level experience only, I take this to provide the 
main argument in favour of the advanced conceptualism that this thesis aims to develop: 
specifically, how we can find a conceptual capacity even though there is no conceptual 
engagement which involves only the three major types of conceptual capacities at the 
occurrence of perception. 
My main objections to non-conceptualism, particularly aimed at those who criticize 
demonstrativism, are follows:      
• Non-conceptualists ignore the feature of context-dependency as one of the conditions 
for possessing concepts. 
• The re-identification condition is not the only necessary condition for possessing 
demonstrative concepts. 
• We are able to think demonstratively using perceptual demonstratives in experience. 
First, I will argue that not only does demonstrativism show the possibility of the 
conceptual character of experience, but it also reveals how we can think about the 
representational contents obtained by the discrimination ability offered by perception; 
hence it implies Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity) or how we can 
secure the conceptual character of experience when we take only the functional 
perspective. I then develop an advanced conceptualism which is the most important 
positive proposal that this thesis offers. This proposal depends on the capacity for using 
perceptual demonstratives being a good illustration of the existence of conceptual 
character in both the functional and expository perspectives on experience. This may 
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provide an appropriate response to the problem raised in sections I-4 and IV-5: namely, 
the coexistence of conceptual and non-conceptual content in conscious experience. This 
is the main reason why I focus on demonstrative concepts and the discrimination ability. 
 
 V-2. Why does the Fineness of Grain in Colour Experience Matter? 
We have seen that most non-conceptualists cannot verify the non-conceptual content of 
experience when we take the expository perspective on experience. Moreover, what we 
call ‘perceptual experience’ does not only refer to the early or late vision, or as 
neurophilosophers’ suggest, sub-personal or personal states, rather, it stands for the 
product of all the processes involved in those levels or states. Hence, what we call the 
‘content of perceptual experience’ does not only refer to the content of a particular stage 
of experience, rather, it is the outcome of all the stages of experience including a 
subject’s interpretation of those states. As such, I deny conceptualism about the early 
vision or subpersonal states, while I have favoured conceptualism about late vision or 
personal states. And I have argued repeatedly that we need to consider the whole process 
of experience in order to examine the conceptual character of experience. Of course, we 
have also looked at how the way we access each stage might be different and how the 
contents96 of these stages are also different from one another. However, all of these 
stages and their contents are processes contributing to perceptual experience, as such, 
there must be conceptual engagement in these processes. 
Most philosophers who advocate non-conceptualism, such as Dretske, Block, 
Raftopolous, Macpherson et al., also concede that there can be conceptual engagement 
in the expository perspective on experience, i.e., at the personal level, in late vision, the 
conscious state, etc. Hence, they seem to focus only on the functional perspective on 
experience in order to prove the non-conceptual character of experience, or they at least 
overlook the importance of the expository perspective. This tendency leads them to 
believe that there is non-conceptual content in experience. Of course, this might not be a 
problem for them if we consider only the functional perspective on experience, but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  This is right only if we accept the view that visual properties or perceptual information 
could be the contents of those stages.	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problem is that we should not talk about a content of experience by focusing on only the 
content of a particular stage, i.e. a content solely of the early visual stage could not be a 
content of experience. If this is so, why do we need to consider both the functional and 
expository perspectives in order to talk about the conceptual or non-conceptual character 
of experience? Here we need to take the discussion back to the early debates between 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism. Did non-conceptualism indeed focus on only one 
perspective on experience?  
Let us have a look at Evans’s (1982) fineness of grain argument. Simply put, the 
fineness of grain argument states that we can perceive97
 
more shades of colour than we 
have concepts of colours. If we treat the shades of colours as sensual information or 
physical properties of an object, then they could be seen in terms of the functional 
perspective, whereas they could be seen as expository contents if we concede that they 
are contents of experience. The key point of Evan’s argument is that the fine-
grainedness at the lower (sub-personal) level of experience could affect the higher 
(personal) level of experience, hence there is no way to grasp the fine-grained content 
even if it is at the expository level because we do not possess colour concepts for such 
fine-grained shades. And the fine-grainedness at both levels leads to the conclusion that 
experience has non-conceptual content. Of course, I claimed that the non-possession of a 
highly general concept does not prove the existence of non-conceptual content through 
criticizing the richness argument (section IV-3.2). However, the fineness of grain 
argument must be considered separately from the richness argument because the 
richness argument concerns various properties of multiple objects in a subject’s visual 
field, while the fineness of grain argument concerns a particular property that belongs to 
a certain object. In addition, this particular property is more fine-grained than our 
concept of the object. Hence, the significance of the fineness of grain argument is that 
not only could a particular property of the object (e.g. a certain shade) exist as a content 
without a subject’s conceptual engagement in her perceptual state, it also cannot be 
explained by her possession of a concept of that object. This interpretation of Evans’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  The meaning of the term ‘perceive’ here is dependent on interpretation. It could refer 
to both the sub-personal and personal level of experience.	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argument seems to satisfy the case of the coexistence of conceptually accessible and 
inaccessible contents of experience. Therefore, the discussion of the fineness of grain 
argument plays a key role in proving the conceptual character in both the functional and 
expository perspectives on experience. 
In the next section, I critically examine the fineness of grain argument in depth in order 
to consider whether it supports the possibility of non-conceptual content at both levels of 
experience.  
 	  
V-2.1. Fineness of Grain in Colour Experience 
The fineness of grain argument is the most well-known argument for non-conceptualism, 
and was propounded by Evans (1982). Evans argues that there can be non-conceptual 
content in perceptual experience because perceptual contents have fine-grained details 
that cannot be captured by the concepts that we possess. He particularly focuses on 
colour experience, and famously asks, “do we really understand the proposal that we 
have as many colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly 
discriminate?” (1982: 229). Evans’s answer is to argue that we do not possess as many 
colour concepts98 as shades that we can discriminate, and so, colour experience has non-
conceptual content.  
My objection is that it is unclear whether Evans is referring to the personal or 
subpersonal level when he explains non-conceptual content (Bermúdez and Cahen 2012). 
According to Campbell’s (2005) interpretation of Evans and non-conceptual content, 
most contemporary debates about non-conceptual content discuss the content of 
conscious perceptual states. On the other hand, it seems that Evans understood the non-
conceptual content of perceptual states as if it were non-conscious, but could be 
conceptual when a subject was able to consciously access it (e.g, A-consciousness) 
because the conceptual contents that Evans defines are contents of thought or talk (hence 
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  These could be linguistic terms for colours if we interpret ‘concept’ here as playing an 
expository role.	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reportable), whereas non-conceptual contents are contents involved in the information 
processing of the visual mechanism. Campbell says: 
“Evans was one of the first to introduce the idea that there is a distinction 
between the type of representational content used in our thought and talk, 
which he called “conceptual content”, and the kind of content that is involved 
in biological information processing, which he called “non-conceptual content”; 
and he tried to provide principled ways of distinguishing them, and a view of 
their relation to one another.” 99 (2005: 196) 
Campbell argues that non-conceptual contents exist at information processing stages of 
experience – stages which we cannot consciously access.  He thus emphasizes the 
functional perspective on experience rather than the possibility of conceptual 
engagement in the expository perspective like McDowell (1994a) and Brewer (1999)  ― 
particularly Type-3 conceptual capacity that categorises the object of perception. If 
Campbell understands Evans’s non-conceptual content correctly, then there are two 
notable points here: (1) Evans himself conceded that there could be conceptual 
engagement between the information processing stage and the stage of thought, and, (2) 
that the fine-grainedness could apply to these two perspectives whether or not they are in 
a conscious or an unconscious state. Nevertheless, what we need to take note of is that 
fineness of grain could exist at both a subpersonal and a personal level. Colour 
experience is a typical example of this. For example, in the case of the colour ‘red’, our 
perception of ‘red’ would be subtly different even when viewing the same designated 
colour. That is, although we perceptually judge the reddish object as being red using the 
concept of red that we possess, an individual’s perceptual contents may vary as we have 
seen in the colour variation case in section III-2. In addition, we do not have all the 
concepts that correspond to each shade of ‘red’. Not only is the perceptual information 
yielded by the visual system more fine-grained than our concept of that information, we 
are also unable to conceptually grasp all the information (delicate shades) that we can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Cf. Evans (1982), index entries under ‘conceptual and non-conceptual content’, 
especially p. 157. For an overview of the current state of play, see Gunther (2003).	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discriminate and talk about. Because of this, the fine-grained argument is claimed to 
show that experience has non-conceptual content even if we take both the functional and 
the expository perspectives. 
In the next section, I explore how conceptualists, particularly McDowell (1994a) and 
Brewer (1999), confront the fine-grainedness of colour contents and the non-conceptual 
character of experience.   
 	  
V-2.2. Demonstrative Concepts	  
As a conceptualist, McDowell appeals (in his Mind and World) to demonstrative 
concepts (such as that red, that scarlet, that shapes, that volume, and so on) in order to 
respond to Evans. He appeals to demonstrative concepts in his famous characterization 
of conceptualism, namely that “my visual experience represents something as being of 
that shade” (1994a: 57). In fact, we are not required to possess a correct name, SSRs, or 
a Pantone list of colours in order to grasp the detailed shades of colours that we can 
sensibly discriminate. It thus might be that Evans-type non-conceptualism restricts 
conceptual abilities to the ability to use colour expressions. As such, McDowell insists 
that non-conceptualists come to the wrong conclusion based on the false premise that a 
content of colour experience has to correspond to a colour expression like green, red, or 
burnt sienna (ibid). Hence, what we need to pay attention to in Evans-type non-
conceptualism is why ‘conceptual capture (or conceptual capacity)’ always refers to 
colour terms.100 In addition, we are not required to have physical knowledge of colour in 
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  McDowell also points to this issue. He asks, “why should we accept that a person’s 
ability to embrace colour within her conceptual thinking is restricted to concepts 
expressible by words like ‘red’ or ‘green’ and phrases like ‘burnt sienna’?” (1994a: 56). 
Here, we can see how McDowell’s conceptualism responds to Evans’s non-
conceptualism: first, the notion of a colour concept is not only restricted to colour 
expressions that we normally use; and second, McDowell’s understanding of Evans’s 
non-conceptual contents refer to the contents of personal level of experience. In the next 
section, I will approach the former by examining Brewer’s notion of demonstrative 
171	  
	  
order to grasp the target colour conceptually. In this sense, McDowell argues that Evans 
himself makes a mistake in defining a conceptual capacity simply as the ability to 
properly use linguistic expressions. McDowell then exploits the use of perceptual 
demonstratives, claiming that we can conceptually grasp fine-grained colour shades by 
uttering “that shade” (1994a: 57). Brewer shares the same view about demonstrative 
concepts, and claims that the subject can make a perceptual judgment such as “that is 
thus” even if more fine-grained contents of colour experience exists than she possesses 
concepts (1999: 172). Brewer, like Evans (1982) and Peacocke (1989), also concedes 
that we can perceptually discriminate very detailed shades of colours, far more shades 
than we possess concepts of, expressible by colour terms like yellow, scarlet, or 
whatever.101 However, he believes that the non-conceptualists’ claims depend on an 
assumption ‘context-independence.’ He argues that: 
“There is an unacceptable assumption behind this line of argument, that 
concepts necessarily correspond with entirely context-independent 
classifications of things […]. This restriction unacceptably rules out any appeal 
to context dependent demonstrative concepts, though concepts associated with 
expression like “that shade of red”, or “just that large in volume”, grasp of 
which essentially depends upon the subject's relations with the actual entities 
which constitute their semantic values.” (1999: 171) 
According to Brewer, colour terms like scarlet or yellow are context-independent 
concepts, whereas we are able to use perceptual demonstratives such as ‘that shade of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concepts, alongside contextuality. I will explore how demonstrative concepts could 
solve the problem of non-conceptual character in the personal level of experience.	  
101	  Brewer also admits that we can find this kind of perceptual experience not only in 
colour experience but also in spatial magnitude or volumes of space. We are able to 
perceive spatial magnitude or a certain volume of space in a kitchen without having any 
concepts of that magnitude or that volume such as unit of measurement or cubic feet 
(Brewer 1999: 170-–171).	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red’ or ‘that shade of green’ that are context-dependent in order to conceptually grasp 
the fine-grained content of colour experience. 102 
These are the conceptualist’s very basic responses to the fineness of grain argument. In 
the next section, I explore in depth why these conceptualists consider the use of 
perceptual demonstratives to be a conceptual capacity involved in the contextual feature 
of experience, namely, immediacy and minuteness between contents of experience and a 
subject’s conceptual capacity. I then consider how the use of demonstrative concepts 
shows the conceptual character of experience even though we take the both the 
functional and the expository perspectives on experience. 
  
V-3. Conceptualism as Demonstrativism 
We have seen that both conceptualists and non-conceptualists agree on the existence of 
fine-grained contents but disagree over the semantic value of concepts. But their views 
on the fine-grained content of colour experience differ. While non-conceptualists claim 
that the content of perceptual experience has non-conceptual content that cannot be 
expressed by the concepts that we possess, conceptualists argue that colour experience 
has contextual features, and that fine-grained shades of colour can be grasped and 
understood by non-descriptive concepts called ‘demonstrative concepts’. Using 
demonstrative concepts, subjects can explain the delicate shades of colour experience 
that cannot be captured by general concepts. For example, regarding a red apple in front 
of me, I can express in detail the properties of the apple by uttering ‘this apple’s surface 
is red’, even though I do not have the concepts ‘scarlet’, ‘F/3 in the Munsell colour 
chart’, or ‘650nm’. That is to say, we are not required to possess such concepts in order 
to conceptually grasp the shades of a red apple; rather, we can conceptually grasp it by 
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  However, it is not quite clear whether the non-conceptualists’ view of colour 
concepts refers only to context-independent concepts because the use of such concepts 
does not imply the context-independence of experience. Perhaps Brewer wants to 
emphasize that contents of perceptual experience belong to the context in which a 
subject and an object are involved. In this sense, it seems that use of perceptual 
demonstratives could reflect the contextual feature of experience.	  
173	  
	  
saying that “my visual experience represents the red apple as being of that shade” 
(McDowell 1994a: 57).   
Brewer (1999) also insists that the non-conceptualists ignore the idea of ‘context-
dependent’ conceptual representation because the notion of ‘context-independence’ is 
implicit in the notion of a concept as used by most non-conceptualists. According to 
Brewer, certain concepts, such as ‘scarlet’ or ‘four cubic feet’, are context-independent 
concepts; on the other hand, terms such as ‘that shade of red’ or ‘that volume’ are 
context-dependent and are therefore demonstrative concepts. In the case of context-
independent concepts, the question of who can grasp the concept is irrelevant to its 
semantic value. By contrast, grasping a context-dependent concept depends upon the 
relationship between the subject and the object that constitutes the semantic value of the 
concept. Brewer thinks that the difference in the fine-grained content of perceptual 
experience can be captured by context-dependent demonstratives. The subject can make 
a perceptual judgment, such as “that is thus” (Brewer 1999: 172), even if there are more 
fine-grained contents of perceptual experience than she experiences. In this respect, he 
insists that the non-conceptualist’s claims are not plausible because fine-grained 
perceptual experience might involve conceptual contents such as the demonstratives 
‘this’ or ‘that’. 
Here we can see the conceptualist’s perspective on the conceptual character of 
experience and fine-grainedness: what subjects need to do in order to exhibit conceptual 
activity is not to match expressible colour terms to each shade precisely. Instead, they 
must match demonstrative concepts to shades in their perceptual context. Even if a 
subject’s visual content of a certain shade (say, of the apple) is constituted without any 
conceptual engagement, such that her visual perception occurs without concepts, she can 
nevertheless grasp the content conceptually by using perceptual demonstratives when 
taking the expository perspective on the experience. McDowell also argues that, 
“[…] in the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively transcends ones’ 
conceptual powers—an experience that ex hypothesi affords a suitable 
sample—one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-
174	  
	  
grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in which the 
demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample.” (1994a: 56-57) 
In this process, we can see that the conceptual character of experience could be 
dependent on the context in which subjects and object are involved. There are two 
characteristics of this contextual feature of experience that show how perceptual 
contents are constituted in a relationship between subjects and coloured objects: namely, 
immediacy and minuteness. Since a certain perceptual demonstrative like ‘this red’ or 
‘that blue’ indicates colour directly in the contexts in which it is used, demonstratives 
minutely and correctly individuate different shades of colour. Because of this direct 
indication, not only does the use of perceptual demonstratives lack ambiguity when 
explaining or comparing the difference between various shades, it also leads us to 
believe that a subject can immediately and conceptually grasp the characteristic features 
of an object. In this way, demonstrative concepts not only secure the content of 
experience, but also reflect detailed phenomenal features of an object such as different 
shades. It is therefore unacceptable to assume that non-conceptual contents could exist in 
fine-grained experience because of the possibility of use of perceptual demonstratives in 
the expository perspective on experience. 
However, the conceptual character of the use of perceptual demonstratives has been 
attacked by various non-conceptualist arguments. Most of such arguments focus on the 
characteristic aspects of demonstrative concepts, which are based on their contextual 
features. In the next section, I examine non-conceptualist arguments for demonstrative 
concepts, and consider whether this can harm the conceptual character of 
demonstrativism.     
 
V-4. Non-Conceptualist Accounts of Demonstrativism 
Non-conceptualists such as Peacocke, Kelly, and Heck, do not concede that 
demonstrativism is a type of conceptualism because they think that perceptual 
demonstratives are not proper concepts, hence, demonstrative concepts cannot play the 
role of a concept. Peacocke (1998b) and Kelly (2001a and 2001b) ask whether 
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perceptual demonstratives could satisfy the conditions for being a concept. By contrast, 
Heck (2000) considers the operation of demonstrative concepts. Peacocke (1998a) 
indicates that perceptual demonstratives involve indeterminacy, and that we are not able 
to confirm which aspect of experience the subject really represents because perceptual 
demonstratives sometimes excessively and minutely classify the content of single 
experience. Kelly (2001a and 2001b) considers the possession condition of concepts 
stating that the use of perceptual demonstratives does not satisfy the reidentification 
condition. While these two philosophers focus on the eligibility for being a concept 
when using perceptual demonstratives, Heck (2000) argues that the use of demonstrative 
concepts does not necessarily imply that they are involved in perceptual experience, viz. 
the ability to use perceptual demonstratives is not engaged with having a perceptual 
representational content when perception occurs. 
I examine these criticisms in this section, and then carefully consider whether they 
undermine the conceptual character of demonstrativism in the next.  First, I will argue 
that Peacocke’s argument only addresses the interpretational problem of a subject’s 
experience, rather than the problem of conceptual character of experience. Also, 
Peacocke seems to overlook the possibility of demonstrative thought (specifically, that 
subjects can think about represented contents by using perceptual demonstratives), hence 
this possibility could entail that the personal level of experience has conceptual content. 
I then consider Kelly’s argument from the re-identification condition as a condition on 
the possession of concepts and suggest that there is no standard measure of re-
identification that can be used to establish whether or not a subject reidentifies an object. 
Second, I will argue against Heck’s criticism (a) that we need to consider the 
constitutional aspect of demonstrative concepts in experience, and, (b) that it is unclear 
what Heck means by ‘causal’ and ‘non-causal explanation.’ In this way, I will take the 
first step towards advanced conceptualism.  
 
V-4.1. Peacocke on Demonstrative Concepts 
Peacocke (1998b) argues that perceptual demonstratives do not (1) secure the content of 
experience, and, (2) reflect detailed phenomenal features of an object. His reason for 
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holding this view is that perceptual demonstratives sometimes minutely or loosely 
indicate more than the experience requires when they indicate properties of colours. By 
this he means that perceptual demonstratives include a richer and a wider range of 
contents than the contents of perceptual experience. For example, certain demonstratives 
such as ‘that red’, ‘that shade’, and ‘that scarlet’ are related to the perceptual experience 
of a certain scarlet rose. These demonstratives all have different conceptual contents. 
However, they are used for the same perceptual experience – ‘the visual experience of 
the scarlet rose’. 
In addition, Peacocke points out that the problem of demonstrative concepts is that “it 
seems quite implausible that just one of these, not the others, features in the 
representational content of the experience of a shade of red” (1998b: 382). The 
demonstrative ‘that scarlet’ might refer to a property of the scarlet rose, but there is no 
need to exclude ‘that shade’ and ‘that red’ from the description. In this case, we may 
suppose that two people, K and S, experience the same scarlet rose but describe it 
differently. Suppose that neither K nor S have concepts for all the detailed shades of the 
rose, and that K utters ‘that scarlet’ and S utters ‘that red’ (rather than scarlet). Suppose 
also that both K and S claim that the shades they perceive are quite similar to H/6 in the 
Munsell colour chart. If this was the case, they might have different interpretations of 
what is represented in their perceptual states despite experiencing the same shade. 
Moreover, if each demonstrative has to indicate a different shade of the rose, then it 
seems that these demonstratives excessively and minutely classify the content of the 
experience of the single ‘scarlet rose’. Because of this, Peacocke argues that they give a 
more detailed description than is necessary, and hence may not adequately explain a 
single colour experience. 
Kelly (2001a) offers a similar argument. He agrees that demonstrative concepts have the 
benefit of directly indicating the properties of an object instead of describing them 
minutely. But this is quite context-dependent. It makes the referents or the contents of 
the experience non-fixable, because direct demonstratives like ostension do not need any 
other description of the target object. As such, demonstratives which indicate 
phenomenological properties such as colours might unnecessarily grasp a wider or 
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narrower scope of a target colour than does experience of that colour (2001a: 605).103 
Moreover, if a subject uses only ‘that’ to refer to a target object, then there is no way of 
knowing whether the demonstrative ‘that’ refers to ‘that surface’, ‘that shade’, or ‘that 
texture’, and so on. Because of this, Peacocke claims that “some general concept must 
be meant if this radical indeterminacy is to be avoided” (1998b: 382).104 
In short, Peacocke and Kelly argue that the use of perceptual demonstratives in one’s 
experience sometimes lead to doubts of the following kinds: (1) About what is really 
represented in a perceiver’s experience because it is not quite clear what ‘that’ really 
refers to in various aspects of its represented contents, and, (2) Whether two different 
perceivers (K and S) are really experiencing the same phenomenal properties due to the 
fact that demonstrative concepts are expressed in the first person and this is dependent 
on the context in which the subject and the object are involved. This is too subjective to 
be an objective standard because a content of experience could be defined by which 
general concept that the subject is primed to use when explicating ‘that’, that is to say, it 
is not enough to evaluate the conceptual character of experience. I will respond to this 
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  Kelly agrees with Peacocke in claiming that Evans fails to consider the possibility of 
demonstrative concepts (Kelly 2001a: 602; Peacocke 1998: 382), though he does not 
agree with Peacocke’s argument about contextual dependency which claims that 
properties of objects that are presented in experience are independent of the context in 
which subjects and objects are involved (Kelly 2001a: 606). Kelly seems to concede, at 
least partly, the contextual dependency of experience, but he brings out another problem 
with demonstrative concepts – a re-identification condition. I consider this in the next 
section.	  
104	  Peacocke basically holds the view that the content of judgements, beliefs, and other 
sorts of higher-level cognitive attitudes are a type of Fregean sense (1992: 3; Papineau 
1996: 425–426). He thinks that concepts are entities at the level of Fregean sense rather 
than reference. In this sense, demonstrative concepts are more closely associated with 
reference rather than modes of presentation, and as such, it seems that Peacocke does not 
allow any spontaneous and contextual feature of concepts.	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objection ― the indeterminacy involved in the use of perceptual demonstratives ― in 
section V-5.1. I then explore another condition for possessing concepts that has been 
suggested by Kelly, namely the re-identification condition. 
  
V-4.2. Kelly on Demonstrative Concepts 
Kelly (2001a and 2001b) argues that subjects using perceptual demonstratives can have 
perceptual experience without satisfying the re-identification condition which is 
essential for concept possession. According to Kelly’s interpretation of McDowell’s 
recognition ability … 
“The re-identification condition states that in order to possess a demonstrative 
concept for x, a subject must be able to consistently re-identify a given object 
or a property as falling under the concept if it does.” (2001b: 403) 
 He then says that, 
“If a subject has a perceptual experience whose content is constituted in part by 
a demonstrative concept, then she must, at the same time, have the ability to 
reliably identify a separate experience as having the same content if it occurs 
after some interval (perhaps extremely short) of that experience.” (2001b: 405–
406, my emphasis) 
Kelly offers two thought experiments to do with colour perception in order to show that 
a subject has perceptual experience using a demonstrative concept without satisfying the 
re-identification condition. In the first, a subject is presented simultaneously with colour 
samples, for example, D/10 and F/10 of the Munsell chart.105 Here, we find that she is 
able to consistently distinguish two very similar shades of green. That is to say, in 
answer to the question, ‘Are these shades the same?’ the subject consistently answers no, 
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  Kelly (2001b: 405–406) originally gives examples of two shapes: a triangle and a 
square. I change these shapes to two greenish colour chips (they are similar looking but 
different in detail) in order to retain the coherence of the discussion for the fineness of 
grain and contextuality. This change does not harm Kelly’s original argument.	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and is consistently right in doing so. Also, she could use the demonstrative concept ‘that 
green’ in order to indicate D/10 or to distinguish it from F/10. In the second thought 
experiment however, the subject is presented with either one of the two colour samples 
ten times. It is perfectly conceivable that she would not be able to consistently re-
identify a shade. That is to say, in response to the question, ‘Is this the colour that was 
previously presented to you on your left?’ the subject might answer yes five times and 
no five times. This is perfectly conceivable, in other words, and there is nothing about 
the nature of perception to keep it from being true that our capacity to discriminate 
colours exceeds our capacity to re-identify the colours discriminated. Kelly thinks that it 
would be impossible for the subject to possess the concept expressed by the phrase ‘that 
colour’ (said while pointing to the D/10 sample in the first test), because “one natural 
condition on the possession of a demonstrative concept is that a person be able 
consistently to re-identify a given object as falling under a given concept, assuming it 
does” (2001b: 406). In fact, we are free to use a demonstrative concept without 
satisfying the reidentification condition. Through these experiments, Kelly tries to show 
there is a case in which a subject may have a content of perceptual experience without 
satisfying the re-identification condition. 
In sum, Kelly argues that perceptual demonstratives may not play the role of a concept 
by which the user can reliably reidentify the same object, hence the content grasped by 
perceptual demonstratives cannot be conceptual.  As such, if a perceiver can have a 
perceptual experience without satisfying the re-identification condition, it does not imply 
that its content can be conceptually grasped; so, it is non-conceptual. Therefore, Kelly 
claims that not only are perceptual demonstratives unable to perform the role of a 
concept in a subject’s experience, but also that contents grasped by  such demonstratives 
cannot be conceptual because the re-identification condition is not satisfied when using 
them. I will respond to this objection in section V-5.2. In the next, I explore Heck’s 
criticism of demonstrative concepts. 
  
V-4.3. Heck on Demonstrative Concepts	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Heck (2000) approaches demonstrative concepts rather differently. Rather than focusing 
on contextual dependency, he completely denies the basic conceptualist idea of 
demonstrativism, namely, that concepts are already involved in the content of perceptual 
experience; so, he can be understood as objecting to the Type-1 conceptual capacity (the 
capacity of spontaneity). He also points out that just because demonstrative concepts are 
available when the subject is having perceptual experience, this does not necessarily 
imply the conceptual character of her experience. That is to say, the conceptual character 
of experience cannot be inferred from the subject’s ability to use perceptual 
demonstratives. According to him, McDowell only shows is that demonstrative concepts, 
which are not possessed before subjects have perceptual experience, become useable 
when subjects have perceptual experience. This fact does not necessarily imply that 
demonstrative concepts are involved in perceptual experience. Moreover, conceptualists 
do not explain how demonstrative concepts are utilized or involved in a subject’s 
experience (Heck 2000: 490–491). As such, a content of perceptual experience 
constituted by a demonstrative concept does not prove its conceptual character. Heck 
argues:   
“Suppose we say, with McDowell, that my having certain demonstrative 
concepts is partially constitutive of the world’s appearing to me in a particular 
way. How then can my having that concept be explained by my having such an 
experience? There would not seem to be sufficient distance between my having 
the experience and my possessing the concepts for the former to explain the 
latter.” (2000: 492) 
Heck’s key point is that there is no clear reason why undergoing an experience 
constituted by demonstrative concepts entails that the world is represented 
demonstratively in the subject’s perceptual state. This could be a question of how the 
content of experience constituted by demonstrative concepts in the personal level of 
experience could confirm the conceptual character in the whole process of experience. 
Heck (2000) claims that the demonstrative concepts that I possess are a function of my 
demonstrative thought, and that “part of what explains my having a given demonstrative 
capacity is my having certain associated experiences; the experience must be prior to the 
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possession of the demonstrative concept if the former is to explain the latter” (Bermùdez 
and Cohen 2012).106 Levine (2010) also holds a similar perspective. He argues that the 
seeing of an object such as a green-ish chip, must be prior to the description of it, e.g., 
‘that green’ or ‘that colour’, when we see and think about it demonstratively. Otherwise 
the utterance ‘that colour’ is meaningless, and the subject indeed does not know what 
she is describing. He says: 
“If the seeing, the perceptual experience, is prior to the demonstrating, then the 
demonstrating can't be what captures, or brings into existence, the content of 
that experience.” (2010: 191) 
Both Heck and Levine seem to concede the conceptual character of demonstrative 
concepts at the personal level of experience but deny its existence at the lower (sub-
personal) level. I am quite convinced that the capacity for demonstrative thought or the 
ability to use it does not conclusively confirm that there is be demonstrative perception 
or demonstrative representation of an object. That is to say, the conceptual character of 
the personal level state does not necessarily confirm the conceptual character of the 
subpersonal one. But this thesis has argued that, despite the difference between personal 
and sub-personal content we need only secure the conceptual character of the former in 
order to show that the content of both the levels is conceptual. So, if the use of 
perceptual demonstratives secures conceptual content at the personal level, then 
experience constituted by perceptual demonstratives as contents is conceptual. However, 
the criticism of McDowell’s demonstrativism raised by Heck and Levine seems to be 
based on a causal explanation of the relationship between demonstrative concepts and 
perceptual experience, that is to say, the causal relationship between the content of the 
subpersonal level and the content of the personal level of experience. Of course, as Heck 
admits, McDowell could respond by just “denying the causal (or explanatory) intuitions 
upon which it rests” (Heck 2000: 492). Nevertheless, it still remains a problem why 
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  Philosophers like Ayers (2002), Hopp (2009), Roskies (2008 and 2010), and Levine 
(2010) share this idea and develop it in various ways. See: Bermùdez and Cohen (2012).	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perceptual experience makes demonstrative concepts useable, even if they see the 
relationship in non-causal terms. 
Throughout chapters III and IV, I emphasized that we can have conceptual content by 
taking the expository perspective even if the representational content at the subpersonal 
level is not affected by any type of conceptual engagement at all. However, as Heck and 
Levine argue, perception does not seem to represent the world demonstratively because 
representational content clearly contains the phenomenal character of the perceived 
object, rather than demonstrative properties. Heck’s criticism of demonstrativism also 
focused on the problem raised in sections I-4 and IV-5, namely that conceptually 
inaccessible contents (phenomenal character) of representational contents could exist 
even though we are able to grasp it by using perceptual demonstratives. That is to say, 
the use of perceptual demonstratives could lead one to understand the context to which 
the subjects and the objects belong, however it does not convey the phenomenal 
character of the objects that is represented in one’s perception. 
In the next section, I explore how conceptualists respond to these criticisms (raised in 
sections V-4.1, V-4.2., and V-4.3). I then indicate some errors involved in such 
criticisms that non-conceptualists have overlooked. These are the possibilities of 
multiple representational contents of an experience and constitutional aspects of 
demonstrative concepts and experience (Brewer 2005 and 2011). The reason for noting 
these errors is that I do not want to defend either the conceptualist or non-conceptualist 
(as I have said, I agree with the non-conceptualist’s argument for UPC (Unconscious 
Perceptual Content) and SV (State View)): rather, I would like to show how the non-
conceptualist’s criticisms of demonstrativism fail. Throughout this examination, I 
consider why we should think that perception is conceptual despite the problems 
involved in the use of perceptual demonstratives. 
	  
	  V-5. Responses to Criticisms 
This section addresses the conceptualist response to criticisms about (1) indeterminacy; 
(2) the reidentification condition; and (3) the operation of demonstrative concepts. 
Regarding (1), I point out that Peacocke’s argument only addresses the interpretational 
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problem of a subject’s experience rather than the problem of conceptual character. I then 
object to Peacocke’s notion of conceptual content by focusing on Campbell’s (2002) 
argument about demonstrative thought, namely, that the subject could potentially think 
about perceived contents demonstratively. Regarding (2), I suggest that there is no 
standard measure of reidentification that can prove whether or not a subject re-identifies 
an object. I focus mainly on Chuard’s (2006) thought experiment regarding re-
identification and the conceptual character of experience. Regarding (3), I suggest that 
we need to consider the constitutional aspect of demonstrative concepts in experience. I 
suggest that we need to clarify the distinction between the sub-personal and personal 
level, so that we can find both conceptual and non-conceptual content in the overall 
process of experience. Through these discussions, I identify the characteristic features of 
perception and experience, and pave the way for an extended notion of conceptualism. 
 
V-5.1. Responses to the Problem of Indeterminacy 
Regarding the use of demonstrative concepts – e.g., ‘that shade’, ‘that rose’, or ‘that 
red’– Peacocke claims that it is unclear to which property of a scarlet rose demonstrative 
concepts really refer in the experience of a scarlet rose, because only one of these might 
be the representational content that constitutes the perceiver’s experience of the rose. 
However, this does not seem to be a problem of conceptual character of experience; 
rather, it is closer to the interpretational problem of a perceiver’s experience. Multiple 
representational contents could be involved in one particular experience. This does not 
mean that there are not different experiences, rather, they might be different contents of 
just one experience. Furthermore, the fundamental issue in the debate between 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism concerns whether or not a subject of experience 
fully possesses the conceptual content of that experience. It is not whether or not (or 
even how) the subject clearly explains her experience to another’s satisfaction. That is to 
say, a subject’s use of a particular concept does not need to correspond to another’s use 
of that concept for the object that they both perceive in order for her to have a 
conceptual experience of it. The subject may freely grasp the object conceptually using 
her own concepts. So, it is unclear why the indeterminacy resulting from allowing 
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interpersonal variability implies the non-conceptual character of experience. In this case, 
Peacocke’s account seems to lead us to a different issue, and veers away from the main 
topic of discussion. 
 
V-5.1.a. ‘Demonstrative Thought’ 
Another issue that we need to consider here is Peacocke’s understanding of conceptual 
content. He agrees that conceptual content belongs to thoughts, that concepts are entities 
in the Fregean sense, (1992) and that there must not be indeterminacy in concepts (1998: 
382). But according to Campbell (2006), the use of a demonstrative concept is 
associated with demonstrative thought. He focuses on the reference of demonstratives 
rather than the sense of the term. Of course, most non-conceptualists have different 
notions of what constitutes a concept. As I have emphasized throughout this thesis, non-
conceptualists generally depend upon a very narrow notion of concept, while they have a 
very wide notion of experience. However, apart from the indeterminacy of 
demonstrative concepts, if the capacity to use demonstrative concepts implies that a 
subject could think of a perceived object demonstratively, then this ability can be 
considered an ability of thought. That is to say, the content of thought not only refers to 
modes of presentation but also demonstrative contents. Campbell says: 
“I have been arguing that experience of objects has an explanatory role to play: 
it explains our ability to think demonstratively about perceived objects. 
Experience of a perceived object is what provides you with knowledge of 
reference of a demonstrative referring to it.” (2002: 114) 
What Campbell addresses here is the idea that our ability to think about perceived 
objects demonstratively provides knowledge of the reference of the demonstrative. This 
knowledge is not a type of descriptive knowledge whose content is specifiable by a 
definite description applying uniquely to the relevant object: Instead, it is closer to “what 
Russell called ‘direct acquaintance’ with the object of reference” (Nes 2006: 162). 
Consider two standard perceivers, K and S. When K utters ‘that rose’ by indicating a 
scarlet rose in front of S, S is able to see the rose and has a conscious experience of it by 
attending to whether or not both agree about the colour of the rose, e.g. that it is at H/5 
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in the Munsell chart. In this way, S is able to know what K refers to, and to understand 
what K means by the demonstrative concept ‘that rose’. Hence, S’s experience of the 
rose provides knowledge of reference for K’s demonstrative to S (Campbell 2002: 7–10; 
Nes 2006: 162). Campbell argues that this is a common-sense view of the knowledge of 
reference of demonstrative concepts, and that “knowledge of reference of a 
demonstrative is to understand the demonstrative” (Campbell 2002 cited in Nes 2006: 
161). Even if the demonstrative content is not a type of conceptual content as defined by 
the non-conceptualist, the important point is that we can think about the perceived object 
using perceptual demonstratives, and at this point, the demonstrative becomes the 
content of thought about that object. In this sense, the demonstrative concept ‘that shade’ 
or ‘that scarlet’ could be a content of thought, and therefore conceptual. 
 
V-5.1.b. The Possibility of the Type-2 Conceptual Capacity in the Use of Perceptual 
Demonstratives 
The key point of bringing the notion of demonstrative thought to bear on the 
indeterminacy argument is that the indeterminacy of a demonstrative concept does not 
harm a subject’s ability to think about that object demonstratively.107 In other words, the 
use of demonstrative concepts itself implies thinking about the perceived object 
demonstratively, and this implies conceptual engagement―in particular, the Type-2 
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  Of course, Peacocke does not accept the view that perception itself is always type of 
thought. He says, “perceptual states provide the necessary basis for more flexible forms 
of thought; but they can also exist in the absence of those more sophisticated abilities.” 
(Peacocke 2003: 615). As I noted in Chapter II, I agree with this idea, but we need to 
consider that the fact that perception could occur without conceptual engagement does 
not entirely imply non-conceptual content of experience because we can think about the 
perceived object by using perceptual demonstratives. Hence an ability to use 
demonstrative concepts involves the possibility to think about the perceived object 
demonstratively, and there is no reason to exclude the possibility that a content of 
experience constituted by demonstrative concept can secure the conceptual character of 
experience.	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conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational structure of perception and 
belief) ― even though there could be some vagueness concerning what property of an 
object is represented in the subject’s perception. We are also able to form demonstrative 
beliefs about what we perceive, e.g., I believe that is thus. The reason for how we 
operate the Type-2 conceptual capacity is that perception involves conceptual contents.  
The lesson that I take from Campbell’s perspective about demonstrative thought is that 
the use of perceptual demonstratives can allow us to think about those representational 
contents involved in an experience even though perceptual demonstratives may not 
correctly capture the phenomenal character of the perceived object that is represented. If 
so, the perceptual demonstratives used (e.g. that red), at the one’s personal level of 
experience do not capture the phenomenal character of perceived objects correctly (e.g. 
scarlet red, yellowish red, and etc). However one could think about perceived objects 
when one uses such demonstratives. This then, can be understood as the problem of 
one’s interpretation or understanding of the perceived object rather than any problem 
about the conceptual character of experience.       
In this sense, Peacocke’s argument ignores that the capacity to use demonstrative 
concepts implies an ability of thought ― in particular, Type-2 conceptual capacity (the 
capacity of understanding relational structure of perception and belief), and that 
indeterminacy does not entail the non-conceptual character of demonstrative concepts. 
 	  
V-5.2 Why is the Re-Identification Condition Necessary? 
Kelly claims that perceptual demonstratives used in perceptual experience cannot play 
the role of a concept because they sometimes do not satisfy the reidentification condition. 
I carefully examine this account and try to show first, that it is unclear how many times a 
subject must succeed in re-identifying an object; and second, that a failure to re-identify 
the same object does not imply the non-conceptual character of experience. I will focus 
on McDowell (1994) and Chuard’s (2006) criticisms of Kelly’s argument. 
  
V-5.2.a. Recognitional Capacities 
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According to Kelly, perceptual demonstratives are heavily context-dependent, and so, 
may not play the role of a concept. As with the second experiment suggested by Kelly, 
the subject is not able to re-identify the target object because the capability of using 
demonstratives is not necessarily an ability to re-identify the same object on every 
occasion. Of course, the referent of a demonstrative concept exists only in a particular 
context, so it will not play the role of a concept once the context ceases to exist. Yet this 
is not a problem for the way in which a subject perceives or experiences an object: rather, 
it is a problem of how long an experience has to continue in order to prove its conceptual 
character. Even if the experience continues for just a short period, such that the subject 
may not re-identify the same object under the concept such as ‘that shade’ in another 
occasion, does this imply the non-conceptual character of that experience? Non-
conceptualists might not accept the contextual feature of concepts, nevertheless there is 
no reason to think that such contents of experience are non-conceptual. McDowell 
clearly identifies the notion of a recognitional capacity in the following: 
“We can ensure that what we have in view is genuinely recognizable as a 
conceptual capacity if we insist that the very same capacity to embrace a colour 
in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of the experience itself. In 
the presence of the original sample, ‘that shade’ can give expression to a 
concept of a shade; what ensures that it is a concept, what ensures that thoughts 
that exploit it have the necessary distance from what would determine them to 
be true, is that the associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a 
short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used also in thoughts about what 
is by then the past, if only the recent past. What is in play here is recognitional 
capacity, possibly quite short-lived, that sets in with the experience.” (1994a: 
57) 
McDowell clearly not only considers a recognitional capacity to be a capacity to re-
identify the same object on different occasions, he also thinks that it could also be 
exhibited in a short time-period. Moreover, why must unreliable re-identification imply 
the non-conceptual character of experience? As I quoted Brewer’s notion of a context-
dependent concept in section V-3, the semantic value of the demonstrative concept is 
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given by its detailed context (this is why contextual features become varied as fineness 
of grain increases). Hence, the duration of the recognitional capacity will shorten as 
contextual features become varied. But a short duration of the recognitional capacity 
does not imply the impossibility of that same capacity. 
Another problem in Kelly’s account arises here because there is no given number of 
times that the subject needs to successfully re-identify the object. It does not seem like a 
few failures of re-identification would entail that experience has non-conceptual content. 
If this is correct, why is the re-identification condition required for possessing 
demonstrative concepts? When referring to, or denoting something, using 
demonstratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’, there is no reason to think that such demonstratives 
would always refer to the same object when used in a different context at a later time. 
Moreover, a subject could mistakenly re-identify an object for some reason. As non-
conceptualists point out, if a demonstrative concept is context-dependent, why is it 
always applied to the same object even if its original context ceases to exist? Kelly does 
not seem to pay sufficient attention to this issue. But if this is the case, the re-
identification condition is not necessary for possessing demonstrative concepts, and 
hence, success or failure in re-identifying the object does not causally affect the 
conceptual character of experience. 
Moreover, in the experiment, Kelly has to show that the subject could discriminate 
between different perceptual experiences without recognitional capacities in some cases. 
Recognitional abilities have to be accompanied by discriminative abilities, meaning that 
the two types of abilities are inseparable. If we can suppose that there is a discrimination 
ability but not a recognitional ability, then the expressions ‘this green’ and ‘that green’ 
would be meaningless, empty expressions. Thus, Kelly’s claim about recognitional 
abilities is a non sequitur. In the next section, I consider why we should reject the view 
that only the re-identification condition can be considered a constraint upon concept 
possession by regarding an imagined case, known as Susie’s case, as suggested by 
Chuard (2006).  
  
V-5.2.b. Chuard on Kelly’s Argument 
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I said that Kelly’s argument does not adequately explain the reliable ratio of correct to 
incorrect reidentifications of the same object. Here I consider another case, called 
Susie’s case. (Chuard 2006). This case suggests that a subject can have conceptual 
content by using perceptual demonstratives even though she is unable to re-identify the 
same object at a later time.  
Chuard (2006) objects that Kelly confuses demonstrative with sortal concepts. As such, 
he thinks that Kelly restricts the conditions for possessing demonstrative concepts to the 
re-identification condition alone. Chuard expresses the re-identification condition 
developed by Kelly (2001b: 403) as follows: 
 “(R) If a subject S possesses a concept C, S must be able to re-identify 
different objects, O1, O2, …, On, which fall under the concept C.” (2006: 167) 
He then rephrases (R) to give a more detailed description:  
 “(R’) If a subject S possesses a concept C for a property f, S must be able to (i) 
identify some object O as f at time t; (ii) to identify some object O’ as f at time 
t+1; and (iii) to identify f at t+1 as the same property f as at t.” (2006: 170)  
Chuard argues that Kelly equivocates demonstrative and ‘sortal’ concepts without any 
basis for doing so (2006: 179). That is to say, Chuard believes that (R’) is a necessary 
condition for the re-identification condition because the problem stems from the view 
that ‘these notions are equal’. Moreover, Kelly does not explain why these two different 
notions are equal. This is why Chuard thinks that Kelly’s claim is based on a false 
premise. But if this is so, why does Chuard think Kelly confuses demonstrative concepts 
with sortal concepts? Chuard thinks that two conditions determine sortal concepts.108
 
The first of these is that the subject is able to use the concept even though this usage is 
under the condition that any instance of the sortal concept does not appear around the 
subject. The second requires that the subject is able to know the criteria for whether any 
given object falls under that concept. Chuard also claims that Kelly’s argument is based 
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  Chuard borrows these conditions from Campbell (2002: 61ff).	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upon the connection between “(a) possession of a concept, (b) knowledge of the things 
which fall under the concept, and (c) the capacity to re-identify such things” (2006: 178). 
He thinks that if we can identify a new instance of a property f as falling under a concept 
C, then we can possess C for f. Therefore, it is not determined by “whether we can re-
identify any instances as the very same objects we have previously perceived before” 
(2006: 182). 
Chuard suggests another possible case that is similar to Kelly’s experiment. In this case, 
the subject, ‘Susie’, is also unable to re-identify the same object that she initially 
perceived. She cannot re-identify the original object by its characteristic features, such 
as colour, shape, or location. Yet when that object stood alone in Susie's perceptual field, 
she was able to form a demonstrative concept that successfully referred to it. The 
following thought experiment is designed to prove that a subject is able to have 
perceptual experience conceptually using a perceptual demonstrative without then re-
identifying the same object at the later time109: 
“A stone from outer space suddenly lands on Susie's desk. She has never seen 
anything like it before. Its colour, insofar as it seems to have one, looks 
completely different from any colour Susie might have experienced in the past; 
and likewise for its shape. She focuses her perceptual attention on the stone. As 
a result, she can point at it (or at some of its properties). When her colleagues 
ask Susie "What is that?" (pointing at the mysterious stone), she is perfectly 
capable to understand their question, even if she is unable to answer. Likewise, 
they understand what Susie means when she says "Why is this on my desk?” 
[…] More extra-terrestrial stones appear on Susie's desk (at a later time). Each 
stone looks slightly different from the first stone—they seem to be 
chromatically and geometrically different, although Susie cannot quite say how. 
Susie has a careful look around her desk, looking minutely at each stone and its 
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  In this particular example, Chuard tries to show that ‘it seems possible that a subject 
forms a demonstrative concept for an object without being able to later re-identify that 
object’ (2006: 185).	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properties. Suddenly, due to the amount of new stones on her desk, Susie finds 
herself unable to tell which stone appeared first. Despite their differences, they 
all look more or less the same to her. And because of their sheer number, she 
cannot even recall the location of the first stone—or its colour or shape. And so, 
Susie is unable to re-identify which stone it was that first appeared on her desk.” 
(2006: 183–185) 
In this scenario, Chuard claims that we cannot say that Susie did not have a 
demonstrative concept of the stone when it first appeared on her desk, even though she 
could not re-identify the first stone after the new ones appeared on her desk. In this way, 
we can have a demonstrative concept of an object even though we cannot re-identify it 
after some time has passed. 
There is also linguistic evidence that Susie and her colleagues form demonstrative 
concepts for the extra-terrestrial stone: they communicate using demonstrative 
expressions like ‘this’ or ‘that’ to refer to the stone. As I argued in section V-5.1, 
knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative requires understanding it, as Campbell 
has pointed out. The fact that they seem to understand one another suggests that they are 
able to grasp the thoughts expressed by such demonstrative expressions. And it seems 
natural to suppose that such thoughts clearly involve demonstrative concepts. What else 
would Susie’s utterance ‘What is that?’ express? 
In the next section, I respond to Heck’s criticism of demonstrative concepts. 
  
V-5.3. Responses to Heck 
Heck and Levine argue that ostensibly or linguistically demonstrating with 
demonstrative concepts does not prove the existence of them in perception. Perception 
must be prior to demonstrating, and as such they claim that demonstrativism is a 
causally mistaken argument. This raises the problem of inaccessible contents in 
experience if we allow that the use of demonstratives is a type of A-consciousness 
because perceptual demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ are not able to capture the 
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phenomenal character that is represented in perception.110 That is to say, while the non-
conceptualists (namely, Peacocke and Kelly) that I have examined in this chapter so far 
consider the use of perceptual demonstratives as a subject’s capacity that activates at the 
personal level of experience, Heck and Levine distinguish mere perception from a 
particular range of experience where we are able to entertain perceptual demonstratives. 
So, there could be perceptual contents that are not engaged with any type of conceptual 
capacities from the beginning to the personal level of experience.  
As we have seen in section V-4.3, Heck’s criticism of McDowell is based on a causal 
explanation of the relationship between demonstrative concepts and perceptual 
experience. Of course, as he admits, McDowell could respond by just “denying the 
causal (or explanatory) intuitions upon which it rests” (Heck 2000: 492). In fact, Brewer 
(2005) insists that we should look for a constitutive explanation, not a causal explanation 
that requires the priority of experience. He says: 
“On the conceptualist view, experience of a colour sample, R, just is a matter of 
entertaining a content in which the demonstrative concept “that shade” figures 
as a constituent.” (2005: 221; See also: Brewer 2011) 
However, Heck consistently claims that the conceptualist must explain why perceptual 
experience makes demonstrative concepts useable, even if they understand the 
relationship in non-causal terms. However, he does not mention specifically what a non-
causal explanation would be. He simply says: 
“There is a perfectly good, noncausal sense in which my having such an 
experience makes the concepts available to me: I would not have them but for 
having it.” (2000: 493) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Campbell (2006) also pointed out this problem. However, what I want to focus on in 
Campbell’s argument is that there is the possibility that subjects can think about 
representational contents even if their ability to use demonstratives precludes them from 
experiencing all of the phenomenal characters initially represented in their perceptual 
states.	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In this sense, there is no particular reason why we take the causal relationship between a 
demonstrative concept and its experience seriously. We can find a reason for not taking 
this kind of causal relationship seriously if we adopt McDowell’s view about the content 
of experience and those beliefs that it produces.  
McDowell (1994a) argues that the perceptual-experiential has a passive character, 
whereas belief content has an active character. He regards both the passive capacity and 
the active capacity as part of the same conceptual capacity. We can take this view to 
explain how ‘having perceptual experience’ means ‘possessing demonstrative concepts’ 
or ‘the possibility of use of perceptual demonstratives’. Subjects use demonstrative 
concepts passively in perceptual experience,111 whereas they use them actively in 
composing belief.112 This seems to explain the ‘sufficient distance’ that Heck demands 
of conceptualists. First, the fact that we can compose belief from perceptual experience 
arbitrarily shows that a demonstrative concept in experience can be distinguished from a 
demonstrative concept in belief. The content of perceptual experience is passively given 
to us, and we can evaluate whether or not we will compose a belief from that content. If 
a subject regards the conceptual content of perceptual experience as a reason for belief, 
then she may have a perceptual belief about that content. Hence, a content of perceptual 
experience and a content of the correlative perceptual belief, even if both share the same 
demonstrative concept, could have a different kind of relationship. That is, the former 
plays the role of a reason for the latter. If the content of perceptual experience is non-
conceptual, then there is no way to set up a reasonable relationship between the content 
of experience and the possession of demonstrative concepts, at least in relation to the 
question ‘why does a certain non-conceptual content ground a certain demonstrative 
concept?’ 
However, non-conceptualists who sympathize with Heck may have a question about the 
above explanation. Although there is sufficient epistemological distance between 
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  This is quite clear if we consider that we cannot garner contents of perceptual 
experience arbitrarily.	  
112	  Whether or not we can take an object as it appears depends on us.	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perception and belief, it is an undeniable fact that whilst an experience of a particular 
shade might allow a subject to judge ‘that shade is pretty’, it does not further entail that 
the demonstrative concept ‘that shade’ figures in its content. This may show that 
demonstrativism is not helpful for bridging the gap between perceptual representation 
and perceptual judgment. If we accept this perspective, then concepts that constitute the 
content of perceptual experience must directly relate to the perceived object. And if this 
is so, then without mediums like non-conceptual contents, it becomes impossible to 
understand how concepts might be reasonably related to perceptual objects directly.  
How do conceptualists solve this issue? In the next section, I consider the results of the 
discussions of section V-5 alongside a characteristic feature of perception (viz. 
discrimination ability) in order to answer the above issue, and to show that perception 
might involve conceptual engagement.  
  
V-6. Discrimination Ability of Perception 
In this section, I argue that perception, including the subpersonal states of mere seeing, 
entails at least one conceptual capacity that is slightly different from the three major 
types of conceptual capacities, and moreover, that this possibility can be easily 
explained by the contextual character of perceptual content which derives from the role 
of demonstrative concepts in the expository perspective. 
Most of the non-conceptualists that we have examined in this thesis assert the non-
conceptual character of the subpersonal level of experience, such as the contents of 
unconscious states. They argue that the contents of those states are neither represented 
by a conceptual capacity nor graspable using concepts that the subject typically 
possesses. But this tendency shows that they sometimes treat perception as mere seeing 
or a type of visual response, and treat the state of mere seeing as an aspect of full 
perceptual experience. That is to say, what they focus on in terms of the non-conceptual 
character of experience is not very different from what we call mere visual response 
rather than conscious visual experience, and thus, they treat the contents of visual 
processing as if it might be the content of experience.  
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The fineness of grain argument also displays the same tendency in that it suggests that 
perception is non-conceptual because we are not depending on concepts that we possess 
in order to have fine-grained contents of experience. Conceptualists also concede that 
perception is different from mere seeing. Here, I do not attempt to argue that perception 
is something entirely different from ‘mere seeing’. I would like to suggest, instead, that 
‘mere seeing’ or ‘visual response’ is one of the processes that constitute experience.   
Again, I agree with the non-conceptual character of perception when considered without 
the expository perspective. However my criticism of this view is that we may find how 
perception is possible by taking the functional perspective, but we may not find what is 
really represented without considering the expository perspective on perception. 
Meanwhile, I have shown that we need to consider the two perspectives on experience in 
order to evaluate the conceptual character of experience, through examining particular 
types of non-conceptual accounts ― UPC and SV types ― from chapters II to IV.  If I 
am right, then the reason for taking the two perspectives on experience is that having a 
representational content in experience could be possible only when all the processes of 
experience are successfully performed. And these could be seen by taking the two 
perspectives on experience, that is to say these could be explained in two different ways. 
One is ‘how it works’, another is ‘what it has’. Hence these processes are required in 
order for perceptual experience to have representational content, but they do not 
constitute the contentful experience. ‘The content of experience’ is not just content at a 
particular stage of the visual process; rather, it is the outcome of all the stages of vision. 
This idea is clearly seen in Marr’s computational theory of vision, even though this 
theory has been used to support UPC type non-conceptualists who believe that there 
could be perceptual content in a subpersonal state. If we carefully consider a hidden 
implication in Marr’s theory, we may find that we get clear representational content of 
experience only from the successful performance of all the stages of experience. That’s 
because it shows that the information of the lower stage is successfully delivered to the 
higher stage without anything being lost. And this would then show how the 
discrimination ability works in the lower level, and also how the information, which is 
discriminated, is secured from the sub-personal to personal levels of experience.   
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Marr’s reason for attempting to specify visual representation as the three levels of 
computational processes about the objective world is to explain the process of how light 
sensitivity produces visual representation: The first level (two-dimensional sketch) → 
the second level (21 2 D sketch) → the last level (three-dimensional images) (1982: 36). 
At the first level, the eye and brain represents only the difference between brightness and 
darkness of the object; the second level has only retino-centric coordinates, and if the 
process successfully goes on to the last level, a perceiver is able to recognise the object 
of perception by comparing previous information about the object that she has. We can 
then confirm what is represented (i.e. representational content) at the last level even 
though Marr explains each level is able to represent something differently from the other 
levels as an optical image.  
What I want to address here is that visual representation does succeed only if all three 
levels are active, i.e., it is successfully reached at the last level. It is then good enough to 
say that a subject of perception could get clear (not-confused) representational content of 
experience. That is to say, the subject is able to have a representational content that she 
can clearly describe using relevant concepts (including perceptual demonstratives) in the 
personal level if the perceptual processes are all active. Likewise, perceptual information 
at each level is developed by passing through the various processes that are operative at 
each level. However, we are not able to confirm what is in the lower levels because 
those do not allow conceptual engagement (since we can only take the functional 
perspective on experience about these levels). So we might be able to know how these 
levels process perceptual information. On the contrary, we can only confirm the content 
of the final level by taking the expository perspective on experience because it is this 
level that allows for conceptual engagement. The important point is that the perceptual 
information at each level is not entirely distinct from that at the other levels, and is 
getting sophisticatedly shaped and developed throughout the processes. The information 
is processed without any conceptual engagement at the lower levels, but it is processed 
with conceptual engagement at the final level. Hence, the perceptual information of the 
early stage (e.g. 21 2 D sketch) is included in the content of the later stages, and the 
process is one of content becoming richer without anything being lost.  
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From this perspective, I also claimed that non-conceptual perception is possible, but that 
there is no non-conceptual content of experience. If this is correct, what is the basis for 
the rejection of all non-conceptual content?  
 
V-6.1. How Can We Prove that Sub-Personal States Entail a Conceptual Capacity? 
It might be possible that the non-conceptualist who considers only the functional 
perspective on experience (e.g. the early visual stage, subpersonal states, and even mere 
seeing) would exclude the expository perspective on experience altogether and say that 
we may prove the existence of non-conceptual content of perception due to the fact that 
perception occurs without conceptual engagement. Of course we do not describe all of 
the perceptual experience that we undergo – countless numbers of non-described 
perceptual states indeed do occur in our lifetime. Consequently, there will always be 
some perceptual information that is not detected in the expository perspective, and this 
might be considered to be non-conceptual content in those states. Because of this, a 
subject of perception has the ability to conceptually engage with the perceptual 
information that is processed at the lower levels as elements of Marr’s final level of 
representation in his computational theory of vision, even if they do not in fact exercise 
this ability in many cases.  
Meanwhile, the debates about the conceptual or non-conceptual character of experience 
we have examined until now focus on ‘whether we represent a perceived object 
conceptually’ or ‘whether we are able to explain the content of perception conceptually’. 
But now this may be adapted to ask instead, ‘how we can prove a perception entails a 
conceptual capacity’. This is the main issue that the advanced conceptualism just 
described should respond to.   
I will now explore one characteristic feature of experience in order to develop this 
advanced conceptualism. This is the discrimination ability of perception. The purpose of 
this section is to show that a certain type of conceptual capacity exists in perception 
through examining this discrimination ability. Doing this also establishes the conceptual 
character of both the personal level and the subpersonal level of experience. How is it 
possible?  
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It will help to carefully re-examine the three levels of visual representation that Marr 
suggested. Perceptual information at the first and second levels are obtained as certain 
features of the environment are discriminated from their surroundings, even though a 
subject of perception may not be consciously aware of them. This information is quite 
limited (only representing the difference between brightness and darkness of the object) 
at the first level; but it becomes more detailed and developed as it passes through the 
second and the third levels. The point is that vision represents the information as a 
discrimination of items in the environment even at the first level, and this discriminated 
information is getting more sophisticatedly and clearly represented without being lost at 
the higher level.113 Finally, the developed information which has passed through these 
processes in the final level will allow the conceptual engagement that recognizes and 
classifies the perceived object. This information, which passed through the three levels 
of representation, is not new information from the first level and the second level, rather, 
I would say that it is a sophisticated content which is successfully derived from the first 
and the second levels. As such, this discrimination ability functions automatically and 
unconsciously, so we are able to have discriminated information such as the brightness 
in the lower level. And we are able to get more developed representational content in the 
higher level based on the discriminate contents from the lower level. The content of the 
highest level is the one that potentially allows for conceptual engagement.  
In this respect, perceptual information about the object at the lower level (e.g. 
subpersonal mental states) is different from that at the higher level (e.g. personal level), 
but it is included in information at that level. So the process is one of acquiring richer 
content. Therefore, they are related contents if the perceptual representation process is 
successfully performed. If so, we can then confirm what has been discriminated in the 
higher level, and this entails that the discrimination ability was activated successfully at 
the lower level. We can understand the discrimination in the subpersonal mental states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 This is the absolutely fundamental aspect of Marr’s account of vision, viz., the 
computational structures of vision and the environmental information that needs to be 
hard coded into them, which then allows the visual system to move from information at 
one level to information at the other.   
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as representational content if and only if the process of representation at all levels is 
successfully performed. And this is how a subject might perceptually represent 
information even though they do not possess any relevant concept at all.  
  
V-6.2. Discriminaiton Ability as Receptivity 
McDowell (1994a: 9) argues that experience is not only constituted by sensible 
information as an operation of receptivity but is also structured by a conceptual capacity, 
such as the operation of spontaneity. Receptivity could be a type of perceptual 
mechanism that activates without the three major types of conceptual capacities, so I 
have conceded that it could be non-conceptual because its representational contents 
could occur without a subject’s conceptual engagement just in case there is no 
spontaneity. McDowell also says that “we need a conception of experiences as states or 
occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to 
spontaneity, in operation” (1994a: 23). However, this does not mean that an empirical 
thought or belief is obtained after our conceptual capacities are exercised on a non-
conceptual content of experience and that we firstly get non-conceptually represented 
content through perception; secondly our conceptual capacities are working on the 
contents; and finally, conceptual contents are obtained through this process. Rather, 
what McDowell addresses is how conceptual capacities are actualised in experience, for 
example, how spontaneity is actualised in receptivity. Therefore, the co-operation of 
spontaneity and receptivity constitutes the content of experience. This is a typical 
conceptualist thought. 
I have been developing a very similar kind of conceptualism, but I do not agree that both 
receptivity and spontaneity operate at the same time in experience, because having 
representational content via perception is possible without the operation of spontaneity; 
so there is no such co-operation at the stage of receptivity. In this sense, my arguments 
are in line with the non-conceptualist’s perspective about the non-conceptual character 
of perceptual states. What I argued is that an ability to access or evaluate the content of 
perception is a conceptual capacity, even though perception could occur without any 
conceptual engagement. Therefore, the content of one aspect, at least, could be 
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conceptual. This is the whole process of experience that I have described and developed 
until now. And I have discussed how the non-conceptualist might be mistaken in 
understanding the conceptualist notions of concepts, experience, and perceptual contents, 
or alternatively, how they rely upon different definitions of these notions. But the 
traditional view of conceptualism still needs developing because there is still the 
problem that the non-conceptual character of perception (in its subpersonal state) could 
still cause the non-conceptual character of both the contents of a perception and the 
personal level of experience ― e.g., the possibility of the coexistence of inaccessible 
and accessible content in a subject’s conscious experience. And I think that 
conceptualists need a stronger version of conceptual character still, which could satisfy 
different notions of experience, concepts, and perceptual contents, which are shared by 
conceptualists and non-conceptualists. 
To do this, I want to turn to the following argument from McDowell: 
“The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity. […] It is not 
that they are exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity. We 
should understand what Kant calls “intuition”—experiential intake—not as a 
bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state 
that already has conceptual content.” (1994a: 9) 
Now, let us reconsider McDowell’s suggestion that the ability to discriminate between 
particulars is the characteristic feature of demonstrative concepts. If subjects are able to 
discriminate a target object from others using demonstrative concepts, then both the 
content of their experience and the description of that content, containing demonstrative 
concepts must be conceptual. Here the ability to use demonstrative concepts is closely 
related to the discrimination ability as a type of a conceptual capacity. The reason we 
can pick out a particular feature of a certain object is that the feature is clearly 
discriminated (as it is represented) from other features of the objects, and we have the 
ability to discriminate all the different features of such objects ― this  does not also 
require us to entertain the three major types of conceptual capacities. Hence, we may use 
demonstrative concepts to refer to a particular feature, e.g. ‘this shade’, that is 
distinguishable from other features such as ‘that shade’ even though we do not possess a 
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more sophisticated concept of the former. Both conceptualists and non-conceptualists 
may be sympathetic to the view that perception provides us with these discriminable 
properties of objects. However, the problem is whether we are able to find conceptual 
character within this discrimination ability. Now I question, how does this 
discrimination ability form thoughts or beliefs?  
  
V-6.3. The Conceptual Character of the Discrimination Ability 
Armstrong (1968), in his A Materialist Theory of the Mind, argues that visual properties 
such as colours, sizes, shapes, etc., are the contents of immediate perception, that form 
the basis of inferences to more conceptually complex beliefs. He says that: 
“We see immediately that there is a thing having certain visual properties 
before us, and […] this, by an automatic and instantaneous inference, produces 
the further belief that there is a cat’s head or a sheet of paper before us. It is 
only the visual properties of things that can be immediately perceived by the 
eyes.” (1968: 235)114 
But what makes him think such a narrow class of visual properties exhaust the 
perceptual experience of non-conceptual creatures who are incapable of forming more 
complex beliefs? Non-conceptual creatures such as birds can distinguish cats from dogs 
on the basis of vision alone, so it is plausible to say that they see cats. It does not follow 
that being a cat is a visual property, only that we theorists of vision can tell from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Armstrong (1968) distinguishes mediate from immediate perception in order to reject 
the premise that infants and animals do not have concepts. According to him, mediate 
perception forms inferential beliefs while immediate perception forms non-inferential 
beliefs. I do not discuss these distinctions in depth here. For more details about this 
distinction and a discussion of non-human animal concept possession, see Fish (2010: 
59–62). Here I want to focus on the idea that visual properties have a particular 
conceptual character by which we undergo experiences of them and form beliefs about 
them; hence content constituted by those visual properties is conceptual.	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bird’s behaviour that being a cat is distinguishable on visual grounds alone. This is 
entirely consistent with the ability to visually discriminate cats being dependent upon all 
sorts of contingent environmental features.115 At the personal level, discriminating cats 
may be prior to discriminating the above-mentioned visual properties, such as colours, 
sizes, and shapes. For example, the things placed on my desk, such as a rectangular 
keyboard, a twelve-inch monitor, and a red coffee cup, are discriminated by the visual 
properties of each item registered in the early stages of the visual processing even if 
those are not part of the content from the expository perspective. I may form the 
perceptual belief that ‘this cup I perceive stands a short distance away from the book on 
my desk’ without forming a belief about the visual properties of those items. Or I can 
have these beliefs at the same time. Armstrong tells us that:  
“Beliefs involve concepts. Acquiring the belief that a particular object is red 
involves possession of the concept of red. Possession of the concept entails a 
general capacity of the perceiver, in at least some set of circumstances, to 
differentiate between things that are red and things that are not red.” (1968: 339)   
Here Armstrong defines concepts that form beliefs in terms of an ability to discriminate 
one from another according to its properties. This can be applied to the discrimination 
ability, demonstrative concepts, and contexts, which we have previously examined. We 
may know that a cup is different from a book by observing their visual properties, and 
may form the minimal belief that ‘this is different from that’ even if we do not possess 
concepts for a cup and a book. And we may automatically form a belief ‘this is 
discriminable from that’ that is solely dependent on the context in which the objects are 
involved rather than their visual properties. We could form such contextual beliefs 
obtained by the discrimination ability before we form a belief about the phenomenal 
character (visual properties) of the perceived object. Hence we may have the same 
context-dependent content in both perception and its belief through the discrimination 
ability. This possibility is accorded the Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 It is plausible to think that the bird’s visual system has evolved to represent those 
contingent environmental features and this is what enables them to go from Marr’s first 
level to a perception of a cat.  
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understanding relational structure of perception and belief). There is no particular reason 
to believe that only phenomenal character represented in perception can be the content 
of experience; contextual properties identically represented in both the subpersonal level 
and the personal level of experience can be also the content of experience, and it is this 
also which allows a subject to potentially form inferential thoughts and beliefs.  
To make this clear, let us reconsider the honeybees experiment in Chapter II. I argued 
that it is difficult to know what is represented in the honeybees’ perceptual states 
because the assumption that perceptual contents are constituted by an enabling condition 
independently of the expository perspective on experience involves the three problems 
― the problem of causal relation between a subject and an object, misinterpretation of 
intentional causation, and misunderstanding of the term ‘recognition’. Because of these 
problems, I argued that we are not able to confirm what perceptual contents the 
honeybees have in their visual states, and hence, contents of the honeybees’ perception 
are not perceptual contents that we can evaluate as to the conceptual character of 
experience. Likewise, I also argued that the content of early vision suggested by 
neurophilosophers in Chapter IV is dependent on an enabling condition, and so, the 
content of the early vision may not be perceptual content that we can evaluate as to its 
conceptual character without considering the expository perspective. In this respect, I am 
not committed to the claim that taking the functional perspective on experience entails 
that there is a perceptual experience. However, the important point involved in both the 
honeybees case and the argument about early vision is that there could be the 
discrimination ability even though we adopt only the functional perspective on 
experience, but both arguments claim that there is no conceptual engagement involved in 
the discrimination. I indicated that Kelly makes the mistake of confusing demonstrative 
concepts with sortal concepts by using Chuard’s objection in section V-5.2. A 
demonstrative concept may be applied only to a context where its user and its target 
object are involved, whereas sortal concepts may be applied to other occasions as well. 
Of course, I do not want to argue that the use of perceptual demonstratives does not 
involve any sortal concept at all. What I want to argue is that the ability to use 
perceptual demonstratives is dependent on the discrimination ability in the context in 
which its user and the target object are involved. The discrimination ability leads a 
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subject to think of the object demonstratively and to form a belief about the context. 
Discrimination is a lower ability than the ability to deploy a concept for an object that 
specifies its features or to form a belief about it; nevertheless, we are also able to think 
of, and to form a belief about, discriminable features of objects via the discrimination 
ability operative in perception. 
 
V-6. 3. a. Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Seeing  
There may be a different view about defining discriminated content as conceptual 
content. Dretske (1969), for instance, demonstrated the possibility that discriminated 
contents can be considered as non-conceptual contents by dividing ‘seeing’ into two 
types: epistemic and non-epistemic seeing (to seen). According to him, non-epistemic 
seeing (seeingn) “is an ability whose successful exercise is devoid of positive belief 
content” (1969: 6). That is, the truth (not the expression or the utterance) of the 
statement ‘S seesn D’ does not entail any statement of the form ‘S believes P’. A 
characteristic feature of this sense of ‘to seen’ is that a subject S seesn D if and only if D 
is visually differentiated from its immediate environment by S. D is visually 
discriminated if and only if D looks in some way to S, but not necessarily looks as if it is 
something. To seen D, S need not to specify D, consider D to be something, or exploit 
one’s visual experience in any other way. So non-epistemic seeing is possible without 
any type of conceptual capacity possessed or deployed by the subject. Also, the subject 
does not need to consider any type of relationship between seeing and beliefs in order to 
enjoy seeingn. Hence, the discriminated object (or visual content) may be considered as 
non-conceptual content on Dretske’s account. 
However, this argument could involve two problems. First that non-epistemic seeing is 
something that is easily attributed to animals and infants, who can be said to see objects 
and events of which they have, or are not capable of having, no conceptual capacity 
whatsoever. For example, my cat is able to ‘see’ me working in front of the computer 
despite her being unable to see that I am in front of the computer — a capacity which 
requires the ability to entertain propositional thought or to possess relevant concepts 
such as computer, in front of, and so on. 
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If we apply the idea of non-epistemic seeing to human adults, it may not harm the idea 
of conceptualism. Of course, this does not mean that I deny there is such non-epistemic 
seeing that doesn’t require the subject to consciously specify or attend to what it is they 
see. I agree with the idea that non-epistemic seeing involves discriminated contents. And 
I agree that such discriminated content could be obtained without any conceptual 
capacity. However, Drestke’s account has a similar problem to that of the three potential 
problems involved in the experiments of conceptually unsophisticated creatures in 
chapter II. First, it is assumed that we can share the inner experience of animals through 
observation. Second, this type of argument seems to involve an excessive and arbitrary 
interpretation of a conceptually unsophisticated creature’s intentional attitudes, i.e., 
misinterpretation of intentional causation. Last, the distinction between epistemic and 
non-epistemic seeing is about the relationship between perception and belief. Perception 
sometimes does not entail any form of belief. But this does not mean that there is a 
specific reason to exclude a possibility of having a belief which is based on perception 
involving such discriminated (conceptually not-grasped) contents. This discriminated 
content can be constituted without the engagement of a conceptual capacity (in 
particular, Type-1 conceptual capacity (the capacity of spontaneity)): specifically, we 
are able to form a belief (even if both perception and belief do not share the same 
content) that is based on the discrimination ability operative in perception. Hence, we 
may able to operate Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding relational 
structure of perception and belief) in this case, i.e. discriminated contents can be a 
reason for operating Type-2 conceptual capacity. In this respect, I argue that perception 
is conceptual. 
 
V-6. 3. b. Is the Discrimination Ability Sufficient for Being a Conceptual Capacity? 
	  
There is a still problem involved in treating the discrimination ability as a type of 
conceptual ability because the former can ensure that the honeybees and the camera in 
Chapter II have a conceptual capacity that allows them to discriminate one target object 
from another. However, I do not want to discuss whether the bees and the camera are 
conceptual beings: Rather, I want to suggest that there must be an additional condition 
needed for treating the discrimination ability as a type of conceptual capacity because, if 
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we consider the discrimination ability to be sufficient for having a concept (as 
Armstrong (1968) argues), it threatens to set the standard for having concepts too low, 
so that any creatures, including mechanical devices such as the camera, that are 
considered to be able to discriminate have a conceptual capacity.  
To do this, we need to reconsider the notion of a context-dependent concept as suggested 
by Brewer (1999). According to Brewer, grasping a context-dependent concept depends 
upon the relationship between the subject and the object that composes its semantic 
value. In the cases of the honeybees and the camera, it is difficult to confirm whether 
they are able to compose the semantic value of the concept ― since the expository 
perspective is excluded ― even though they are able to detect the target objects (sugar 
water and faces) via the discrimination ability. That is to say, we are able to have a 
thought (including demonstrative thoughts) about the perceived object via discrimination, 
however, this is only possible when the discrimination engages with all the process of 
experience ― from the sub-personal to personal level. Although we just discount the 
expository perspective, the discrimination ability still leads us to compose the semantic 
value of the concept that we use in the context, and also leads us to possibly have the 
expository perspective on representational contents derived from discriminated features 
of the objects. For example, while I am working at my desk, I garner a great deal of 
visual information that I can sensibly discriminate. Through this, I have a perceptual 
experience of a thing, e.g. a book; and this can be a reason for my belief about the book, 
such as ‘the book is discriminable because it looks different from a cup’. In this case, we 
have conceptual contents when the discrimination offered by perception has the 
possibility of getting through to personal level of experience, where this could be 
confirmed when we take the expository perspective on experience.    
Because of this possibility, I have emphasized the importance of considering the two 
perspectives on experience, and this shows how we can have perceptual contents from 
visual information obtained by perception. In this sense, perception could involve at 
least one conceptual capacity that leads us to think of the object of perception 
demonstratively. If this is so, then not only does this idea of discrimination ability secure 
conceptualism’s central idea (namely that a content of perceptual experience must be 
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conceptual in order to be a reason for belief), but we also may find the conceptual 
character of experience when taking both the functional perspective and the expository 
perspective on experience.   
 
V-7.  Why Must It Be Non-Conceptual?	  
In this chapter, I examined two main ideas by exploring and examining demonstrative 
concept responses to the fineness of grain argument. These were associated with the two 
perspectives on experience, the consideration of which underpins the discussion in this 
thesis. First, in the case of the expository perspective on experience, if there is a fine-
grained content (whether or not it is conceptual) in a subject’s perceptual state, and if it 
can be grasped by a concept (including demonstrative concepts), how can that content be 
non-conceptual? Here I have discussed the content of perceptual experience. We may 
access such content through descriptions like ‘I see that red’ after perceptual experience 
or the perception of red occurs. If the object ‘that red’ may potentially be changed later 
into a proper concept (with which non-conceptualists would be satisfied) such as ‘scarlet 
red’, then there is no sufficient reason to accept non-conceptualism. I also suggested 
another reason why we need to consider the expository perspective on experience: 
namely, that experience not only refers to a particular stage or process of experience, it 
refers to all of the processes involved in perceptual experience. Hence the content of 
experience is conceptual because there must be conceptual engagement in the whole 
process of experience. Second, an experience’s conceptual character still exists even 
when we only consider the functional perspective. This can be thought of in two ways: 
First, we are able to demonstratively think about a perceived object using demonstratives; 
and second, we can conceptually perceive the difference in objects through using our 
discrimination ability. If this is correct, then a content of experience that is discriminable 
and demonstrable is wholly conceptual.  
In this way, we can also respond to (1) the problem of the coexistence of inaccessible 
and accessible contents in a conscious experience and (2) the problem of bridging the 
gap between perceptual representation and perceptual judgment. This is because both 
perceptual contents and perceptual representations are derived from their discriminable 
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features, hence, both  content and  representation involve discriminated properties via 
perception that we may think of (demonstratively), and form a belief about, the 
circumstance in which the subjects and  both contents are involved. This is the idea of 
advanced conceptualism that allows us to confirm the conceptual character of experience 
in both the functional and expository perspective. Therefore, experience has conceptual 
content. 
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Conclusion: Is There Any Type of Non-conceptual Content?	  
  
This thesis has focused on the debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists 
about experience and in particular colour experience, in order to demonstrate that we 
should understand perceptual content from both the functional and the expository 
perspective. Recognizing this allowed us to see how the conceptualist’s and non-
conceptualist’s notions of concepts, perceptual content and experience differ, and also 
allowed us to infer the existence of conceptual content in experience.   
This thesis started by briefly examining the three major types of conceptual capacities, 
and the types of non-conceptual contents of experience. By considering these, we found 
one major issue that formed the basis of the main argument of this thesis. This was that 
the difference between conceptualism and non-conceptualism could be characterized as 
a difference in the notions of a concept and an experience. Most conceptualists 
acknowledge that there are various aspects involved in the notion of a concept but define 
experience too restrictively. In contrast, non-conceptualists define concept very 
restrictively but define experience very widely, extending that notion from the sub-
personal to the personal level. On the basis of these findings, this thesis suggested that 
we need to consider the functional and the expository perspectives in order to satisfy 
both camps’ demands on the notions of conceptual character of experience. Using this 
idea, this research considers the non-conceptual arguments which show a very strong 
tendency to treat experience as being on a sub-personal to personal level in chapters II, 
III and IV. 
Chapter II considered an argument for non-conceptual content which focused on the 
colour perception of conceptually unsophisticated creatures such as animals and human 
infants, and stated that there could be non-conceptual content if it is true that those 
creatures could enjoy perceptual experiences. I argued that there is no way to confirm 
whether such creatures could have perceptual content through examining two famous 
experiments on non-conceptual beings’ perception of constant colour with honeybees 
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and human infants. I suggested that non-conceptualists (especially Peacocke (1998a, 
1998b. and 2001), Hurley (1998) and Bermùdez (1995 and 1998)) share the same 
perspective on such creatures with the experimenters of honeybees and human infants, 
and then criticised this perspective on the grounds that it leads us into three problems 
related to non-conceptual character of experience: namely, physical causality, intentional 
causation and the problem of recognition. In light of these problems, not only do such 
non-conceptual arguments fail to successfully establish the non-conceptual character of 
experience, they also fail to show what is truly represented in a non-conceptual 
creature’s perceptual state. Therefore, we may not confirm any conceptual or non-
conceptual content (or indeed, even the existence of perceptual content) within their 
perceptual experience. The reason for this conclusion is that the experimenters and non-
conceptualists are concerned with enabling conditions of colour perception and not the 
conditions for constituting colour experience. Of course, I agreed that perception 
sometimes occurs passively in the sense that is independent from a subject’s conceptual 
capacity. However, I raised the question: why is the content of perceptual experience not 
composed passively?   
In connection with the discussion in Chapter II, Chapter III began by examining colour 
physicalism, which is also concerned with an enabling condition of colour experience. 
Against this idea, I used the example of colour variation, i.e. that perceivers can have 
different perceptual content even though they encounter the same viewing conditions. I 
also critically analysed the arguments of non-conceptualists, which are strongly 
dependent on the physical properties of colours and assume that such colour variation 
can be solved within physicalism using an analogy and appealing to normality. I 
criticised this argument for three reasons. First, using an analogy could demonstrate a 
conceptual interpretation of a given stimuli, i.e. the possibility of conceptual engagement 
in experience, and therefore, it fails to prove the non-conceptual character of colour 
variation. Second, in the case of appealing to normality, I showed that there is no clear 
criterion for discriminating an illusion from genuine experience in the example of colour 
variation.  
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 I also claimed that there is no physical definition of pure colours (e.g., pure yellow) 
even though subjects are able to discriminate and to judge pure colours from other 
different colours (e.g. greenish yellow and reddish yellow); hence the physical approach 
to colour experience seems to be too much to ask of a standard perceiver who is able to 
perceive pure colours. Throughout these discussions, I claimed that the content of colour 
experience is not merely a response of visual neurons to the physical properties of 
colours, but rather, that it involves application of concepts to stimuli and objects since 
we are able to access the colour content with concepts in the personal level of experience. 
So, the conclusion drawn is that there must be conceptual engagement in experience. 
Chapter IV discussed neurophilosophers who considered the non-conceptual character of 
experience when taking the functional perspective on experience only. They also have 
the same tendency as the non-conceptualists in Chapters II and III. The difference is that 
these neurophilosophers divide experience into two stages: the early and late vision, and 
then claim that there could be non-conceptual content in the early visual stage that is not 
cognitively penetrable (given that the criterion of conceptual content is cognitive 
penetration). I accepted the coherence of this distinction but rejected the thought that 
there could be non-conceptual content in the early visual stage. Building on the 
discussions from Chapters II and III, I then argued that these philosophers make the 
same mistake as the non-conceptualists regarding the argument of early vision. I then 
considered Macpherson’s example involving the psychological experiment of shapes in 
order to show that early vision could be affected by a subject’s concept, i.e. there could 
also be conceptual engagement at the time of perception. However, I argued that this 
fact need not lead to the conclusion that sub-personal mental states always involves 
conceptual character since non-conceptual character can still exists at the occurrence of 
perception. Hence, I proposed that existing conceptualism must be re-considered in 
order to overcome this issue.  
Throughout the discussions in Chapters II, III and IV, this thesis has claimed that there 
could be two types of non-conceptual arguments. One concerned the notion that 
representational content must somehow involve all of the object-properties in a subject’s 
visual field. The typical arguments here are the richness argument and the fine-
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grainedness argument that claim we do not possess concepts that could grasp all of the 
representational content that experience conveys (the richness argument) or all of the 
properties that one particular object has (the fine-grainedness argument). These 
arguments acknowledge accessible representational content. By contrast, another 
concerns an enabling condition for perception, particularly a physical property such as 
SSRs, visual mechanism and sub-personal states in colour experience. It turned out that 
both arguments could be refuted by the conceptualist if the latter can support the key 
conceptualist premise that experience is a type of mental state which provides a reason 
for belief. Hence, the mental state could not be an experience unless its contents could 
be a reason for belief (Cf. Bengson, Grube & Korman 2011: 168 and 181). For this 
reason, if the content of the mental state is not able to produce a corresponding belief, 
then it cannot be perceptual content. In this respect, what conceptualists call perceptual 
content must be conceptual. 
Nevertheless, this study accepts the possibility of state non-conceptualism and accepts 
that we may be in a perceptual state without deploying any concepts at all because the 
occurrence of perception does not seem to be the result of the co-operation between 
receptivity and spontaneity. As McDowell insists:  
“We need a conception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive 
but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, in 
operation.” (1994a: 23) 
We can think about many cases where perception occurs passively without conceptual 
engagement from subjects or we can be in a perceptual state which has both 
conceptually accessible and inaccessible content. Also, there could be non-conceptual 
content in early vision (as Macpherson (2012 and forthcoming) holds) where there are 
cognitively penetrable states. There is no reason to deny that these cases are perceptual 
states even though their content does not correspond to belief content or can be 
represented without any conceptual engagement. As such, what this thesis focuses on is 
that we should acknowledge that such cases of perception exist, but we must still find 
the conceptual character of those states. Not only is this the main aim of this thesis, but it 
213	  
	  
is also a criticism of the shortcoming of the existing conceptualism that must be 
remedied. 
For this reason, Chapter V reconsidered the early debate between conceptualism and 
non-conceptualism, then discussed the fine-grainedness argument with demonstrative 
concepts alongside the non-conceptualist’s three rebuttals of this argument. This allowed 
us to build a notion of discrimination ability that makes us think about perceptual 
content. 
Through these discussions, I claimed that first, in the case of the expository perspective 
on experience, if there can be any possibility of content that could be engaged with a 
subject’s conceptual capacities (i.e., the possibility of conceptual engagement at the 
personal level of experience),  there is no reason for it to be called non-conceptual. I also 
insisted that we must consider this possibility because experience not only refers to a 
particular stage or a process of experience, it also refers to all of the processes of 
perceptual experience. Hence, we need to consider all of the perceptual content in the 
whole processes of experience in order to evaluate its conceptual character. . 
Second, I found that we may infer the existence of conceptual character even when we 
only consider the functional perspective on experience because subjects perceive the 
difference in objects through using a perceptual discrimination ability. Discriminating 
perception enables inferential thoughts about a context-dependent aspect of experience. 
Also, we are able to know what is represented in sub-personal mental states ― the 
existence of perceptual content in unconscious states, namely discriminated content. So, 
even though there is no spontaneity in receptivity, perception nevertheless provides us 
with discriminating representational content that allows us to have inferential thoughts 
about that content. For this reason I claimed that any content of experience that is 
discriminating or demonstrative is entirely conceptual. This is the contextual aspect of 
perception rather than the phenomenal character of objects represented in experience. 
Still, there is one more thing that this thesis does not sufficiently consider. This is CV 
type non-conceptualism. CV type non-conceptualists argue that a content of perception 
is not always the same as a content of the corresponding belief, and so, a subject’s belief 
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is not necessarily directly formed by the content of her perception. Hence, the content of 
perceptual experience can be non-conceptual. Regarding this issue, I agree that 
perception could operate without conceptual engagement. Hence, the main idea of 
conceptualism, namely that a content of experience must be conceptual in order to be a 
reason for belief, can be rejected. We could have belief content that differs from 
perceptual content, i.e. there could be perceptual content that is not a reason for 
perception-based beliefs. This was the main weakness of existing conceptualism. Also, I 
still doubt how the idea of discrimination ability as a conceptual capacity provides an 
adequate explanation of contradictory phenomena: for example, the waterfall illusion 
and a stick in water, because representation of a contradictory situation is not a simple 
phenomenon like the perceptual discrimination. 
Nevertheless, I think that there are two errors involved in this argument. First, the 
difference between perceptual content and the content of those beliefs that it produces 
does not imply the existence of non-conceptual content. Rather, we could have 
inferential thought elicited from perceptual discrimination separately from perceptual 
belief at the same time. Therefore, it is possible that perceptual contents can be 
conceptually grasped by a subject in inferential thought. Hence, this fact implies neither 
the non-conceptual content of experience nor the impossibility of conceptual 
engagement. What Crane and Heck show is just that we can have belief content that is 
different from experience. Second, ‘a single perceptual belief formed by only a single 
perceptual content’ is a premise in both Crane’s and Heck’s accounts. There is no reason 
to exclude the possibility that we could form at least one or more perceptual beliefs from 
a single perceptual state. For example, not only does the perceptual information about a 
cup in front of me involve visual properties such as ‘red’ and ‘round’, it also entails 
various contextual information such as ‘this is a short distance away from that’ or ‘half 
full’. It seems to me that neither Crane nor Heck considers such various contextual 
information, as well as the possibility of multiple beliefs being formed from it. Because 
of this Type-2 conceptual capacity (the capacity of understanding the relational structure 
of perception and belief) can be secured in such contextual relationships even though 
perceptual contents are not necessarily correlated with belief contents. This is another 
reason for developing a new type of conceptualism. 
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This dissertation tries to show that this new type of conceptualism is successful in 
confirming the conceptual character of experience, that it can build a bridge between 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism, and finally, that it can play an important role in 
future research regarding  various perceptual experiences that are not considered here. 
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